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Annex : Commission 1\Iemorandum to the Council on the maintenance of balanced economic growth. 
Note: 
This survey was completed around mid-November 1969.  As regards the most recent developments and where 
it has not been possible to take them into account because of the pace at which national statistics are prepared and 
the time it takes to publish the survey in five languages, the latest issue of the "Graphs and Notes on the Economic 
Situation in the Community" can usefully complete the information supplied here. 
2 I.  THE OVERALL SITUATION 
Economic  growth  in  the  Communi!)',  already  very  rapid  in  1968,  continued  to 
reflect the veritable boom that prevailed in 1969.  Never since the Common Market 
was  founded  have  production  a11d  employment risen  so  rapidly.  Real gross  Com-
munity product,  which from  1967 to  1968 had expanded by 6  %,  rose  some 7 % 
from  1968 to  1969,  bringing its total growth since  1957 to 85  %,  compared with 
corresponding  increases  of 63  % in  the  United  States  a11d  41  % in  the  United 
Kingdom. 
These  extremely  positive  figures  for  economic  growth,  however,  contrasted  with 
a  marked  deterioration  in  the  price  climate  and  a  considerable  tendency  for  the 
equilibrium  of  trade  and  payment relations  between  the  member countries  to  be 
upset.  This led the Governments of France  and Germany to change the parities of 
their currencies.  The French franc  was devalued by 11.11 % on 10 August 1969 and 
the German mark revalued by 9.29  % on  27 October. 
Overall demand expanded very rapidly in  1969, with the impetus coming more and 
more from internal demand.  The growth of visible exports to non-member countries 
was  nevertheless  again  very  high.  Towards  the  end  of the  year,  however,  there 
were signs of a distinct slowdown, due in particular to the weaker trend of exports 
to the United States and an  appreciable slackening in the expansion of deliveries to 
the United Kingdom.  Compared with 1968, the total value of Community exports 
to non-member countries was  11  % up. 
The  expansion  of  expenditure  on  consumption  gathered  speed  in  the  course  of 
1969.  Public  current  expenditure  on  goods  and services  rose  appreciably  in  most 
member  countries,  mainly  as  a  result  of  the  vigorous  increase  in  salaries,  and 
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spending by households expanded at an  unusually  vigorous rate,  owing  to  a  rapid 
rise  in disposable incomes and,  in some countries,  to a decline in the savings ratio. 
Taking the average  for  the full  year,  private consumers' expenditure was  probably 
11.5 % in value and 7 % by volume higher than a year  earlier. 
Internal  supply in  the  Community expanded very  vigorously  in  1969,  particularl'V 
during  the  first  half  of  the  year,  when  in  most  member  countries  it  was  still 
comparatively easy  for  the growth of production to keep up  with the expansion of 
overall demand.  Subsequently,  the growth of production  was  increasingly impeded 
by bottlenecks in technical capacity and by a severe shortage of labour.  This led to 
a further appreciable increase in the already heavy backlog of orders. 
The  index  of  the  Statistical  Office  of  the  European  Communities  shows  that 
industrial production expanded by more than  12  % from  1968 to 1969, compared 
with  8.7  % from  1967 to  1968.  \Vith demand  continuing  to  expand  vigorously, 
the declining  elasticity  ill  the  supply  of goods  and  production  factors  entailed an 
upward thrust of prices that tended to strengthen in the course of the year.  In the 
Community as a whole,  for instance, prices for capital goods rose 100 % faster than 
/rom  1967 to 1968, and the prices of goods  for  private consumption 50 % faster. 
The  mounting  pressures  on  the  markets  in  the  Community  can  be  seen  in  an 
unusually  sharp  rise  in  imports  from  non-member  countries.  In  terms  of  value, 
these imports were probably 17 %  higher than a year earlier.  Trade between the 
member countries  even expanded by almost one  third,  the highest rate  of increase 
ever registered in a single year since the Community was established. 
The Community's balance of visible trade with non-member countries, which in the 
previous year had sttll shown a surplus of $ 1 700 million, closed with a deficit in 
1969. 
Movements of long-term capital showed another heavy deficit.  On the other hand, 
the various bouts of currency speculation led until September to large-scale  inflows 
of  short-term  funds  into  the  Community,  particularly  into  Germany,  but a  large 
part left that country again  after the revaluation of the German mark. 
The official gross  gold  and  foreign  exchange reserves of the Community,  which in 
the full  year  1968 had fallen  by some $  1 800 million,  were up some $  2 500 mil-
lion in the first nine months of 1969; in October, however, they fell  again  sharply. 
Economic  expansion  in  the Community  will  remain  lively  in  1970.  The  trend of 
business  activity  throughout the  world  will  probably  be less  dynamic  than  in  the 
past  year,  so  the  rise  in  Community exports to the non-member countries can  be 
expected to slow down appreciably.  Domestic demand,  by contrast, should in most 
member  countries  continue  to  provide  very  considerable  stimuli  to  economic 
growth. 
Since  at  the end of 1969 the level  of orders  on  hand was  very  high,  gross  fixed 
asset formation  will still rise  vigorously for a while; later in the year,  however, the 
propensity to invest of enterprises may weaken distinctly.  As personal incomes are 
likely to go  on rising  at a lively pace,  private consumers' expenditure should main-
tain  its very  rapid  growth. With  the  degree  of  capacity  utilization  unusually  high  at  the  end  of  1969  and 
manpower shortages  very severe,  the growth  of production  in  1970  will probably 
be  considerably  smaller  than  in  1969.  A  less  uniformly  rising  trend  among  the 
elements of demand in some  member countries  may also  work in  the same direc-
tion.  All in  all,  the growth  of real  gross  Commu11ity  product from  1969 to  1970 
can  at the moment be estimated at  some 4.5 %. 
Given this outlook for  the trend of supply and demand,  prices are  likely to show 
a  further  vigorous  rise,  particularly  since  wage  costs  must be expected  to  go  up 
fairly  appreciably. 
Imports  will  maintain  their  very  rapid  upward  tendency,  leading  to  a  heavier 
deficit  on  the Community's balance  of trade.  Intra-Community  trade  will at  the 
same  time develop  along  l'ery  dynamic  lines,  although  growth  rates  will certainly 
not bl!  as  high  as  in  1969. 
5 A.  Balance sheet for 1969 
Prosperity  in  the  Community  increased  at  an 
unusually  vigorous  rate  in  1969.  Never  since 
the  inception  of  the  Common  Market  has  the 
rise  in  production,  real  incomes  and  the  stan-
dard of living  been so  rapid.  Real  gross  Com-
munity  product  expanded  by  7  %  and  the 
volume of private consumption per head of pop-
ulation by 6 %. 
These  extremely  pos1t1ve  figures  for  economic 
growth, however,  contrast with a marked dete-
rioration in the price climate and in the external 
equilibrium  of  the  various  member  countries, 
where  strains  in  the  business  situation  engen-
dered  an  inflationary  upward  thrust  of  prices 
or reinforced  it.  There were  in  addition  wide 
divergences  between their balance of payments 
trends,  particularly between those of Germany 
and of France.  These, however, were now due 
less  to  differences  in  the  level  of demand  pull 
in  the individual  countt.:ies,  but mainly  to the 
behaviour  of  transactors,  which  contributed 
powerfully  to  the  uncertainty  about  develop-
ments  in  the external purchasing power of cer-
tain  currencies.  The  trend of  prices  and  costs 
in the previous  years  was  certainly an  essential 
factor  in  this  development.  While  until  1966 
the trends  in  the various  Community countries 
had,  at least when looked at  over a number of 
years, been largely parallel, from  1967 onwards 
a  distinct  slowdown  in  the  rise  of  costs  and, 
particularly in Germany and Italy, a large meas-
ure  of  price  stability  contrasted  with  a  persis-
tent rise in other member countries, particularly 
France. 
The result was  that since  1968 there have been 
several  bouts  of  heavy  speculation,  entailing 
considerable  outflows  of  capital  from  France 
and a substantial inflow of money and capital to 
Germany. 
A fairly  detailed description of the measures of 
short-term  economic  policy  which  the  Govern-
ments of the countries concerned took to restore 
better internal and  external equilibrium can be 
found in Quarterly Surveys Nos.  1 and 2/1969 
on  "The  Economic  Situation  in  the  Commu-
nity", and in Part II of this Survey. 
In the end,  these  measures  were considered to 
be  insufficient  to  remove  the  imbalances  that 
had arisen  and,  in  particular,  to put an  end  to 
the hectic movements of  speculative funds.  On 
10  August  1969 the French Government there-
fore lowered the parity of the franc by 11.11 %. 
The  German  Government  in  its  turn  revalued 
the  German  mark  by  9.29  % on  27  October 
1969, following  the  temporary  introduction  of 
a system of floating  exchange rates. 
The  decisions  on  these  parity  changes  led  the 
Commission  and  the  Council  to  take  special 
measures in the framework of the common agri-
cultural  policy.  The  unit  of  account  for  the 
common  agricultural policy  was  left unchanged 
in  both cases.  However the Council,  acting on 
a  proposal  from  the  Commission,  authorized 
France on 12  August  1969  to  reduce the inter-
vention  or  buying-in  prices  fixed  in  units  of 
account by up to 11.11  r;i .  To ensure that this 
reduction  did  not  Lead  to difficulties  in trade 
with  the  other  member  countries,  the  French 
Government  was  authorized  to  grant  corres-
ponding  subsidies  on  imports  and charge  com-
pensatory  amounts  on  exports  of  the  relevant 
products.  Under  the  regulation  issued  by  the 
Council,  French prices  must be restored to the 
common level  at  latest by the beginning of  the 
1971/72  marketing  year;  where  possible,  ad-
justments must be made  even before, with due 
regard  to the  particular circumstances  affecting 
each  of  the  agricultural  products  concerned. 
There is no doubt that these measures constitute 
a major  departure from  the system of common 
agricultural prices.  For France  they were indis-
pensable if an  automatic upward adjustment of 
farm  prices  in terms  of  French francs  was  not 
to jeopardize the success  of devaluation  and  of 
the  accompanying  stabilization  measures.  The 
impact  of  an  immediate  automatic  adjustment 
on  the  cost  of  living  would  indeed  have  been 
such  that  there  was  an  unusually  great  danger 
of  the  wage  and  price  spiral  taking  another 
sharp turn upwards. 
For Germany,  where  an  automatic  adjustment 
of farm prices in terms of DM entails a substan-
tial loss of income for agriculture, it was agreed 
in  the  Council  of  the  European  Communities 
that  one  part  of  this  loss  of  income  will  be 
offset  from  Community  funds  while  the  other 
part  may  be  compensated  through  measures 
taken by the Federal Government.  Pending the 
adoption of the necessary legal  arrangements in 
7 the  Federal  Republic,  the  Federal  Government 
was  authorized  to  apply,  in  respect  of  certain 
agricultural products, compensatory measures at 
the  frontiers  during  a  transitional  period  that 
expires at the end of 1969. 
The latest events  in  the monetary  field,  which 
have  given  rise  to major problems  that  are,  of 
course,  not  confined  to  agriculture  alone,  but 
affect also most other economic sectors and prac-
tically  all  economic  transactions  between  the 
Member States, have  again  served to make one 
thing  very  clear:  customs  union,  the  common 
market in agriculture and free  movement of the 
factors  of  production,  particularly  capital,  can-
not in the long run be safeguarded if economic 
developments  and  economic  policies  fail  to fol-
low  sufficiently  compatible  lines. 
1.  The  world  economic  situation  in 
1969 
The  level  of  economic  actlvlty  in  the  world 
continued to rise rapidly in 1969.  The slacken-
ing  in  activity  and  in  the  trend  of import  de-
mand  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United 
States exerted considerably less  effect  than had 
been  anticipated;  in  particular,  the  expected 
shift  towards  a  better  balance  in  the  United 
States was very slow to materialize.  In addition, 
the  economic  upswing  in  the  other  industria-
lized  countries  generally  continued  at  a  rapid 
and in some cases  even faster pace;  in many of 
these countries, inflationary strains made  them-
selves  felt,  and  these  often  grew  more  severe 
during the year.  The particularly vigorous  eco-
nomic upswing in the Community also provided 
considerable  stimuli  to  world  trade.  In terms 
of value,  the  rate of expansion of world trade 
from  1968  to  1969  was  probably  12  % and 
therefore slightly higher than the 11  % achieved 
a year earlier. 
Business  activity in the United States expanded 
considerably,  though the pace  of expansion de-
clined distinctly as  the year advanced and infla-
tionary strains persisted.  There was little if any 
slowdown  in  the first  six  months,  despite  the 
more  restrictive  budgetary and credit  measures 
by  which  the  authorities  extended  the  action 
they had been taking since the summer of 1968 
in  an endeavour to curb growth.  Domestic de-
mand maintained its vigorous expansion, mainly 
as  a result of the behaviour of transactors who 
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anticipated inflationary price increases.  Private 
consumers'  expenditure  in  particular  rose  at  a 
lively pace,  and gross  fixed  asset  formation  too 
expanded rapidly.  Only in residential construc-
tion  and  stockbuilding  was  the  trend  less 
dynamic. 
Since  the middle of the year,  however,  the ma-
jor economic  indicators  have  pointed to  a  cer-
tain slackening of demand in money  terms  and 
to  a  stagnation  of  business  activity  in  several 
industries.  Retail sales have  scarcely risen since 
the summer;  investment in residential construc-
tion, increasingly hampered by the strains on the 
capital market, has  fallen  appreciably;  the  rise 
in  purchases  of  plant  and  machinery  and  in 
expenditure  on  industrial  building  appears  to 
have  weakened;  fixed  investment  plans  were 
repeatedly revised downwards by firms in 1969. 
Personal  incomes,  however,  showed  a  further 
rapid  rise  during  the summer, particularly  as  a 
result of increases  in public sector salaries  that 
took effect in July and August.  The expansion 
of  industrial  production  was  lively  until  July 
but in the following months the adjusted figures 
showed a decline.  Unemployment rose distinct-
ly  as  the  year  advanced;  the  unemployment 
rate, which at 3.3  % after seasonal adjustment 
had been down to a very low level in the first 
quarter,  rose  to  3  .5  % in  the  second  quarter 
and 3. 7  % in the third quarter. 
Although  the  growth  of  demand  in  terms  of 
money has of late slowed down, there has hard-
ly been any easing in inflationary strains.  Prices, 
particularly  those  for  industrial products,  con-
tinued to rise rapidly;  in the first nine months 
of the year, the consumer price index was 5.8 % 
above  the  average  for  1968.  The  inflationary 
tendencies  were also  clearly visible  in the way 
the  balance  of  trade  developed.  Even  though 
exports  expanded  appreciably  during  the  year, 
imports continued to grow  at such  a high !ate 
that  the  surplus  on  trade  should  have  fallen 
further than in the previous year. 
In the United Kingdom,  the economic  trend in 
1969  was  marked by  further  progress  towards 
internal and external equilibrium.  Under the in-
fluence  of the restrictive measures taken in No-
vember  1968  and  under  the  1969/70 budget, 
consumer  demand  in  money  terms  remained 
virtually unchanged in the first half of the year; 
in  real  terms  it  even  declined.  In  the  third 
quatter, however, ~it revived again, if only slight-ly.  Demand for consumer durables in particular 
remained low.  Encouraged by good business in 
the export--orientated  industries,  investment by 
enterprises expanded briskly, following  a period 
of stagnation at the beginning of the year caused 
by  the  withdrawal  of  certain  tax  concessions 
at  the  end  of  1968.  Apart  from  the  effects 
produced by an increase in certain indirect taxes, 
the rise  in  prices  was  fairly  modest. 
The  main  factor  influencing  the  expansion  of 
production  was  a  slowdown  in  the  growth  of 
consumption;  the  advance  was  particularly 
weak in the first  half of the year.  For the full 
year,  the  growth  in  real  GNP may  well  have 
been  only  some  2  %.  Industrial  production, 
which had declined in the first quarter, has since 
been  expanding  only  slowly;  its  growth  from 
1968  to  1969 probably did not exceed  3.5  %. 
This fairly weak trend went hand in hand with 
a distinct increase in unemployment.  Seasonally 
adjusted,  the number of unemployed registered 
at  the  end  of  the  summer  was  approximately 
586 000, i.e.  2.5  % of the working population, 
as  against 506 000 in January. 
The country's external equilibrium  took a turn 
for  the better.  The balance  of trade improved 
steadily  during  the  year,  largely  under  the  in-
fluence of the rapidly expanding exports.  There 
were  also  increasing  surpluses  on  invisibles; 
seasonally  adjusted,  the current  account  swung 
from  a  deficit  of  £  66  million  in  the  fourth 
quarter of 1968 into surpluses  of £ 18  million 
in the first, £ 75 million in the second and over 
£ 100 million in the third quarter of 1969.  The 
basic balance, which ha:d closed with deficits  of 
£  182  million  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  1968 
and £ 5.2 million in the first  quarter of  1969, 
in the second quarter of 1969 showed the large 
mrplus of £ 100 million. 
In  the  other  industrialized  countries  outside 
the Community,  economic  activity expanded at 
a lively pace in 1969.  The gross national prod-
uct  of  these  countries  as  a  whole  probably 
grew appreciably faster than in 1968.  Economic 
activity  was  stimulated  by  the  buoyancy  of 
export  demand,  particularly from  the Commu-
nity, and by the gathering momentum of domes-
tic  demand  as  the year  advanced.  In many  of 
these countries, this trend led to more and more 
obvious  inflationary  strains,  with  the  result 
that  the  authorities  had  to  take  restrictive 
measures. 
In Switzerland, expansion continued to be rapid. 
All components  of domestic  demand  developed 
along  more  dynamic  lines  than  in  1968.  As 
there has been a tendency for pressures to build 
up,  particularly  on  the  labour  market,  restric-
tive measures have been taken since  the middle 
of the year in the credit and budgetary field. 
In Sweden,  the  growth  of  real  GNP in  1969 
probably  reached  5  %,  compared with  3.5  o/r 
the  previous  year.  Investments  rose  rapidly, 
and private consumers'  expenditure was  stimu-
lated by a strong upward thrust of wages.  The 
faster  rise  in  imports  in  the  last  few  months 
has  induced a distinct tendency for  the balance 
of trade to deteriorate.  Credit policy was  tight-
ened up in  an  effort to reduce  the overheating 
and  stem  the  foreign  exchange  losses,  which 
were  partly  a  result  of  appreciable  exports  of 
capital. 
In Japan, economic expansion recovered its mo-
mentum  after  a  temporary  slackening  early  in 
the year;  for  the full  year,  it was  probably  at 
least as  vigorous as  in 1968.  The rise in export 
demand continued to be lively and the trend of 
investment was unusually dynamic.  In view of 
the inflationary pressures  on  the economy,  the 
authorities  took  restrictive measures  at  the  be-
ginning of September to contain bank liquidity. 
Canada  was  another  country  where  economic 
activity expanded vigorously  in  1969;  the real 
growth  of  GNP was  substantially  higher  than 
in  1968.  The  inflationary  strains  which  had 
been discernible in the preceding years persisted 
in 1969.  Prices and costs continued to rise at a 
lively pace  throughout the year  and imports re-
mained at  a high level.  To curb  the expansion 
of demand,  budget  policy  and  measures  in  the 
monetary  and credit field  were  gradually  tight-
ened up. 
In Spain, the growth of domestic demand accele-
rated vigorously  in the course  of the year.  In 
view of the  signs  of overheating that appeared 
in the summer and have since become more and 
more obvious, the authorities have taken various 
measures to curb activity. 
In Austria, economic expansion picked up again 
after  a  temporary  slowdown  at  the  beginning 
of the year that was  mainly  attributable to the 
influence  of  tax  measures.  For  the  full  year, 
real GNP is  likely to have expanded by 5.5 %, 
as  against  4.5  % in  1968. 
9 In Denmark,  economic  expansion in  1969  was 
distinctly  more  vigorous  than  in  1968;  real 
GNP  was  probably  5 %  higher  than  in  the 
previous  year,  despite  credit  limitations  that 
curbed investment. 
In Norway,  the growth of production, which had 
been weak in  1968, recovered at  the beginning 
of 1969 and maintained a rapid tempo through-
out the  rest of the year. 
The vigorous  demand from  industrialized coun-
tries  stimulated economic  activity  in  the devel-
oping  countries.  Although  imports  by  these 
countries  advanced  at  a lively  pace,  their  gold 
and  foreign  exchange  reserves  rose  further,  as 
their  exports  were  expanding  vigorously  in 
terms of value, partly thanks to rising prices on 
world markets. 
2.  Demand 
Total demand in the Community expanded very 
rapidly  in  1969;  the rate  of  growth was  even 
higher than in 1960, when it had been unusually 
vigorous. 
The  trend  of  exports  remained  very  dynamic. 
In year-to-year  terms,  the  expansion  of  visible 
exports to non•member countries was hardly less 
vigorous  than  in  1968,  despite  a  slack  period 
towards  the  end  of  1969;  in  terms  of  value 
they  probably  rose  by  some  11  %,  compared 
with 11.5  7r  a year  earlier. 
Exports from the Community to all other indus-
trialized countries maintained their lively expan-
sion in  1969.  It is  true that in 1969 deliveries 
to the United States, which had expanded at an 
Visible exports to  non-member countrtes 
(Values and %changes on preceding year) 
1
------
All non-member countries 
of \vhich : 
Industrialized countries  2 
including : 
United States 
EFTA 
United Kingdom 
Developing countries  3 
including : 
Associated overseas countries and territories 
Other countries  4 
1968 
Million 
u.a.1 
Full 
year 
1st 
quar-
ter 
2nd 
quar-
ter 
1969 
3rd 
quar-
ter5 
---~-------~------------
1 ,1,+ 
I 
35  290  3.5  + 21  +  9 
I 
22 873  + 11.5  +  2.5  + 21  + 10 
5 768  + 30.5  - 15.5  + 19  +  4 
11  217  +  7.5  +  7.5  + 17.5  + 13 
3 127  + 10  +  2.5  + 14  +  8 
9 309  + 12  +  7  + 19.5  +  8 
2 064  + 15.5  + 12  + 39.5  +  5 
3 108  +  8.5  +  3.5  + 28  +  2 
I 
I 
Full 
year5 
+ 11 
+11 
+  3 
+13 
+  8 
+11 
+ 17 
+ 10 
-------------------'-------
Source:  Statistical Office of the European Communities (SOEC). 
1  1 u.a.  =  1 unit of account =  0.888671  g of nne gold =  US $ 1 at the official exchange rate. 
2  Class 1 of the Standard Country Classification for Foreign Trade Statistics of the EEC. 
3  Class 2 of the Standard Country Classification for Foreign Trade Statistics of the EEC. 
4  Class 3 of the Standard Country Classification for Foreign Trade Statistics of the EEC, and other destinations. 
5  Commission estimates. 
10 unusually  vigorous  rate  in  the  previous  year, 
were  back  to  a  normal  tempo  of  growth  and 
even  showed  a distinct  tendency  to  weaken  in 
the second  half  of  the year.  The expansion of 
exports  to  the  United Kingdom  also  slackened 
appreciably.  The  high  level  of  activity  in  the 
other industrialized countries, however, allowed 
exports  from  the  Community  to  rise  consider-
ably. 
Exports to the developing countries, particularly 
the  associated  overseas  territories,  also  main-
tained  a  distinctly  expansionary  trend.  Lastly, 
sales  to  the  east  European  countries  also  rose 
more  vigorously  than  a  year  earlier,  following 
a  slowdown  at  the beginning of the  year. 
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Compared  with  the  previous  year,  the  rise  in 
internal demand  was  distinctly  more  rapid. 
As  in 1968, gross fixed asset formation was  the 
most dynamic element in this sector of demand. 
The average  increase  for  the  year was  16.5  % 
in value and 11  %  in real terms, compared with 
9  % and  6.5  % a year  earlier. 
Investment by enterprises in plant and machin-
ery  advanced  at  an  unusually  vigorous  pace. 
Provisional estimates suggest that from  1968 to 
1969 it may have risen by about 15  %,  which 
would be the highest rate registered since  1960. 
This  strong propensity  to  invest is  attributable 
to a number of reasons, prominent among which 
were the good sales  outlook, the growing pres-
sure on reserves of production capacity in most 
industries, the urge to rationalize, and the com-
paratively  favourable  financing  conditions  that 
prevailed  during  part of  the  year-particularly 
the  high  level  of  liquidity  enjoyed  by  firms  at 
the  beginning  of  the  year  and,  in  some  coun-
tries,  the distinct rise  in profits  that was  again 
achieved despite the mounting pressure of costs. 
Even  though in some  countries  the propensity 
to  invest  may  have  declined  somewhat  in  the 
second half of  the year,  this did not affect  the 
level  of  actual  investments,  particularly  as  for 
many  capital  goods  delivery  times  were  still 
lengthening. 
While investment demand  was  particularly vig-
orous  in  industry,  agriculture  and  the  services 
sector  also  stepped  up  their  e-.,;penditure  on 
equipment appreciably. 
In  year-to-year  terms,  investment  in  building 
and construction also expanded faster than from 
1967 to 1968, but here the pace of acceleration 
was  not as  remarkable  as  in plant and  machin-
ery.  As  in  1969  costs  in  this  sector  were  in 
general  rising  appreciably  faster,  real  growth 
for  the  year  was  probably  little  more  than  in 
1968.  As  in  1968,  the fastest  rise  in  expendi-
ture occurred in industrial building.  One impor-
tant  reason  underlying  the  need  for  firms  to 
speed  up  implementation  of  their  expansion 
programmes was  that reserves  of capacity were 
steadily  dwindling  in  most  member  countries, 
especially Germany, where the amount spent by 
firms  on building rose very  rapidly. 
The expansion of residential construction in the 
Community  also  gathered momentum in  1969; 
by and large, the results for the year do not yet 
seem  to have  been  significantly  affected by  the 
rise in interest rates on the mortgage markets or 
by  the  credit  restrictions.  In  Italy,  where  in 
1968 the number of building permits issued had 
been particularly high owing to the application 
of  certain  legal  rules,  year-to-year  growth  was 
still very vigorous;  the number of actual starts, 
however, increased only slowly in the course of 
the  year.  In  France,  demand  from  persons 
wishing to be owner-occupiers, which had already 
been  expanding  appreciably  in the second  half 
of  1968,  was  even  more  buoyant  in  1969, 
and  provided  a very  vigorous  stimulus  to  resi-
dential  construction.  In Belgium,  too,  invest-
ment  in  residential  construction  advanced  at  a 
fairly  rapid  pace.  In Germany,  its  rise  in  the 
first half of the year was inclined to be modest, 
but subsequently it accelerated appreciably.  The 
Netherlands was  the only country where invest-
11 ment  in residential construction showed a com-
paratively modest rise  from  1968 to 1969;  this 
was mainly because a large number of residential 
building projects were executed in 1968 already 
in an  effort to beat the  deadline for  the intro-
duction of the  tax on value added. 
In the Community as  a whole, the expansion of 
public  inv;estment,  which  had  slackened  some-
what in the closing months of  1968, appears to 
have shown little if any sign of revival in 1969. 
The total for  the year will  probably have  been 
smaller than in 1968. 
Stockbuilding is  also likely  to have contributed 
to the faster growth of demand as  stocks had to 
be  increased  to  cope  with  the  vigorous  expan-
sion of production.  Stocks  of some basic mate-
rials  contracted because of  the difficulty of ob-
taining  supplies.  The  business  surveys,  too, 
showed that towards  the end of the year most 
industries  considered  their  stocks  of  finished 
products to be below the level required, for the 
brisk rise in final  demand was  having its effect 
on the stocks of finished products held by man-
ufacturers.  Dealers'  stocks,  on  the other  hand, 
will if anything have been stepped up,  as  deal-
ers  expect the upward trend of consumption to 
continue. 
Expenditure on consumption rose  in fact  much 
faster than in 1968, both on a year-to-year basis 
and in terms of the trend during the year. 
The  trend  of  public  current  expenditure  on 
goods and services in 1969 was in most member 
countries  mainly  influenced  by  a  vigorous  rise 
in salaries, but in some countries, as  for instance 
in the Netherlands,  the heavier expenditure on 
goods  also played a part. 
Never since  1960 has private consumers' expen-
diture  expanded  on  such  a  scale  as  in  1969, 
when it was  affected by the rapid rise in dispo-
sable incomes  and also-in some countries-by 
a decline in the savings  ratio.  For the full  year 
1969, the rise at current prices can be estimated 
at some  11 Yz  %, compared with 71/z  % a year 
earlier.  In terms of volume, the expansion prob-
ably  reached  7  %,  as  against  4¥2  %  a  year 
earlier. 
Disposable  incomes  of  households  showed  in 
most member countries an  appreciably  stronger 
year-to-year  rise  than  in  1968.  Wage  incomes 
in particular climbed considerably faster  than a 
year  earlier.  The increase  in  the  total number 
of hours worked was one factor contributing to 
an  appreciable  rise  in incomes.  The rates  paid 
Private  consumers'  expenditure 
(% change on preceding year) 
Value 
---
~---
1968  1969 
Community 1  +  7%  +  1112 
Germany  +  5.7  _L  10Yz  I 
France 
I  10  +  15  T 
Italy  +  5.4  +  9Yz 
Netherlands  +  8.4  +  10Yz 
Belgium  +  7.1  +  9 
Luxembourg  +  7.0  +  7Yz 
1  Calculated on the basis of the official exchange rates of 1963. 
2  Commission estimates. 
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Volume 
1968  1969 
+  4%  +  7 
+  3.5  +  7Yz 
+  5.0  +  7Yz 
+  4.3  +  6Yz 
+  5.7  +  3 
I  4.9  +  5  T 
+  4.3  +  5 were also up considerably in all countries.  Added 
to  this  there  were  wage  increases  due  to rises 
under  sliding  wage  scale  arrangements  and  in 
the form of cost-of-living supplements.  Transfer 
incomes  advanced  fairly  vigorously,  particularly 
in  Italy,  where  old-age  pensions  were  put  up 
appreciably-and  with  retroactive  effect  from 
1 January 1969.  Lastly, incomes of households 
from  property  and  entrepreneurship  in  1969 
probably rose considerably more than in  1968. 
In general, the upward thrust of wages was dis-
tinctly  more  pronounced  towards  the  end  of 
the year, especially in Germany and Italy, where 
in the  autumn  agreed  wages  were  raised  very 
appreciably,  following  industrial  disputes  of 
sometimes considerable proportions.  In France, 
the  wage  increases  granted by  firms  in  the  au-
tumn were very appreciable. 
3.  Production  and  employment 
Internal  supply  in  the  Community  expanded 
very vigorously in 1969, particularly in the first 
half  of  the  year,  when it was  still  easier  for 
production to keep abreast of the rise in overall 
demand.  Subsequently, the factors of production 
were in increasingly short supply, which in most 
countries  and  sectors  of  the  economy  led  to a 
decline  in the elasticity of production and to a 
further  lengthening  of  the  already  long  order 
books. 
Despite  the  good  results  achieved  in  the  pre-
vious  year,  agricultural  production  may  well 
have expanded a little, the weather having been 
good  everywhere  except  in  the  north.  The 
grain harvest was  probably at least  as  plentiful 
as  in  1968.  Output  of  fruit  and  vegetables 
should  have  exceeded  the  figures  for  1968. 
Output of livestock products advanced  slightly. 
The  expansion  of  industrial  production  in  the 
Community gathered  additional  momentum,  at 
least in the first half of the year;  in the second 
half,  growth  slowed  down  as  firms  came  up 
increasingly  against  the limits  of  their capacity 
and also, in some member countries, because of 
large-scale  strikes.  Delivery  times  came  to  be 
abnormally  long,  particularly  for  certain  iron 
and steel products, and for  tin and copper.  In 
the circumstances, the seasonally adjusted index 
of the Statistical Office of the European Com-
munities, which excludes construction and food, 
beverages  and  tobacco,  went  up  by  approxi-
mately  2  %  in each  of  the first  two quarters, 
while  its  rise  in  the  third and  fourth  quarters 
was probably down to an  average of 1.5 % per 
quarter.  The index  shows  that,  all  in  all,  pro-
duction was  probably more  than  12  % higher 
than in the previous year, compared with a rise 
of 8.7 % from  1967 to 1968. 
Industrial  production  in  the  Community 1 
C%  change on preceding year) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1967  1968  1969  2 
I 
I 
I  I 
Community  +  1.7  +  8.7 
I  +  12 
I 
I 
Cermany  - 2  +  12.9  +  13 
France  +  2.2  +  4.0  +  12% 
Italy  +  8.6  +  6.4  +  6 
Netherlands  +  4.4  +  12.0  +  12 
Belgium  +  0.2  +  6.4  +  10% 
I 
I 
Luxembourg  +  0.3  +  5.5  +  12Y, _j 
I 
1  As defined for the index of the Statistical Office of the European Communities, i.e. excluding construction and 
food, beverages and tobacco. 
2  Commission estimates. 
13 The  trend  varied,  however,  from  one  member 
country to  another.  In France  and  the Nether-
lands,  for  instance,  the  growth  of  production 
began  to slacken  at a comparatively early date; 
in  these  countries,  particularly  in  France,  the 
rates of annual growth shown in the table below 
are  influenced  very  substantially  by  the  high 
level reached by tbe end of 1968.  In the other 
member countries, growth probably did not be-
gin to slacken until the second half of 1969. 
In  the  analysis  by  industry  group,  the  trend 
of  production  was  particularly  dynamic  in  the 
capital  goods  jndustries.  This  is  true  of  all 
branches, including even railway equipment and 
shipbuilding.  In  mechanical  engineering  and 
steelwork,  however,  in  several  member  coun-
tries the capacity of many firms was approaching 
exhaustion  and  expansion  lost  momentum.  In 
most member countries this also applies for elec-
trical engineering. 
The  advance  of  production  in  the  basic  mate-
rials industries slackened somewhat after the be-
ginning of the  year  as  pressure on  capacity  de-
pleted  reserves  even  earlier  than  in  the  other 
sectors;  the  situation  varied,  however,  very 
considerably  from  industry  to  industry  and 
country  to  country.  Coal  output  in  Germany 
and  France  was  practically  unchanged,  but 
there  was  a  further  sharp  fall  in  the  Benelux 
countries.  Iron  and  steel  production,  by  con-
trast, was appreciably higher than a year earlier; 
this is  true of all  countries and particularly the 
Netherlands,  where the advance was  the result 
of  a  fresh  expansion  of production  capacities. 
Owing, however,  to  the very  high  pressure on 
capacity generally,  the underlying trend for  the 
160 
150 
140 
130 
120 
Industrial 
production  1963  = 100 
I  l  I 
'  I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I  v 
I 
i 
I 
I  1./ 
~  VI  -
I 
I 
I 
I"""-:--v 
I 
~ 
v-
I 
! 
I 
I  '  II  110 
1  11  Ill  IV  V VI  VII  VII,  IX  X XI  XIII  II  Ill  IV  V \1  VII  VIII  IX  X XI  XII  I  II  Ill  IV  V VI  VIIV1IIIX  X XIX 
1967  1968  1969 
14 
Community  as  a  whole  showed  a  fairly  small 
rise  in  1969.  In  the  chemical  industry,  the 
growth of production gathered  appreciable  mo-
mentum thanks to the high degree of production 
elasticity in  that industry. 
Supply from  the consumer goods  industries ad-
justed quite well  to  a rise  in demand  that was 
much  steeper  than  in  1968;  in  most  member 
countries  the  adjustment  was  particularly 
smooth  in  the  textile  industry.  An  exception 
was  the motor vehicle industry, where delivery 
periods lengthened in France and even  more in 
Germany. 
In building and construction, the growth of real 
value  added  still accelerated  a little from  1968 
to  1969, despite the fairly  high growth rate of 
the previous year,  the only exception being the 
Netherlands, where-as pointed out already-a 
rombination of several factors curbed the expan-
sion of production. 
Activity  in  the  services  sector  appears  to  have 
advanced  more  slowly  than  industrial  produc-
tion, at least at  the beginning of the year;  this 
applies above all to the contribution from trans-
port and the distributive trades.  In the second 
half of the year, however, activity in the services 
sector was stimulated appreciably as  the econom-
ic  upswing  spread  more  widely  throughout  the 
economy and-more importantly-as household 
spending rose  rapidly. 
All in all it can be assumed that real gross Com-
munity  product  rose  by  7  %  from  1968  to 
1969, compared with an  increase of 6  ',;  a year 
earlier.  This  is  the  highest  rate  of  growth 
achieved since the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Rome. 
As  in  1968,  the  faster  growth  of  production 
within the Community was accompanied by very 
considerable gains in overall productivity ( gr0ss 
value  added  at  constant prices  per person  em-
ployed).  In most  member  countries,  however, 
the  rise  in  productivity  slackened  distinctly  as 
the year advanced, mainly because of the increas-
ingly  full  utilization  of  technical  production 
capacities  in industry. 
After  declining  in  1967  and  showing  little 
change in 1968, the average number of persons 
in employment throughout the Community rose 
slightly from  1968  to  1969.  This result masks 
two conflicting trends, namely a fresh and appre-
ciable  fall  in the number of self-employed per-sons  as  an  increased  number  of  gainfully  em-
ployed  persons  previously  working  in  a  self-
employed  capacity  went  into paid  employment 
and  as  marginal  self-employed  activities  were 
given up in Italy, and a pronounced rise  in the 
number  of  persons  in  paid  employment.  Re-
cruitment of additional labour, which had gone 
up distinctly in the second half of 1968, contin-
ued to rise in 1969 in all member countries, the 
pace  of  advance  being  sometimes  very  rapid. 
The  total  number  of  persons  in  paid  employ-
ment in the Community probably rose by  2  % 
from  1968 to 1969, compared with 1 % a year 
earlier.  The increase  was  strongest in industry, 
including  building  and  construction;  but  as  a 
whole  the  services  sector,  too,  registered  an 
appreciable  rise,  despite  a  downward  trend  in 
Italy.  In agriculture,  by  contrast,  the  number 
of persons in paid employment fell  further as  a 
result of  the  restructuring process. 
Although  1969  differed  from  the  preceding 
years  in  that  the  average  number  of  persons 
constituting  the  available  labour  force  in  the 
Community probably expanded slightly because 
the  distinctly  greater  immigration  of  foreign 
workers more than offset the decline in the pro-
portion  of  persons  capable  of  gainful  employ-
ment,  the  total number of  unemployed fell  ap-
preciably:  by  some  15  ~~  from  1968  to  1969, 
compared with only 3 %  a year earlier.  Unem-
ployment  edged  downwards  in  all  member 
countries until the end of the year, dropping at 
times  to  an  extraordinarily  low  level  in  some 
countries;  at  the  end  of  September,  the  rate 
was  0.6  % in Germany,  1.3  % in the Nether-
lands,  1.7  % in France, 2.1  % in Belgium and 
3.2  % in Italy.  With manpower  requirements 
rising  and firms  finding  it increasingly difficult 
to  recruit  additional  labour  as  the  manpower 
r~serves still  available  did  not  have  the  right 
skills  or  did  not  live  in  the  right  places,  the 
shortage of manpower and particularly of skilled 
labour  became  more  and  more  acute  in  the 
course of the year, especially in the most heavily 
industrialized regions of the Community. 
4.  Balance of  the  markets 
As  the growth  of  internal  demand  was  excep-
tionally dynamic in 1969, the Community's im-
ports from non-member countries expanded very 
briskly throughout the year;  all in all, the value 
of  visible  imports  was  probably  17  Vc  higher 
than in 1968. 
The liveliness of import demand affected in par-
ticular the purchases of finished industrial prod-
ucts,  which  were  probably  some  30  %  higher 
than a year earlier.  There was also a significant 
rise  in  purchases  of  raw  materials  and  semi-
manufactures.  Imports of foodstuffs and energy 
products,  by  contrast,  rose  only  modestly.  A 
geographical  breakdown  shows  that  the  main 
increase  was  in EFTA  exports  to  the  member 
countries;  in terms of value, they probably rose 
by more  than  20  Y~  from  1968  to  1969.  But 
sales hy Japan and Canada also developed along 
very dynamic lines, while imports from the de-
veloping countries  expanded faster than before. 
The strong expansion of demand in the member 
countries greatly stimulated the growth of intra-
Community  trade  in  1969.  According  to  the 
customs returns for imports, the value of visible 
trade  between  the  member  countries  probably 
rose by almost 30 % from 1968 to 1969, which 
is  the highest rate of growth ever registered in 
a  single  year  since  the  entry  into force  of  the 
Treaty of Rome. 
The buoyancy of intra-Community trade was re-
flected in the imports of  all  member countries. 
In  Germany,  the  rise  in  imports  from  other 
Community  countries  is  mainly  attributable  to 
strong domestic  demand,  the  steadily  shrinking 
reserves  of  production  capacity  and  the  tax 
measures in the field of foreign trade introduced 
at  the  end  of  1968;  for  the  full  year,  the 
purchases  of  this  country from  the other Com-
munity countries will in terms of value probably 
have been more than 30 % higher than in 1968. 
In France, the pressure exerted on the domestic 
market by influences  from  abroad  eased  some-
what towards the end of the year as  a result of 
devaluation, but for the greater part of the year 
imports rose nevertheless at a particularly rapid 
pace;  all  in all  their  value in units of  account 
will probably have gone up almost  35  % from 
1968 to 1969.  In Italy, imports from the other 
member countries were sluggish at the beginning 
of  the  year,  partly  for  fortuitous  reasons,  but 
subsequently  they  resumed  their  rapid  expan-
sion; compared with the previous year, the v,alue 
of  Italy's  imports  from  the  other  Community 
countries  is  also  likely  to  have  risen  by  more 
than  30 %.  The Belgo-Luxembourg Economic 
Union,  too,  bought  much  more  in  the  other 
15 Community countries, largely because of a faster 
rise in private consumption, which led to a lively 
increase in imports of industrial consumer prod-
ucts.  In  the  Netherlands,  the  expansion  of 
imports from  the Community was  only  modest 
at  the beginning of the  year,  but subsequently 
it resumed a fairly rapid pace;  the rate of annual 
growth in terms  of value  was  nevertheless  dis-
tinctly lower than in the other Community coun-
tries. 
Visible imports from  non-member countries 
(Imports 1968 and % year-to-year changes) 
-----
~------ -------- ~----------------c-----
1 
I 
1968  1969 
------------,--
2nd  3rd 
Full 
quar- quar-
year5 
ter  tcr5 
I.Milli~n  Full 
1st 
year 
quar-
u.a. 
ter 
---------- -----~---------- --- ------'~ 
I 
I 
I  All non-member countries 
of whicb  : 
1-j- 23  + 14 
_j_  17  I 
I 
I 
33 542  +  8.5  + 12 
Industrialized countries 2  18 626  +  9.5  + 11.5  + 26  + 16  + 18 
including  : 
United States  6 386  +  8.5  - 2.5  --'- 25  -t-13  +  12 
I 
EFTA  7 840  +  10.5  + 16.5  1 + 25  --~  19  -~ 20 
United Kingdom  2 994  +11  -[  15  --1-24  + 20  +  20 
Developing countries  3  12 506  +  8  +13  +  19  +11  I+ 14 
including : 
Associated overseas countries and territories  2 498  +  9.5  +  9  + 24.5  +  8  -t-13 
I 
Central and South America  2 679  4.5  +  14  +  18.5  +  20  +  18 
Other countries 4  2 410  +  5  I+  9  + 18  + 15  + 14 
--'--~-'-- Source:  Statistical Office of the European Communities (SOEC). 
1  1 u.a.  ,~ 1 unit of account  =  0.888671  g of fine gold  =  US $ 1 at the official exchange rate. 
2  Class 1 of the Standard Country Classification for Foreign Trade Statistics of the EEC. 
3  Class 2 of the Standard Country Classification for Foreign Trade Statistics of the EEC. 
4  Class 3 of the Standard Country Classification for Foreign Trade Statistics of the EEC and other sources. 
:;  Commission estimates. 
The exports  of  all  member  countries  benefited 
in fairly equal measure from  the dynamic  trend 
of intra-Community trade. 
As  in  the  four  preceding  years,  a  comparison 
of the trend of each  member country's balance 
of trade with the others reveals that the French 
balance of trade deteriorated distinctly, with the 
16 
deficit for 1969 probably reaching almost 2 000 
million  dollars.  The  trade  balances  of  Italy 
and  the  Belgo-Luxembourg  Economic  Union, 
by  contrast,  improved  distinctly;  the  surplus 
of  the  Belgo-Luxembourg  Economic  Union  in 
1969  was  probably  some  800  million  dollars. 
Germany and the Netherlands registered no sig-
nificant ahange. 3800 
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In  all  member  countries  except  Luxembourg, 
prices  rose  much more vigorously  in 1969 than 
a year earlier. 
Numerous factors contributed to this trend.  The 
rapid  expansion  of  overall  demand  for  goods 
and  production factors  placed  heavy  strains  on 
supply.  There  was  also  a  deterioration  in  the 
trend of costs.  The increase in labour costs per 
unit of output during 1969 was distinctly faster 
than a year earlier.  In Germany, Italy and Bel-
gium  the  rise  in wages  gathered  speed  signifi-
cantly during the year, while productivity gains 
dropped  back  to  a modest  rate  as  reserves  of 
capacity  were  gradually  exhausted.  The  world 
market  prices  of  basic  materials  for  industry 
Prices  of the  main  components  of demand 
(% change on preceding year) 
---------------.-----------------------c--------------,---------
Community 3 
Germany 
France 4 
Exports 1 
1968  1969  2 
I 
I 
-1.11+2 
+  0.5  +  5 
Gross tixed 
asset formation 
1968  1969 2 
-1-- 2.5  +  5 
+  1.9  +  3 
+  2.8  +  6 
Public current 
expenditure on 
goods and serv. 
1968  1969  2 
+  5 
I 
Private 
consumers' 
expenditure 
1968  1969  2 
'  -1- 3 
3.1 
I  _J_  6 
I  , 
I+  412  +  2.0  +  2% 
7.4  +  8  +  5  +  7 
Italy  - 0.6  +  1  Y2  +  2.3  +  5 Y2  +  4.9  +  5Y2  +  1.1  +  3 
Netherlands  +  2.3 
Belgium  +  0.5  +  2.5 
-1- 9  +  5.2  +  9  ,- 2.5 
+  4Y2  +  4.0 I+ 
! 
5Y2  +  2.0 
+  7 
I 
+  3Yz 
Luxembourg  0  4Y2  +  4.0  +  7  + 
I 
4.0 I+  4Y2  +  2.5  +- 2112 
1  Goods and services. 
2  Commission estimates. 
3  Calculated on the basis of the official exchange rates of 1963. 
4  The figures for France are strongly influenced by the events of May and June 1968. 
and  of  semi-manufactures  have  climbed" appre-
ciably  since  the  middle  of  1968 as- ~ result  of 
the boom conditions prevailing in the industria-
lized  countries.  The  prices  of  various  farm 
products, too, went up rapidly in the first half of 
1969, as harvests in 1968 had been less  satisfac-
tory. 
In two member countries, consumer prices were 
influenced by changes  in  the system of indirect 
taxation.  In the Netherlands, for instance, they 
climbed vigorously in the early months of 1969, 
causing the Netherlands Government to order a 
price freeze in April.  But after the level of con-
sumer  prices  had  stabilized  in  May  and  world 
17 Labour costs and import prices 
(%change on preceding year) 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
I Luxembourg 
I 
1  Commission estimates. 
market prices for  raw materials and semi-manu-
factures had subsequently hardened, the Nether-
lands Government replaced the price freeze by a 
somewhat  more  flexible  system  under  which 
external  cost  increases  could  be  taken  into 
account. 
In France, TVA rates  were  raised considerably 
on 1 December  1968.  As  a result, services and 
certain foodstuffs  were taxed more heavily.  In 
view of the vigorous expansion of demand, this 
combined  with  the  rises  that  had  occurred  in 
labour  costs  during  1968  to  cause  a rapid  rise 
in  the  level  of  consumer  prices.  The devalua-
tion  of  the  French  franc  also  helped  to  force 
up  the  level  of  domestic  prices  although  the 
French  Government  ordered  a  price  freeze, 
which in mid-September was replaced, in respect 
of industrial products, by price agreements bet-
ween Government and manufacturers and a sys-
tem of price supervision.  The subsidies on im-
ports  and  levies  on  exports  of  agricultural 
products,  introduced  with  the  approval  of  the 
Council of the European Communities, kept the 
rise  in  agricultural  prices  due  to  devaluation 
within narrow limits. 
The Community's balance of  vis,ib1e  trade with 
the non-member countries deteriorated consider-
ably in 1969, mainly as  a result of the vigorous 
rise  in imports.  For  the  full  year,  there  will 
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probably be a trade deficit  of some  $  250 mil-
lion,  following  a  surplus  of $  1 7  48  million in 
1968.  Accordingly,  the  surplus  on  current 
account  fell  considerably. 
The  Community's  capital  account  was  marked 
by  two conflicting tendencies, namely heavy ex-
ports  of  long-term  capital  and  substantial  in-
flows  of  short-term  capital.  Total  exports  of 
long-term capital were higher than a year earlier, 
at least in the first nine months.  But their rise 
seems  to  have  slackened  in  the  course  of  the 
year  because  there was  a general  weakening  of 
the propensity to invest on American securities 
markets,  and  because  net exports  of  long-term 
capital from  Germany weakened gradually  dur-
ing  the  year.  Short-term  capital  movemems 
were  subject  to  severe  fluctuations  in  1969. 
The repeated bouts of currency speculation gave 
rise to cross-frontier movements of money on an 
unprecedented  scale.  In  May  and  September, 
for  instance,  substantial  amounts  of short-term 
capital  flowed  into  Germany.  At  the  end  of 
September, the inflow reached such proportions 
that the  Government had  the foreign  currency 
exchanges  closed  for  two  days  before the Bun-
destag  elections  and  had  them  re-opened  only 
two days after the elections, having first request-
ed 11he  Bundesbank. to refrain from intervening 
on  the  foreign  exchange  market  at  the  old maximum  and  minimum rates.  As  a result  the 
rate  of  exchange  for  the  German  mark  was 
practically  floating;  this  transitional  period 
ended  on  27  October  1969  when  the  parity 
was in fact raised by 9.29  ~;.  After revaluation, 
the  Federal  Republic  experienced  a  substantial 
outflow  of  foreign  exchange.  In  France,  by 
contrast,  expectations  of  parity  changes  led  to 
persistent foreign  exchange  losses  despite  strict 
foreign exchange controls.  In August, a period 
of relative calm in the monetary field,  the franc 
was  devalued by 11.11  %.  In the autumn, the 
French  foreign  exchange  position  recovered 
somewhat.  After the exchange  rate of the DM 
had  been  allowed  to  float,  Belgium  and  the 
Netherlands  also  appear  to  have  attracted  hot 
money.  On balance,  transactions  with  abroad 
led in the first nine months  to a  heavy  inflow 
of foreign  exchange  into the Community.  Dur-
ing  this  period,  the official  gross  gold and for-
eign  exchange  reserves  rose  by  some  $  2 500 
million,  against  a  fall  of some  $ 2 000  million 
in  the  corresponding  period  of  the  previous 
year.  Part of  this  foreign  exchange  inflow  is, 
however,  attributable to  the fact  that the com-
mercial  banks  repatriated  a  substantial propor-
tion of the assets they held abroad. 
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All  in  all,  the  transactions  with abroad  contri-
buted  to  an  expansion  of  internal  liquidity  in 
the Community. 
The cash  transactions of  the public  authorities, 
too,  had  little  if  any  dampening  influence  on 
internal liquidity, but several governments were 
trying to keep the cash deficits of public budgets 
within bounds.  France, for instance, introduced 
a  first  set  of  restrictive  measures  in  July,  and 
this was followed by a programme of severe cuts 
after the devaluation of the French franc;  under 
this  programme,  the budget deficit  for  1969 is 
to  be  reduced  from  the  original  figure  of 
FF 6 400 million to less  than FF 5 000 million. 
As  budgetary expenditure had been stepped up 
until late in the summer, this would mean that 
in the  closing  months  of  the  year  the  budget 
must have shown a fairly  high surplus.  In Bel-
gium,  too,  the cash  deficit  on  the  budget was 
cut back in the course of  the year,  particularly 
through  a  measure  restricting  public  invest-
ment expenditure.  For the full year,  the deficit 
was  probably  somewhat  lower  than  in  1968, 
when, however, it was already high.  One of the 
reasons  for  introducing  this  restrictive measure 
was  that during the greater part of the year the 
Belgian State had found it very difficult to pro-
cure finance on the capital market.  In Italy and 
the Netherlands, the budgets were handled along 
expansionary lines.  In the Netherlands, the bud-
get  deficit  will  presumably  prove  to  be  some 
Fl.  500  million  higher  than  planned  in  the 
spring  of 1969, and  in  Italy,  where  there  had 
still been appreciable cash  surpluses in the first 
six months, the second half of the year probably 
brought  heavy  deficits.  Budget  policy  in  Ger-
many  was  distinctly  countercyclical;  here,  the 
rise in revenue was particularly vigorous, while 
the  public  authorities  exercised  restraint  in 
stepping up expenditure.  Prompted by the rec-
ommendations  put  forward  by  the  Financial 
Planning Council in March and May, the Federal 
Government blocked, for  1969, items of expen-
diture  amounting  to  DM  1 800  million,  and 
later  cancelled  them  altogether.  For  the  full 
year,  the Federal budget probably  showed  the 
first cash surplus  since  1955-56. 
Bank lending to business and private customers 
expanded  at  a lively  pace  in  all  member  coun-
tries.  As  a  result  of  the  sharp  economic  up-
swing, demand for credit was very strong every-
where.  Almost  all  member  countries  took 
measures  to  restrict  credit.  Belgium,  for  in-
stance, introduced in April the first  rediscount 
quotas  for  commercial  banks,  and  these  were 
reduced  on  several  occasions  during  the  year. 
In addition,  quantitative limits  were  placed  on 
lending,  and  these  too  were  lowered  several 
times.  The  Netherlands  also  placed  a  ceiling 
on the extent to which credit might expand in 
1969,  and  at  the end  of  July  this  system  was 
19 extended to include the savings banks.  Lending 
nevertheless expanded after the summer months 
more  vigorously  than  had  been  envisaged.  In 
France,  the  restrictive  credit  policy  introduced 
in  November  1968  was  tightened  from  May 
1969 onwards.  As the measures concerned lend-
ing  by  the  commercial  banks  only,  borrowers 
were  often  able  to  switch  to  the  specialized 
credit institutions.  From June onwards, meas-
ures  were therefore taken on  several occasions 
to  extend the  restrictive  policy  to  cover  other 
financing  institutions  which  specialized  more 
particularly in the granting of medium- and long-
term loans.  In Germany, the minimum reserve 
requirements  were  raised  on  1  June  and 
1 August.  In November, however, the Bundes-
bank lowered them again a little with a view to 
offsetting part of the drain on liquidity caused 
by  the  outflow  of  foreign  exchange  after 
revaluation. 
The money markets of the Community were evi-
dently  influenced  by  the  rise  in  interest  rates 
and monetary speculation throughout the world. 
Since  the autumn of  1968, interest rates on the 
major money markets outside the member coun-
tries,  i.e.  in  New  York,  London  and  on  the 
Euro-money  markets,  have  soared;  interest 
rates in the member countries have followed this 
movement, though with a considerable time-lag. 
The  monetary  authorities  of  all  member  coun-
tries  have  supported the market  trend by  what 
were  sometimes  vigorous  increases  in  discount 
rates.  Except in Germany,  this policy was  also 
Demand  for  and  supply  of  goods  and  services 
current 
prices 
in '000 
million 
% change on preceding year 
u.a.  Volume  Value  Volume  Value  Volume 
1------------------------------------~1  -------·---------+------------+~------1 
Gross fixed asset formation 
Public current expenditure on goods and 
servtces 
Private consumers' expenditure 
80.3  +  6%  +  9  + 11  + 16%  +  7 
50.0  +  3  +  8  +  4%  + 10%  +  3Yz 
211.6  +  4%  +  7%  +  7  + 11%  +  5 
Gross Community product  1  350.1  +  ,  +  ,  +  7  + 12  +  ·~~ 
-B-al--an-~e  -exp:~s-le_s_s  __  i_m_p_o_r-ts_(_a_t_c_u._rr_e_n_t  __ -··---- __  --'.,-------~'----------------'-I-------+· -ST+ 
4
.  - 5
-~ 
/  prices, in '000 million units of account 
5  +  5.9  +- 7.1  ~ 
1  Statistical Office of the European Communities: General Statistical Bulletin 1969, No.9. 
2  Commission estimates. 
3  Commission forecasts. 
4  Based on Community totals of the aggregates of the individual member countries at official exchange rates 1963. 
3  1 u.a.  =  1 unit of account  =  0.888671  g of tine gold  =  US  $ 1 at the official exchange rate. 
Note: 
(a)  The difference between the figures for demand and those for supply is  accounted for by movements in stocks 
and differences in treatment of the balance of exports less imports. 
(b)  The estimates and forecasts are approximations based on certain hypotheses, generally mentioned in the Quar-
terly  Surveys.  They  have  been  discussed  with  the  experts  of the  member  countries  but are  established  and 
published on the sole responsibility of the Commission. 
20 intended to curb exports of money and capital, 
which  at  times  were  massive.  In  Germany, 
Bank rate rose from  3.5  % to 6  %,  in France 
from 6 % to 8 %, in the Netherlands from 5 % 
to 6  %, and in Belgium from 4.5  % to 7  %. 
Italy introduced dual rates in July;  banks which 
exceeded a certain rediscount ceiling were to pay 
5  % as  from  1 July, instead of the general rate 
of  3.5  %.  In mid-August,  however,  Italy  too 
tightened the discount screw by 0.5  %,  raising 
the  general  rate for  the first  time  since  1958. 
This points to a change in Italian interest rate 
policy;  while for domestic reasons the main aim 
had  hitherto  been  to  keep  interest  rates  low, 
greater  importance  is  now  being  attached  to 
foreign  trade and payment problems because of 
the undesirable  outflow of  money  and  capital. 
In addition, the economic situation in this coun-
try too  now  seemed to call  for  a policy of res-
traint. 
Bond  markets  in  the  Community  were  also 
affected by the rise in interest rates abroad.  The 
external  influences  were  further  strengthened 
by internal factors, i.e.  the high capital require-
ments of enterprises and the public authorities. 
Only in Germany did the Federal Government 
call much less on the capital market than in the 
preceding years.  In France, the rise in interest 
rates  appears  to  have  calmed  down  somewhat 
in  the second half of the year.  In the Nether-
lands, demand for capital by both the State and 
private  firms  was  much  higher  than  in  1968. 
In Belgium,  too,  the  capital  market  was  until 
September  under  heavy  strain,  so  that  it was 
difficult  for  the  State  to  obtain  long-term 
finance.  Until  August  the Banca  d'Italia still 
supported bond prices, but this policy was  sub-
sequently  discontinued. 
On the equity markets of the Community,  the 
summer brought a reversal of the earlier trend. 
While in the first five  months prices had risen 
vigorously everywhere and had been determined 
by  the  generally  good  business  outlook,  the 
climate  subsequently  deteriorated  sharply,  in 
part no doubt because of  the announcement or 
application of restrictive measures in the mone-
tary and credit field.  Added to this there was a 
slump  on the New  York Stock  Exchange,  and 
some countries were affected by a greater or les-
ser degree of political uncertainty at home.  Only 
in Germany did the stock exchanges prove fairly 
successful  in  maintaining  prices.  In Italy,  the 
stock exchanges were able to recover after tem-
porary setbacks in the summer;  their resilience 
was evidently due in part to action taken by the 
Government  to  improve  the  capital  market, 
promote saving  in the form  of shares  and stem 
the flight of capital. 
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23B.  Forecasts for 1970 
In all  probability  the world economic  trend in 
1970  will  be  much  less  buoyant  than  it  was 
during  the  greater  part  of  1969.  A  tendency 
for the expansion of world trade to slow down 
has  been  discernible  since  the middle of  1969, 
and is  likely to continue, if not to gather addi-
tional  strength,  in  the  year  ahead.  Economic 
developments in the Community, however, will 
continue to provide an  appreciable  stimulus for 
world trade. 
But the trend of economic activity in the United 
States  is  also  an  important  factor  that  will 
strongly influence  the buoyancy  of world trade 
in 1970 and lines on which it develops.  At the 
moment, it is more than usually difficult to fore-
cast  what  this  trend will in  fact  be.  It is,  for 
instance, uncertain whether and how effectively 
the  American  authorities  will  continue  to  take 
restrictive  action  should  inflationary  pressures 
remain strong while unemployment rose further. 
If  it is assumed that the effects of the restrictive 
policy,  particularly of the very  stringent mone-
tary and credit measures  that have of late been 
tightened still further, will make themselves felt 
fully  in the next few  months, economic activity 
may  mark time for  a while.  This would be re-
flected  first  and foremost  in  a deterioration of 
the investment climate due mainly  to the meas-
ures  taken  to mop  up liquidity,  the very  high 
level  of  interest  rates,  the  withdrawal  of  tax 
concessions for investment in plant and machin-
ery-provided  the proposed tax reform is passed 
by  Congress-and  the  dampening  effect  on 
1969  profit  margins  exerted  by  the  upward 
thrust of wages.  The tone  in the  building and 
construction markets, where there was already a 
distinct  slowdown  in  1969,  would  continue  to 
be  very  subdued.  Private  consumers'  expendi-
ture,  too,  might  well  lose  momentum;  the 
weakening  in  the  growth  of  personal  incomes 
which  started  in  1969  could  in  1970  become 
even  more  marked,  particularly  as  a  result  of 
a slower  expansion  of  employment  and shrink-
ing corporate profits.  It is moreover not improb-
able  that the cuts in Federal expenditure under 
the 1969-1970 budget will make themselves felt 
very distinctly in the first half of  1970.  A run-
down  of  stocks  may  also  exert  an  additional 
inhibiting influence on business  activity.  If the 
trend of demand  developed  on these  lines,  in-
dustrial production is likely to mark time, if not 
decline.  Imports will probably remain weak for 
quite  some  time,  particularly  in  view  of  the 
time-lag  generally  discernible between the recov-
ery  of  production  and  the  upturn  of  imports. 
Although business  activity in the United States 
may  well  revive  in  the  course  of  1970,  the 
effects  on  the  trend  of  Community  exports 
would therefore show at  a fairly late date only. 
On the other hand, if the American authorities 
decided  relatively  early,  say  at  the  beginning 
of  the  year,  to  relax  their  restrictive  policy  in 
view of the aggravation of labour market prob-
lems,  world trade would  be certain  to expand 
fairly  vigorously in  1970  also.  The 10  % sur-
charge on income tax introduced some time ago 
has  in  any  case  not yet  been extended beyond 
31  December 1969.  As far back as  the summer, 
the  Government  was  already  considering  the 
possibility  of  reducing  this  rate  to  5  % from 
1 January 1970. 
For the United Kingdom,  the outlook for  busi-
ness  activity  is  somewhat  less  uncertain.  The 
burden resulting from foreign indebtedness will 
still  severely  limit  the  room  for  manceuvre  in 
economic  policy,  but  after  the  balance  of  pay-
ments  improvement  registered  in  1969,  1970 
may well see  a more lively expansion of domes-
tic  demand,  as  there is  little likelihood  of  the 
restrictive  policy  being  tightened further.  The 
revival  of  economic  activity  expected  for  the 
closing  months  of  1969  should  therefore  con-
tinue in 1970.  The trend of private consumers' 
expenditure  will  no  doubt  be  somewhat  more 
buoyant.  Given  the  projects  currently  under 
consideration it appears, too, that actual invest-
ment by  enterprises will, despite the restrictive 
credit policy, run at a high level, at least in the 
first half of the year.  Exports are also likely to 
maintain their appreciable pace  of advance.  As 
against  this,  residential construction and  public 
spending  may  have  an  inhibiting  effect  on the 
expansion of overall demand during part of the 
year,  even  though  there  is  some  chance  of 
their  subsequently  providing  some  additional 
stimulus  to  economic  expansion. 
All in all, production and imports can be expect-
ed to advance  appreciably.  The rise  in imports 
25 is likely to gather momentum, mainly as  a result 
of an expansion of overall demand and only in 
small  measure  because  of the  slight  relaxation 
of the import deposit scheme which was decided 
upon at the end of  1969 and has  reduced from 
50  % to  40  % the  sums  which importers  are 
required to deposit interest-free for six months. 
In the other industrialized countries, the restric-
tive measures taken in 1969 to prevent domestic 
demand  from  expanding  too  rapidly,  coupled 
with the expected  slowdown  in the growth of 
demand from abroad, particularly from the Unit-
ed  States,  will  help  dampen  the  expansion  of 
economic  activity  at  least  during  the  first  half 
of 1970.  This does  not apply  to several of the 
EFTA countries, particularly Austria and  Swit-
zerland,  where  expansion  will certainly  still be 
very lively.  Here, the closeness of trade relations 
with  the Community  is  indeed  likely  to  stim-
ulate  economic  activity.  In  the  Scandinavian 
countries,  by  contrast,  economic  growth  is 
expected to be no more than small.  In Norway, 
the  economic  trend  is  likely  to  weaken  from 
1970  onwards,  one  reason  being  that  the 
growth  of  domestic  demand,  particularly  pri-
vate  consumers'  expenditure,  may  fall  off  dis-
tincdy  as  the  massive  purchases  of  consumer 
goods  that developed towards  the end of  1969 
prior to the entry into force  of  the tax reform 
on  1  January  are  likely  to  be  followed  by  a 
lull.  In  Canada  and  Japan,  lastly,  economic 
activity and consequently imports may lose much 
of their momentum as  the year progresses. 
In general, the expansion of imports by  the in-
dustrialized  countries  will  probably  be weaker 
than in 1969.  This may  well influence imports 
by  the developing countries too,  although there 
will be a certain time-lag.  The  reserves  of the 
developing  countries  rose  appreciably  in  1969, 
and  while  the  less  vigorous  expansion  of  the 
volume  of  their  exports  and  the  stagnation  of 
raw materials  prices  that can  be expected after 
the  upward  trend  recorded  till  the  middle  of 
1969  will  affect  the  export  earnings  of  these 
countries,  this  is  unlikely  to  have  any  percep-
tible effect before mid-1970. 
It must,  then,  be  assumed  that  the  growth  of 
Community  exports  will  fall  off  appreciably 
from  1969  to  1970.  It may  amount  to  some 
7  %, but could well fall  short of this rate, de-
pending on the direction in which  the business 
trend in the United States moves. 
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Internal  demand  in  the  Community  will  as  a 
whole  probably  remain  lively,  though  its  pace 
may  be somewhat  slower  than in 1969.  There 
are, for instance, several indications that the rise 
in  gross  fixed  asset  formation  will  be  weaker 
than from  1968 to 1969. 
Investment  in  plant  and  machinery  will  none 
the  less  continue to expand fairly  substantially, 
particularly in the first half of the year.  Orders 
on hand in the capital goods industries are gene-
rally  high  and  delivery  periods  rather  long. 
Given the acute manpower shortage and the in-
creasing pressure of costs, the case for rationali-
zation  will  also  gain  in  strength.  The  first 
results  of  the  EEC  investment  survey  carried 
out in the autumn of 1969 show at any rate that 
corporate spending on investment can in almost 
all member countries still be expected to expand 
quite  appreciably.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
effects  of  the  restrictive  monetary  and  credit 
measures,  the  reduced  possibilities  of  self-
financing  and  the less  favourable  prospects for 
export sales, may in the course of the year lead 
to  a  weakening  of  the  propensity  to invest  of 
enterprises, and perhaps to a downward revision 
of their investment projects, which towards the 
end of the year might even make itself felt in a 
decline  of  actual investment activity. 
Expenditure on building  and construction,  too, 
will advance less from 1969 to 1970 than it did 
from  1968 to  1969.  The slowdown in the rise 
will,  however, be no more  than gradual, firstly 
because the backlog of unfinished building proj-
ects,  particularly  in  industrial  building,  is  still 
considerable  in  almost  all  member  countries, 
and secondly  because under the  budgets public 
building activity will on the whole continue to 
expand  appreciably,  with  France  as  the  only 
exception.  In residential  construction,  by  con-
trast, the stiffer financing  conditions, especially 
the high level of interest rates on the mortgage 
markets,  will  have  an  inhibiting  effect  on  de-
mand.  An  additional point is  that in  Belgium, 
Luxembourg  and  Italy  special  factors  such  as 
the introduction of  the TV  A  and  the  adoption 
of  new  building  regulations  have  meant  that 
building projects were brought forward to 1968 
and  1969, and  thi~ is  likely  to have  a dampen-
ing effect on investment in residential construc-
tion in  1970. 
Stockbuilding will probably still provide a fairly 
considerable  stimulus  to  demand  in  1970. Stocks  of  raw  materials  and  semi-manufactures 
will have to be built up further, in line with the 
growth  of production.  The  stocks  of  finished 
products,  which  in  some  countries  have  been 
run down very appreciably,  may  be brought to 
a normal level again in the course of the year. 
The  rise  in  total  expenditure  on  consumption 
in  the  Community  will  in  1970  no  longer  be 
quite as  vigorous  as  in  1969.  This  will,  how-
ever, hardly be true of  public  spending,  which 
is  known to react very  strongly,  with a certain 
time-lag,  to  the  general  trend  of  wages  and 
prices.  The rise in private consumers'  expend-
iture, by contrast, may be somewhat weaker from 
1969  to  1970, but in  terms  of  value  it should 
still amount to some  10 % and in terms of vol-
ume  some  5 %,  compared  with  11.5 %  and 
7  % from  1968  to  1969.  Briskly  expanding 
consumption  will  therefore  continue  to  be  a 
major factor in the economic trend in the Com-
munity.  The  rise  in  disposable  incomes  from 
wages  will  flatten  out  comparatively  little: 
although the rise in employment will be smaller 
than a year earlier, the increase in wages  in the 
Community as  a whole may, on an annual basis, 
be almost as high as  in 1969.  In Italy, Belgium 
and  Luxembourg,  the  upward  thrust  of  wages 
must even be expected to gather some  addition-
al momentum, particularly in view of the way in 
which consumer prices  are  developing;  in Ger-
many  and  the  Netherlands  average  wages  for 
the  year  will  probably  rise  at  much  the  same 
tempo as in 1969.  Only in France is the year-to-
year  rise  in  wages  likely  to  be  considerably 
weaker than in  1969, but this will only in part 
be  attributable  to  a  weakening  of  business 
activity in the course  of the year. 
Although  transfers  of  income  can  again  be ex-
r-ected  to  rise  very  appreciably,  non-wage  in-
comes  as  a whole are likely to rise  at  a slower 
pace  than in 1969  as  the increase  in  profits is 
expected  to be distinctly  weaker.  The rise in 
disposable  incomes  may  in addition  be  curbed 
by  the fact  that income  taxes  are  progressive, 
although on 1 January 1970 the rates of tax will 
be lowered in the Netherlands and  the tax-free 
allowances  increased in Germany. 
The  expansion  of  internal  supply  in  the  Com-
munity  will  be  much  less  vigorous  than  in 
1969.  The year-to-year growth of the real gross 
Community product will fall from 7 % to about 
4.5  %.  The  incipient  tendency  for  growth  to 
slow  down  will  continue  in  the  next  few 
months,  mainly  as  a  result  of  the  increasingly 
frequent bottlenecks in production, the resultant 
slowdown  in  the  advance  of  productivity,  and 
the acute labour shortage.  As the year advances, 
a  less  uniformly  rising  trend  in  demand  may 
also  inhibit production in certain member coun-
tries  and  certain  sectors.  The  slowdown  will 
probably  be  most  evident  in  industry  and  in 
building and construction. 
Even  though manpower  requirements  will  still 
be very heavy, the rise in employment will slow 
down  because  in  most  member  countries  man-
power reserves are almost completely exhausted. 
Should  the  pressure  of  demand  on  some 
branches of industry ease during the year,  there 
will still be for a while the customary hoarding, 
i.e. firms will seek to hold on to their staff.  In 
these  cases,  the  cutback would in a first  stage 
probably be  confined  to  a shortening of hours 
actually  worked.  In several  member countries, 
incidentally,  the  number  of  hours  actually 
worked  will be influenced by  reductions  under 
collective  agreements. 
With the available labour force  in  the Commu-
nity  virtually  unchanged,  the  average  number 
of  unemployed  will  again  be  fairly  distinctly 
down  in  1970,  though  the  decline  everywhere 
except  in  Italy  is  likely  to  be  appreciably 
smaller  than  in  the  previous  year. 
All  in  all,  labour  markets  in  most  member 
countries  will  probably  remain  under  heavy 
strain during the greater part of 1970.  Towards 
the  end of the year  a greater degree  of variety 
may  emerge,  with  a  shortage  of  manpower  in 
most sectors of activity going hand-in-hand with 
a decline  in  manpower  requirements  in  certain 
others. 
Imports from  non-member countries  are  hardly 
likely to show the same high growth rates  as  in 
1969.  The  pressure  of  demand  and  internal 
supply should none the less  cause  a very vigor-
ous  rise in imports, particularly in the first half 
of the year.  The further tariff reductions made 
in  accordance  with  agreements  reached  in  the 
Kennedy  Round  will  also  contribute  to  this 
development.  Towards  the  end  of  the  year, 
however, the rise may  slacken, especially in im-
ports  of  raw  materials  and  capital  goods,  In 
addition it must be expected that as  a result of 
the  comparatively  good  harvests  purchases  of 
farm products will show no more than a modest 
growth. 
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than the rise in exports, the deficit on the Com-
munity's balance  of  trade  will  be heavier  still. 
The  parity  changes  of  1969  should  make  no 
more than a marginal contribution to this devel-
opment,  as  the  effects  produced  by  the  reval-
uation of the German mark and the devaluation 
of  the  French  franc  will  in  part  offset  each 
other. 
In the Community as  a whole, prices will prob-
ably  still rise vigorously in 1970;  the pressure 
of costs will persist, if not strengthen, and the 
seller's market is  likely to enable firms,  at least 
temporarily,  to  pass  on  cost  increases.  Trends 
may, however, differ fairly  widely between one 
country and  another. 
Although  there  will  be  differences  of  degree, 
the rise in wage costs per unit of output will in 
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all member countries be faster  than in 1969, as 
productivity  gains  generally  will  flatten  out. 
In Germany,  the  revaluation  of the  mark will 
probably  exert  a  dampening  influence  on  the 
rise  in the level of domestic prices, particularly 
as  the  DM  prices  for  agricultural  products, 
which depend directly or indirectly on the agri-
cultural  unit  of  account,  are  being  lowered. 
Quite generally, the pressure of imports entailed 
by  revaluation  should  lead  to  keener  competi-
tion  on  the  domestic  markets  of  this  country. 
On the other hand, the revaluation of the Ger-
man mark may in limited measure engender cer-
tain  price  increases  in  some  other  member 
countries,  as  prices  for  imports  from  Germany 
are going up.  In France, the devaluation of  the. 
franc  will  in  1970  probably  still  have  after-
effects in the form of price increases for certain 
products. C.  Short-term  economic  policy 
In view  of  the  economic  prospects  for  1970, 
the prime  concern of  all  Member States in  the 
months ahead must be to curb any  tendency to 
inflation.  There is  no  doubt that the  strength 
of  this  tendency  varies  from  country  to  coun-
try.  The  starting  positions  in  the  struggle 
against  inflation  are  also  different  at  the  mo-
ment;  particularly in the second half of the past 
year,  the  instruments  of  economic  policy,  for 
instance,  were  already  being  more  vigorously 
used in a number of member countries in order 
to  maintain  or re-establish  the  main  economic 
equilibria,  while  in  France  and  Germany  the 
parity  changes  introduced  fresh  conditions  for 
removal  of  the  tendencies  towards  imbalance. 
At the moment, however, the upward thrust of 
prices is  in all  member countries still such that 
the struggle against inflation should continue to 
rank very high on the list of priorities. 
In a Memorandum sent to the Council on 9 July 
1969,  the  Commission  pointed  to  the need  to 
bring the inflationary  process  under control as 
rapidly  as  possible.  Energetic and rapid  action 
seemed  to be called for  if  the imbalances  were 
not  to grow  further  and  become  a  permanent 
feature;  failure  to prevent such a development 
would lead to a vigorous  rise  in costs, and this 
would  heavily  undermine  the  competitiveness 
of several Member States.  The policy which the 
Commission recommended in the Memorandum 
was not aimed at bringing about a recession but 
at  preventing it while  there was  still  time,  by 
putting the Community's  economy  on a  sound 
basis.  The measures to combat inflationary ten-
dencies were to bear primarily on the following 
points:  firstly,  an  expansion  of  overall  supply 
through  systematic  mobilization  of  resources, 
maiuly  by  means  of  measures  in  the  field  of 
vocational  training  and  retraining  of  labour; 
secondly, an effort to limit the growth of overall 
demand  in money  terms  to  the possibilities  of 
expanding  overall  supply,  the  limitation  to  be 
achieved  mainly  through  a  stringent  budget 
policy;  thirdly,  active  participation  by  both 
sides of industry in the development and imple-
mentation of  an  economic  and  social  policy  in 
the Member States  which would safeguard  the 
conditions  for  balanced economic  growth.  The 
Council  endorsed the conclusions  of  the  Com-
mission's  Memorandum on  17  July  1969. 
Developments  have  meanwhile  become  all  the 
more alarming because  the upsurge in prices  is 
now  due  not  only  to  the  evident  pressure  of 
pent-up demand but is in most member countries 
also  gaining more and more strength because of 
rising  costs.  Demand  is  expanding  at  a  very 
lively  pace,  reserves  of  capacity  are  shrinking 
further  and  further  and  in  some  countries  the 
shortage of manpower has  reached an unprece-
dented degree  of severity.  Not only  are  prices 
for  imported  raw  materials  and finished  prod-
ucts going up, but all countries are experiencing 
a  vigorous  rise  in  wage  costs  per  unit  of 
output which,  given  the  appreciable  decline  in 
productivity  gains,  does  not  appear  to  have 
reached  its  peak  in the  autumn of  1969.  The 
internal upsurge in costs  and prices  may  entail 
an appreciable deterioration in the Community's 
competitiveness  precisely  at  a  moment  when 
the effects  which  the prospective weakening of 
economic activity in the United States will have 
on  exports  from  the  Community  will  make 
themselves felt more strongly.  This would be a 
serious  matter  because  it  would  restrict  the 
margin of manceuvre open to the six Community 
countries in their endeavours  to counteract any 
weakening  of  the  economic  trend in the  Com-
munity by co-ordinated action. 
Even  after  the  parity  changes  in  France  and 
Germany  it remains  of  prime  importance  that 
the  expansion  of  domestic  demand  should  be 
checked.  In France,  the case  for  such  a policy 
appears  to  be  all  the  stronger  as  the  rise  in 
import prices  engendered by devaluation  could 
lead to a wage-price spiral.  If  devaluation is,  in 
addition,  to  have  the  expected  effects  on  the 
current account,  action  should be  taken  to  en-
sure  that  the  continuing  excess  of  domestic 
demand  over  domestic  supply  is  rapidly  elimi-
nated,  so  that sufficient capacity can be freed for 
export production and  that the rise  in imports 
can be held down.  In Germany, the revaluation 
of the mark is  in point of  fact  contributing to 
better internal and external equilibrium.  Here, 
the efforts  to  stabilize prices  are being assisted 
by the fall  in import prices  and the adjustment 
of the DM equivalent of  those  prices  for  agri-
cultural  products  which,  under  the  common 
organization  applicable  to the agricultural  mar-
ket,  are  directly  or indirectly  fixed  in units  of 
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necessarily  check  the  expansion  of  demand 
sufficiently  in the short term,  since  the volume 
of  imports  and  exports  is  comparatively  slow 
in  reacting  to  changes  in  the  terms  of  trade. 
In this  context it must be  borne in  mind  that 
the  tendency  to  overheating  has  persisted  till 
very  recently  and  that  there  is  probably  little 
chance  of  the  expansion  of  demand  returning 
very  rapidly  to  a  pace  more  in  line  with  the 
distinctly reduced possibilities for  an  expansion 
of supply.  The restrictive policy  pursued until 
now should therefore be continued for the time 
being.  Once there are  signs  of  a distinct slow-
down  in  the  trend  of  demand,  particularly  in 
exports  and investment,  there would, however, 
be a case  for  rapid relaxation of  the restrictive 
measures  being  applied  in  the  monetary  and 
credit field  and for a less  stringent budget pol-
icy,  with a view not only to enabling the effects 
of revaluation  to have  their full  impact  on  the 
current  account  but  also  to  preventing  too 
severe  a slowdown of economic  activity,  which 
would inevitably affect the other member coun-
tries. 
The pursuit, in  Germany,  of a  short-term eco-
nomic policy conceived along  these lines  would 
be  all  the  more  in  the  interest  of  most  other 
member countries as  it would help to avoid too 
abrupt  a  rise  in  the  demands  made  on  their 
resources  in  the  form  of  exports  to  Germany 
but would ensure steady and dynamic expansion 
of  their deliveries  to that country. 
The  parity  changes  that  have  taken  place  in 
France and Germany should not tempt the other 
member countries into relaxing  the efforts they 
are  making  to  bring about  a  distinct  easing  in 
the  expansion  of domestic  demand.  The infla-
tion  of  prices  and  costs  being  experienced  in 
these countries has  already reached serious pro-
portions, and in addition the tax on value added 
is to be introduced in Luxembourg on 1 January 
1970, in Belgium  probably on  1 January  1971 
and later in  Italy too;  if the changeover is  not 
to  release  new  upward  pressures  on  prices,  it 
should be made in as  calm an economic climate 
as  possible. 
After  the  parity  changes  in  France  and  Ger-
many,  the risk that conflicting objectives  might 
be pursued by the countries of the Community 
has  been  considerably  reduced.  For  internal 
equilibrium to be restored, however, all member 
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countries will have to be very flexible in the use 
they  make  of  the  various  instruments  of  eco-
nomic  policy. 
In the  struggle  against  inflation  a very  impor-
tant contribution must come  from  the budgets; 
to  judge  from  the  estimates,  these  still  appear 
to be along  unduly  expansionary lines  in some 
member countries.  Generally, the rise in public 
spending in  1970  should be  strictly  limited  to 
a rate  that is  appreciably  lower  than  the pros-
pective  rise,  in  terms  of  money,  of  the  gross 
national  product  in  1970.  In  the  countries 
where the need for infrastructure investment is 
still very great, the efforts at containment, which 
must  be  pursued  energetically,  should  concen-
trate mainly on those items of expenditure which 
contribute  to  consumption.  Where  this  is  not 
possible,  an  increase in direct taxes  or a reduc-
tion  in  tax  concessions  should  be  envisaged. 
Generally,  a  concentration  of  spending  in  the 
first half of the year should be avoided as far as 
possible  and  consideration  should  rather  be 
given  to spreading  outlays  uniformly  over  the 
year.  If deficits cannot be avoided, they should 
be  financed  from  the  internal  income  circuit 
rather than by monetary means. 
As  it is  not possible  to  forecast  with certainty 
the influence which will be exerted during 1970 
by  the  economic  situation  in  the  rest  of  the 
world,  all  Community countries would be well 
advised to ensure here and now that a "contin-
gency" margin over and above the anti-inflation-
ary  bias  of the budgets  that is  currently abso-
lutely  indispensable  is  available  both  on  the 
expenditure and  the revenue  side of their bud-
gets,  so  that the way in which public funds  are 
handled  can,  where  necessary,  be  adjusted 
rapidly  to a changed economic  situation in the 
Community. 
The business situation as  it is  today appeats to 
call  also  for  a continuation of  the  tight money 
policy.  In Germany,  the situation has  changed 
after the revaluation of the mark, in that there 
will in future probably be considerably less need 
to  offset  the  surpluses  on  current  account  by 
substantial exports of capital.  In this  country, 
incidentally,  an  unusually  sharp  contraction  of 
domestic  liquidity  has  resulted  from  the  out-
flows  of  foreign  exchange  and  has  led  to  an 
appreciable  rise  in  interest  rates.  A  certain 
relaxation of the measures  to influence liquidity 
in Germany may prove perfectly desirable if the restrictive pressure exerted by market forces  is 
not to become unduly strong.  By  lowering the 
minimum reserve requirements the Bundesbank 
has in some measure already taken cognizance of 
this  aspect  of the situation. 
The importance  of  the  struggle  against  the in-
flationary  tendencies  through  a  firmer  steering 
of domestic  demand is  enhanced by  the almost 
complete  exhaustion  of  reserves  of  technical 
capacity and by  the growing  imbalances  on the 
labour  market,  which  are  increasingly  limiting 
the possibilities of action to expand supply.  The 
efforts to mobilize  those resources  that are  still 
available, particularly through adjustment of the 
economic structures and increased endeavours to 
equip  young  people  and  adults  with  the  right 
skills,  should nevertheless  be  stepped up.  Par-
ticular importance  attaches  in this  context  also 
to the efforts to ensure a better balance between 
regions;  this could be the source of substantial 
further  reserves  of  productivity  which  could 
help  create,  at  least  in  the  longer  term,  more 
favourable  conditions  for  an  expansion  that 
would  be  rapid  yet  free  from  strain.  In  the 
present business situation, moreover, any  meas-
ures  to promote effective competition between 
firms  would  also  be  exceptionally  well  worth 
while. 
The events of 1968 and 1969 and the problems 
they  raised  for  integration  again  highlight  the 
need to make substantial progress towards closer 
co-ordination of economic policy  at Community 
level. 
This is why the Commission unremittingly advo-
cated,  even  before  monetary  difficulties  devel-
oped in  1968, action  to  improve  the co-ordina-
tion  of  economic  policy  and  to  establish 
monetary solidarity  among  the Member  States, 
a:1d  has  proposed  that the  appropriate  mecha-
nisms  should be set up to this end. 
In its  Memorandum  to the  Council  concerning 
the co-ordination of economic policies and mon-
etary co-operation in the Community of 12 Feb-
ruary  1969  and  in  other  places  the  Commis-
sion  has  made  practical  proposals  to  this  end; 
the  main  points  from  the  Memorandum  were 
outlined  in  Quarterly  Survey  No.  1/1969  on 
"The economic situation in the Community". 
At  its  session  of  17  July  1969  the  Council 
discussed  these  problems  in  detail.  On a  pro-
posal from the Commission it adopted a decision 
introducing a procedure of prior consultation in 
respect  of  all  important  decisions  or measures 
to be taken in the field  of short-term economic 
policy which would have a major impact on the 
economies  of  the  other  member  countries  or 
which might lead to a major divergence between 
economic  trend  developments  in  one  country 
and  the  medium-term  economic  objectives  that 
have been jointly agreed.  Although the rules to 
govern  implementation  of  this  procedure  still 
need  to be  laid  down  in  greater  detail,  there 
have already been several prior consultations of 
this  type. 
The Council also  agreed that before the end of 
1969 there should be a discussion--on the basis 
of  the  Commission's  Memorandum-on  the 
principles involved in the guidelines for medium-
term  economic  policy.  The  Council  further 
agreed  to the principle of  a Community system 
of short-term monetary support measures which 
is  to  be  established  in  accordance  with  the 
guidelines  set  out  in  the  Memorandum  of 
12  February,  and  it invited  the  Committee  of 
Central  Bank  Governors  to  continue  its  work 
on  rules  to  govern  the  functioning  of  such  a 
system.  In addition, the Council requested the 
Monetary  Committee  to  submit  to  it and  the 
Commission a report on the arrangements need-
ed  to  implement  a  system  of  medium-term 
financial  assistance. 
It now remains to make better use than hitherto 
of the various possibilities for co-ordination, and 
to  give  co-ordination  as  practical  a  content  as 
possible.  Only in this way will it in future be 
possible  to  avoid  parity  changes  which  are  al-
ways  a potential threat to integration.  Decisive 
importance must therefore be attached in future 
to  mutual  endeavours  at  co-ordination  of  eco-
nomic objectives and of the measures  by which 
they  are  to  be  achieved. 
31 PATTERN OF INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE -1958 and 1968 
Reporting country  Germany  France  Italy  Nether  lands  B.L.E.U.  Community 
Year 
Country of origin  Im·  Ex- Im- Ex- Im·  Ex- Im- Ex- Im- Ex·  Im- Ex-
or dest,ination  ports  ports  ports  ports  ports  ports  ports  ports  ports  ports  ports  ports 
----
1958 
-=-1~ ~~~~ ~~~  ~~~  ~~~  Germany  ---
1968  45.0  43.2  49.3  46.6  47.6  48.4  37.9  32.6  31.7  28.7 
1958  29.61__:7  .7  _:::_I  22.3  6.7111.7  ~123.5  ~1- 18.7  France  ---
1968  29.2  32.7  31.3  31.4  11.7  18.3  27.7  28.9  19.2  23.3 
-
1958 
-=-I~ ~~~  ~~~  ~~~ 
9.8111.2 
Italy  ---
1968  24.1  20.2  20.1  21.4  8.2  8.4  7.8  5.8  14.5  13.0 
1958 
~~~ 
11.61  9.1  12.0 I 8.6  ~~~  ~j-==  Netherlands  ----
1968  26.3  27.1  12.9  11.7  10.7  11.6  26.6  32.8  16.4  18.5 
1958  _r~l  24.3  ~~~ 
9.41  9.5  -===-I~  ~~---=== 
B.L.E.U.  ---
1968  20.3  20.0  21.9  23.6  8.7  10.4  32.5  24.9  18.1  16.5 
1958 
~~~  ~~~  ~~~  ~~~  ~~~  ~~_r~  Community  ---
1968  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
32 Community 
TABLE 1: Basic data 1968 
I Commu- Ger- France  Italy  Nether- Bel- Lux  em-
I 
nity  many  lands  gium  burg 
Total area ('000 sq. km.)  1167.5  248.5  551.2  301.2  33.5  30.5  2.6 
Total population ('000)  185 806  60 184  50  188  52 778  12 725  9 619  335.5 
Density of population per sq. km.  159  242  91  175  380  315  129 
Numbers in employment ('000)  73  898  26  342  19 675  19 069  4 547  3 615  138.8 
Numbers  in  employment,  break-
down by main sector (%)  : 
- Agriculture  14  10.0  15  22.3  7.7  5.6  12.1 
- Industry  43  47.4  40  41.4  40.2  44.9  45.3 
- Services  43  42.6  45  36.3  52.1  49.5  42.6 
Share  of gross  domestic  product 
(%): 
- Agriculture  4.8  8  12.4  7.0  6.2 
-Industry  48.8  41  40.4  42.2  50.0 
- Services  46.4  52  47.2  50.8  42.9 
In % of gross domestic product : 
- Private consumers' expenditure  56.0  60.9  63.6  56.4  61.1 
- Public  current  expenditure 
on goods and services  15.8  12.8  13.5  15.5  12.0 
- Gross fixed  asset formation  22.9  24.9  19.4  26.7  25.1 
- Total exports  23.8  14.3  19.5  43.0  81.2 
- Total imports  20.3  14.3  14.1  43.1  78.9 
-
TABLE 2 : Key indicators 
I 
I 
Volume 
% change by volume  indices 
on preceding year  (1963 
=  100) 
1964  I  1965  I  1966  I  1967  I  1968  1968 
Gross Community product  6.1  5.0  4.1  3.3  6  127 
Industrial production  7.0  4.4  5.3  1.3  8.7  130 
Visible imports  8.7  8.1  9.3  2.1  14.7  151 
Private customers' expenditure  4.8  5.0  4.5  3.8  4.5  125 
Gross fixed asset formation  9.4  3.8  4.7  1.2  6.5  128 
Visible exports  11.6  11.5  8.4  8.1  15.8  168 
Intra-Community visible trade  13.2  12.2  10.9  6.0  18.9  178 
Gross product per capita  5.0  3.9  3.2  2.7  5.1  121 
'--------------------------------------- ------ --- ---~------------- --·-·---------
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TABLE 3 : Basic monthly indicators 
I Year I Jan.  I Feb.  I Mar.  I Apr.  I May  I June I July  I Aug., 
Industrial production  1967  115  118  120  122  121  122  111 
(1963  =  100) 
1968  121  126  130  133  1•)')  130  119 
1969  137  142  146  150  151  152  136 
Imports from non-member  19fl7  2 607  2 392  2 610  2 515  2564  2654  2 366 
countries (cif, million u.a.) 
19G8  2 69±  \!  606  2 811  2 709  5 408  2 850 
19R9  3 173  2 793  3 105  3 283  3 321  1 3 376  3 259 
Exports to non-member  1967  2 563  2 413 
countries (fob, million u.a.) 
2 678  2 681  2 595 1 2 721  2 543 
1968  2 781  2771  3 025  2 848  5 323  3 206 
1969  2 887  2 7±5  3 261  3 305  3 295 1  3 296  3 5o4 
Balance of trade  1967  - 44  +  21  +  68  + 166  +  31  1 +  67  + 177 
(million u.a.) 
1968  +  87  + 165  +  214  + 139  - 85  + 356 
1969  - 286  - 48  + 156  +  22  - 261- so  + 325 
Intra-Community trade  1967  1 925  1 861 
(million u.a.) 
2 145  2 002  1 974 1  2 099  1 913 
1968  2 123  2 162  2 371  2 287  4 248  2 479 
1969  2 695  2 727  3 057  3 043  3 o13 1 3 101  3 157 
NOTES TO GRAPHS AND TABLE~ 
Source:  Community: Statistical Office of the European Communities (SOEC). 
Germany: SOEC; Statistisches Bundesamt. 
France: SOEC. 
Italy: Relazione generale sulla situazione economico del Paese (1968). 
931 
107 
115 
2 376 
2 608 
2 858 
2 358 
2  ""Q  II~ 
2 801 
- 18 
+ 164 
- 57 
1 734 
2 085 
2 415 
Sept.,  Oct.  I Nov.,  Dec. 
122  126  130  131 
135  140  149  146 
146 
2 444  2 620  2 784  2 837 
2 790  2 991  3 061  3 008 
2 525  2 918  2 763  2 876 
2 784  3 297  3 171  3 286 
+  81  + 298  - 21  +  39 
- 6  + 306  + 110  + 278 
1 956  2 245  2 182  2 126 
2 409  2 773  2 658  2 724 
Netherlands: SOEC; Ministerie  van Sociale  Zaken en Volksgezondheid; Centraal Bureau voor de Sta-
tistiek. 
Belgium: SOEC; .Ministere de l'emploi et du travail; 
Luxembourg: SOEC. 
Conversion into units of account (1  u.a.  0.888671  g of fine  gold 
Graph  1 
US  $1) at the official exchange rates. 
- Three-month moving averages  of the  seasonally  adjusted  value of exports  to non-member countries  (fob) 
and imports from these countries (cif), as  shown by foreign trade statistics. 
Graph 2 
Trend curve; estimate established on the basis of indices adjusted for seasonal and fortuitous variations (ex-
cluding construction, food, beverages and tobacco). 
Graph 3 
Three-month moving averages of the seasonally adjusted value of trade between member countries, as shown 
by foreign trade statistics on imports. 
Graph 4 
- Total gross reserves of gold and foreign exchange held by the monetary authorities of the member countries 
at the end of each month. 
34 Table  1 
Total population at mid-year; for Germany, estimated average for year; for Italy, average for year. 
- Resident population in employment at mid-year; for Germany, estimated average for year; for Italy, average 
for year less persons temporarily working abroad. 
- Breakdown by agriculture, industry and services at factor cost; for Luxembourg, 1967 figures. 
Shares of the major aggregates in the gross domestic product at market prices. 
- Total exports and imports: goods, services and factor income. 
Owing to revision of the national accounting arrangements in Belgium, information on the breakdown of the 
gross domestic product was not available when this Survey was prepared. 
Table 2 
Industrial production: index of the  Statistical Office  of the European Communities,  excluding construction, 
food, beverages and tobacco. 
Imports (cif) from non-member countries, as  shown by foreign trade statistics. 
Exports (fob) to non-member countries, as  shown by foreign trade statistics. 
Trade between member countries, as shown by foreign trade statistics on imports. 
Table 3 
- See note to Table 2. 
35 ..  , II. THE SITUATION IN EACH 
OF  THE  COMMUNITY  COUNTRIES A.  Germany 
The  vigorous  economic  upswing  in  the  Federal  Republic  continued  in  1969  and 
gained  additional  strength.  The  main  growth  factors  were  export  demand  and 
unusually brisk investment.  The expansion  of private consumers'  expenditure was 
also gathering more and more momentum.  Particularly in  the first half of the year, 
domestic supply was still very elastic but as  the year advanced it became increasingly 
obvious that there were limits to the expansion of supply.  This was  most evident 
on  the labour  market,  where the sharp  increase  in  recruitment  of  foreign  workers 
did not prevent a hitherto unprecedented imbalance developing between the number 
of unfilled vacancies  and the number of unemployed.  With the volume  of orders 
on hand expanding,  delivery periods in industry lengthened substantially.  Producer 
prices  hardened  increasingly  as  the  year  advanced,  and  at  the  level  of  private 
consumption,  too,  the  upward  thrust  of  prices  gathered  additional  momentum, 
particularly  towards the end of the year.  The surplus on  foreign  trade and in the 
balance  of payments  contracted  only  a little in  1969,  despite  a  very  vigorous  rise 
zn  imports. 
Given the persistently high  external surpluses and the resultant tendency  for  prices 
to rise, the German Government revalued the German mark by 9.29 % on 27 Octo-
ber.  This has  changed  the setting  for  economic  development in  1970  and has  in 
particular  brought nearer  to  fulfilment the conditions which  must be  met if strain 
is  gradually  to be eased.  The rise  in demand and the high level of orders on hand 
nevertheless suggest that the economy will continue to  expand rapidly.  As a result 
of the current round of wage increases, private consumers' expenditure, in particular, 
is likely to make an  important contribution to  expansion.  In the light of both the 
situation  on  the labour  market and  the advances in  productivity,  the scope  for  an 
expansion  of supply  will  be  distinctly  smaller  than  in  1969,  so  that  it is  at  the 
moment reasonable to  assume that for  1970 the gross  national product at  constant 
prices  will rise  by about 4.5 %. 
1.  Balance sheet for 1969 
Throughout 1969 there was an unusually strong 
upswing  of  activity  in  Germany.  Although 
initially  the  elasticity  of  supply  was  still  com-
paratively high, an increasing number of strains 
appeared, and towards the end of the year cases 
of  overheating were  discernible. 
As  in  1968, export demand was  a very dynamic 
factor  in the upswing.  There was  a very  rapid 
rise in export orders:  the world economic trend 
was  still  very  expansionary,  especially  in  the 
first half of  the year;  boom conditions obtained 
in  the Community;  compared  with some  coun-
tries,  cost  and  price  trends  relevant  to foreign 
trade  were  more  and  more  in  favour  of  Ger-
many,  and  there  was  heavy  speculation  on  a 
change  in  exchange  parities.  Only  later in the 
year  did  the  export  boom  slacken  a  little, 
particularly  after  the  conditions  governing 
foreign  trade had been changed by  the devalua-
tion of the French franc,  the temporary floating 
of  the  rate  of  exchange  of  the  German  mark 
and,  subsequently,  its  revaluation.  In  visible 
trade, sales  in term:>  of value  went up by some 
16%. 
Receipts  from  sen•tees  included,  the  rise  from 
1968  to  1969  in  exports,  as  defined  in  the 
39 national accounts, was  probably  15 %  in terms 
of value and 13 % in terms of volume, compared 
with 13.2% and 15.6 %, respectively,  the pre-
vious  year.  Expansion  was  particularly  lively 
in exports to the other member countries, which 
went up by 24.5 %.  But exports  to the non-
member  countries  also  rose  by  some  11  % 
despite a distinct slackening in deliveries to the 
United States. 
Trade with non-member 
million u.a.  countries 
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The contribution of domestic demand continued 
to strengthen appreciably in 1969, with invest-
ment again the leading factor making for expan-
sion.  Investment in plant and machinery, which 
had  risen  by  almost  12 %  the  previous  year 
already,  probably more than doubled its rate of 
year-to-year increase in 1969.  Corporate invest-
ment  activity  displayed  particular  vigour.  In 
the  second  half  of  the  year  the  trend  slowed 
down slightly,  solely because bottlenecks on the 
supply  side  were  making  even  faster  growth 
more  and  more  difficult.  The  propensity  to 
invest,  at  any  rate,  had  shown  no  sign  of 
slackening  by  the  end  of  the  year  and  the 
backlog of orders for capital goods was running 
at an unprecedented level.  The decisive factors 
in  the  continued  buoyancy  of  the  investment 
boom  were  in  particular  the  sales  prospects, 
which  until  quite  recently  were  very  good,  a 
further  vigorous  rise  in  profits,  virtually  un-
restricted access  to finance,  and the pressure to 
rationalize,  due,  among  other  things,  to  the 
labour shortage.  Although building investment, 
by contrast, expanded on the whole less rapidly, 
activity even in this field  picked up increasingly 
from the spring onwards.  This applies in special 
measure  to  corporate  expenditure  on  building. 
Investment  in  residential  construction  at  the 
&arne  time  rose  more  vigorously  in  1969  than 
a  year  earlier.  In addition,  public  investment 
40 
expenditure,  which a year  previously  had gone 
up  very  sharply  as  the programme  to promote 
economic  activity,  decided  upon  in  1967,  was 
being  implemented,  rose  in  1969  at  much  the 
same pace as from 1967 to 1968.  It is estimated 
that  building  investment  as  a  whole  rose  by 
10%. 
Lastly,  investment  in  stocks  showed  a  further 
vigorous  rise  in 1969,  partly  as  a  reflection  of 
the fact that in the first half of the year substan-
tial quantities of cereals were imported and put 
into  storage  because  of  the  discount  at  which 
the French franc  was  available  on  the forward 
market.  For technical reasons,  the rapid expan-
sion  of  output also  entailed a  rise  in  the level 
of stocks needed at earlier stages in the produc-
tion process.  Also, increasingly frequent bottle-
necks  in  the  supply  of  components  delayed 
deliveries in many industries.  In the consumer 
goods industries, too, any increase in stocks was 
definitely not due to sluggish demand.  In fact, 
most  firms  taking  part  in  the  EEC  Business 
Survey  considered  their  stocks  too low. 
The  tendency  for  consumption  to  expand,  al-
ready  discernible  in  1968,  was  increasingly 
gaining in speed during 1969.  For the full year, 
the expansion of public current expenditure on 
goods  and  services  remained  comparatively 
modest,  despite the wage  and  salary  awards  of 
the  autumn,  since  the  spending  policy  pursued 
before had been rather cautious.  Private consu-
mers'  expenditure,  however,  rose  fairly  rapidly 
throughout the year,  with expansion gaining in-
creasingly  in vigour.  The most dynamic  trend 
was  in purchases of consumer durables,  notably 
motor  vehicles;  in the first  nine  months,  reg-
istrations of new passenger cars were 28 %  up 
on a year  earlier.  Sales  of  electrical household 
8ppliances  were  no less  expansionary,  while  in 
traditional  consumer  goods  the  trend  was  ini-
tially  still  quiet,  gaining  in vigour  only  in  the 
second half of the year.  Overall, private consu-
mers'  expenditure  in  1969 was  probably  some 
10.5% up on 1968. 
The key  to the expansion of private consumers' 
expenditure  was  the  vigorous  upward  move-
ment  of  incomes.  Although  agreed  wages 
showed  no  more  than  a  comparatively  modest 
rise  until  the  summer,  substantial  increases  in 
agreed  wages  and  salaries  were  subsequently 
awarded  under  the  pressure  of  relatively  short 
strikes.  In the autumn, the economy as a whole 
\ Germany
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41had  to  absorb  a  very  substantial  wave  of  in-
creases  in agreed  wages.  Since  as  early  as  the 
beginning  of  the  year,  the wage  drift had  also 
been  very  vigorous,  mainly  because  the  man-
power shortage led many  firms  to  introduce in 
increasing measure  overtime  working and extra 
shifts  and  to pay  wages  that were in excess  of 
the agreed rates.  All in all, the gross wage- and 
salary-bill for  1969 was  probably  a good  12 % 
up  on  1968.  Business  profits  in  1969,  too, 
were  again  appreciably  above  the  record  level 
of  the  previous  year.  The  rise  in transfer  in-
comes,  by  contrast,  was  comparatively  small. 
The  progressive  tax  scale  and  the  increase  in 
social  security  contributions  meant  that  dispo· 
sable  incomes  rose  considerably  more  slowly 
than gross incomes.  In addition it appears that 
the  proportion  of  incomes  saved  continued  to 
rise,  another  factor  curbing  the  expansion  of 
private  consumers'  expenditure. 
It was  on the labour market that the tendency 
for  the  boom  to  create  strain  made  itself  felt 
most  strongly.  By  the  end of May  the unem-
ployment rate had dropped to 0.6 %.  By  Sep-
tember, which is  the seasonal peak  for employ-
ment,  the  number  of  unfilled  vacancies  had 
risen  to  833 000,  more  than  eight  times  the 
number of unemployed.  The strain would have 
been even greater if the number of foreign wor-
kers  had  not  climbed  sharply.  At  the  end  of 
September  it  was  1.5  million,  a  new  record. 
Part-time  working  also  expanded  vigorously  in 
1969.  The number of persons in paid employ-
ment is  likely to have risen by about 2.5 %. 
Labour market  (thousands) 
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In industry, which accounted for the lion's share 
of  the  additional  employment,  production  ex-
panded once again  at a decidedly vigorous pace. 
Industrial production as  a whole  probably rose 
by  almost  12 %.  In  the  second  half  of  the 
year,  however, the expansion of production was 
somewhat less rapid, owing to capacity shortages 
and  smaller  productivity gains.  The unusually 
sharp  expansion  in  the  capital goods  industries 
in  1969  reflected  an  investment  upsurge  that 
was  initially the main factor  in the boom.  For 
the full year,  for instance,  the output of capital 
goods  was probably 17 % higher than in 1968. 
In  mechanical  engineering  in  particular,  the 
backlog  of  orders  was  very  large  towards  the 
end of the year.  Output of consumer goods, by 
contrast, did not quite maintain the growth rate 
of a year earlier. 
Industrial production 
!50 
1963  =  100 
140 
T  l 
T  Q::  ,....... 1--
i/  --~---r---
/ 
130  / 
VI 
12(1  ,.  ..,....., 
v  -..',.....  110 
100  , 
I  II  Ill  IV  V VI  IJII  \1111~  /.  fi  All  I  II  Ill  IV  V VI  VII  V,ll  IX  X XI  XII  I  II  Ill  IV  V VI  VII  VIII  IX  X XI  XII 
1967  1968  1969 
The  other  sectors  of  production  likewise  con-
tributed  strongly  to  the  expansion  of  supply. 
This  applied  in  particular  to  services.  Farm 
output fell only a little short of the record level 
of  the previous  year.  All in  all,  real  gross  na-
tional  product  is  estimated  to  have  risen  by 
about  8 %  in  1969;  growth  was  thus  of  the 
same  order  of  magnitude  as  in  1968  and  was 
more  than  double  the average  annual  rate  sug-
gested under the projections of the Community's 
fitst Medium-term Economic Policy Programme. 
The  boom  and  the  increasingly  full  utilization 
of  the domestic  supply potential led to heavier 
recourse  to  imports.  The  growth  of  imports 
was  stimulated  not only  by  a tendency for im-
port  demand  to  gather  additional  momentum 
but also  by special  factors  such  as  the 4 % tax 
rebate  on  imports  introduced  in  November 
1968, discounts on the forward market for some 
major currencies,  the devaluation of the French 
franc  in August and the floating  and the subse-
quent  revaluation  of  the  German  mark.  The 
rise  was  sharpest  in  purchases  of  finished 
products.  The increase in raw material imports, 
43 by  contrast,  remained  comparatively  modest, 
compared with the strong expansion of produc-
tion.  With  import  prices  rising  appreciably, 
total visible imports in terms of value  went up 
by  some  22 %.  Imports  of  services  included, 
total imports are likely to have been up by some 
20 % while their volume expanded by 17.5 %. 
Trade with other member 
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As a result of the unusually strong expansion of 
demand,  the  price  climate  deteriorated increas-
ingly  as  the  year  advanced.  The  tendency  for 
prices  to  rise,  which  initially  was  mainly  due 
to  the  pressure  of  demand,  was  strengthened 
appreciably in the last third of  the year  by  the 
pressure of costs.  There was  a fairly sharp rise 
in industrial producer prices,  which  in  October 
were almost 4 % up on the level of a year ear-
lier.  In the agricultural sector, prices rose even 
more substantially;  in October, £arrogate  prices 
were 4 % higher than in the same month of the 
previous year.  At consumer level,  by  contrast, 
competition  prevented  prices  from  going  up 
more  steeply,  at least  in  the  first  half  of  the 
year.  Although the October cost-of-living index 
was  approximately  2.8%  higher  than  a  year 
160 
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earlier,  the  bulk  of  this  increment  was  ac-
counted for  by  dearer  food,  beverages  and  to-
bacco.  Towards  the  end  of  the  year,  the  up-
ward  thrust  of  consumer  prices  was  generally 
gathering distinct momentum. 
Pressure  on  the  domestic  market  was  still  not 
relieved  sufficiently  by  imports,  while-as 
pointed out already-the trend of  exports was 
still very expansionary;  as  a result the "external 
contribution",  as  defined  for  the  national  ac-
counts,  fell  much less  sharply  than was needed 
for  the  health  of  the  economy.  For  the  full 
year, it may be estimated at DM 15 500 million, 
compared with DM 18 400  million  in  1968. 
At DM  10 600  million,  the  balance  of visible 
trade  for  the  first  nine  months  closed  with  a 
surplus  that was  only DM  1 300  million lower 
than  that for  the  same  period  of  the previous 
year.  The balance  on  service  transactions,  by 
contrast, was in heavy deficit again,  so  that the 
current  account,  which  includes  transfer  pay-
ments that were only marginally higher, showed 
a surplus  of  DM  5 200  million,  compared with 
DM 6 800  million for  the first  nine months of 
1968.  As  this  contrasted with net  exports  of 
long-term  capital  that  were  DM  5 100  million 
higher, the basic balance showed the very heavy 
deficit of DM 8 500 million.  With net inflows 
of  short-term  capital  running  at  more  than 
double  the  1968 figure,  the picture was  never-
theless  essentially  different  in that the residual 
item  of  the balance  of payments,  which  in  the 
main  reflects changes  in leads and lags,  showed 
the  formidable  surplus  of  DM  11  100  million.  } 
This  was  mainly  the  result  of  speculative 
changes  in  attitude  before  24  October  which 
are  difficult  to  assess  in  statistical  terms  and 
were  prompted  by  expectations  that  the  mark 
would  be  revalued. 
During  the  greater part  of  the  year,  the  main 
feature  of  the  monetary  trend was  an  increase 
in inflows of liquidity from abroad.  This helped 
to  make  more  capital  available  to  firms  which 
are  directly  linked  with  their  foreign  parent 
companies  or  subsidiaries.  The  inflows  also 
contributed  to  a  considerable  increase  in  bank 
liquidity.  As  the  economic  upswing  was 
spreading,  borrowing  by  firms,  particularly  at 
short  term,  expanded  vigorously.  The  factors 
checking the expansion of liquidity, by  contrast, 
hardly affected the supply of bank credit to any 
significant  extent at this stage, although money 
and  credit  policy  tended  to  tighten  liquidity through  several  increases  in  the  m1rumum  re-
serve  requirements  and  reductions  in  redis-
counting facilities.  In addition, Bank  rate was 
raised by  steps  from  3 %  to  6 %. 
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The  trend  of  the  cash  position  of  the  public 
authorities  also  had  a  restrictive  influence  on 
domestic  liquidity.  With  tax  revenue  rising 
substantially,  spending policy  followed  cautious 
lines,  particularly  in the  first  half  of  the year, 
so  that  in  1969  the  public  sector  as  a  whole 
achieved  a financial  surplus  of some DM  6 000 
million;  as  there  was  a  deficit  of  DM  5 000 
million in the previous year,  this means an anti-
cyclical  swing,  from  one  year  to  the  next,  of 
DM  11 000  million. 
Restrictive  policy  and  the  rise  in international 
interest  rates  led  in  1969  to  an  unmistakable 
change in trend on the capital markets.  On the 
bond market, for instance, interest rates declined 
until  February  but  then  rallied,  although  this 
did  not  affect  long-term  capital  exports,  which 
are  desirable  for  balance-of-payments  reasons. 
Demand  for  and  supply  of  goods  and  services 
1967 1  1968 1  1969  2 
---- --~-------
At 
current  % change on preceding year 
prices 
(in DM 
'000 
million)  Volume 
-
Exports 4  111.5  +  15.6 
Gross fixed asset formation  110.4  +  8.2 
Public current expenditure on goods and 
services  80.6  +  0.2 
Private consumers' expenditure  281.4  +  3.6 
Gross national product  485.1  +  7.6 
Imports 4  95.3  + 16.9 
1  Federal Statistical Office, "Wirtschaft und Statistik", No. 9/1969. 
2  Commission estimates. 
3  Commission forecasts. 
4  Goods, services and factor income. 
5  At preceding year's prices. 
Note: 
Value  Volume  Value 
+  13.2  +13  +  15 
+  9.9  +  13lf2  +  17 
+  3.8  +  4lf2  +  9 
+  5.7  +  7lf2  +  10lf2 
+  9.4  +  8  +  11 
+  13.2  +  17lf2  + 20 
I 
1970 3 
Volume 
5 
+  8 
+  8lf2 
+  4 
+  6 
+  4lf2 
+  15 
(a)  The difference between the figures for demand and those for supply is accounted for by movements in stocks. 
(b)  The estimates  and  forecasts  are  approximations  based  on  certain  hypotheses,  generally  mentioned  in  the 
Quarterly Surveys. They have been discussed with the experts of the member countries but are established and 
published on the sole responsibility of the Commission. 
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bearing securities rose from 6.2 %  in February 
to 7.2 %  in October,  although net sales  of do-
mestic bonds  were  distinctly  below  the figures 
of  a  year  earlier,  partly  because  of  the  lower 
borrowing  requirements  of  the  public  authori-
ties. On the share markets, too, sales  of domes-
tic shares lagged behind the 1968 figures, while 
net purchases  of  foreign  equities  were  several 
times higher. 
2.  Outlook for 1970 
Given the considerable imbalances  in the exter-
nal trade and payments pattern and particularly 
the heavy surpluses on goods and services which 
persisted  even  during  the  boom  and  were  in-
creasingly threatening to become a source of in-
flation,  the  Federal  Government  allowed  the 
rate  of  exchange  to  float  and  on  24  October 
revalued the mark by 9.29 %.  The new parity 
is  now DM 3.66 to the US  dollar.  The margin 
on  either  side  of  the  parity  was  at  the  same 
time restored  to 0.75 %.  However, the 4% 
tax  on  exports  and  similar  rebate  on  imports, 
introduced in November 1968, were definitively 
withdrawn. 
The future trend will consequently be influenced 
by  two basic  factors:  firstly,  by  the vigour  of 
the  current  economic  upswing  which  has  ap-
parently not yet passed its peak, and,  secondly, 
by the repercussions which the parity change is 
expected  to have  on  foreign  trade  and  service 
transactions  and  on  the  attitudes  of  manage-
ments, unions and other economic groups. 
It  is  particularly  difficult  at  the  moment  to 
make  sound  estimates  of  the  future  trend  of 
export  demand.  The  abolition  of  the  export 
tax and the upward tendency of prices and costs 
which persists  in some  major  partner countries 
suggest that export demand will continue to ex-
pand despite  revaluation,  which  was  not  large 
enough  to  arrest  export  growth.  There  is  a 
good  deal  of  evidence  that  the  price  increase 
for  German  products,  which,  expressed  in 
foreign currencies, would be 9.2 %, will in fact 
be  lower,  since  German  exporters  will  be 
tempted  to  shave  down  their  export  prices. 
The extent  to  which  they  will  actually  do  so 
depends,  however,  essentially  on  the  state  of 
export  demand  and  on  the  further  trend  of 
business  activity at home. 
46 
Despite  the  slower  growth  of  export  demand, 
the  vigorous  expansion  of  overall  demand  will 
probably continue unabated far  into 1970 since 
aggregate  domestic  demand  will  if  anything 
gather  additional momentum. 
Although gross fixed asset formation can hardly 
expand  as  fast  as  in  1969,  investment  demand 
will probably  go  on boosting economic  activity 
far  into  1970.  Never  before  was  the  backlog 
of  orders  for  capital  goods  in  the  industries 
manufacturing plant and machinery as  heavy  as 
at the end of 1969, so  that for this reason alone 
investment  activity  is  certain  to  continue  at  a 
high  level  beyond  the  first  half  of  the  year. 
The  persistent excess strain on production capac-
ities  and  the  rise  in  costs  touched  off  by  the 
spate of wage  awards  of  the autumn constitute 
an  additional  important  incentive  to  step  up 
rationalization investment.  The investment sur-
vey carried out shortly before revaluation in co-
operation  with  the  IFO  Institute  suggests,  in-
deed, that in 1970 firms will step up investment 
sharply.  According  to  the  survey,  industry 
intended to spend  some  15 %  more  on invest-
ment.  However, as exporting will be more dif-
ficult  and  revaluation  will  add  to  the pressure 
on  profit  margins  already  squeezed  by  rising 
wage  costs,  some  firms  may  feel  prompted  to 
revise their investment plans downwards.  Cur-
rent  building  projects  in  residential  construc-
tion, industrial building and public building sug-
gest  that  building  investment,  too,  will  go  on 
expanding,  at any  rate in the early  part of the 
year. 
The  trend  of  consumption  should  remain  very 
dynamic.  Public current expenditure on goods 
and services will probably expand fairly rapidly, 
influenced as  it will be by the wage and salary 
increases.  Private  consumers'  expenditure  is 
likely to rise vigorously in the first half of 1970, 
mainly  owing  to  the  very  heavy  increase  in 
Germany's  net wage- and  salary-bill  (including 
transfer  incomes  from  public  sources)  in  the 
last  quarter  of  1969.  There  are  many  indica-
tions  that the upward movement in wages  will 
not slacken until later in 1970.  Numerous wage 
agreements will come up for  renewal.  Were it 
only  to prevent unofficial  labour  conflicts  out-
side  the  collective  wage  agreements,  the  trade 
unions  will probably put forward  further wage 
claims  of  major  proportions;  given  the  acute 
manpower  shortage,  employers  will  probably 
concede  substantial wage  increases  unless-and this is unlikely-the trend of demand falls  very 
appreciably in the near future.  In addition, the 
wage  drift will probably be fairly  strong again, 
notably  as  workers  move  up  to  higher  paid 
jobs  or change  firms  or industries  in  search  of 
better pay.  Furthermore, self-employed persons 
can  be  expected  to  withdraw fairly  substantial 
amounts  from  their  businesses.  Transfer  in-
comes,  by  contrast,  are  likely  to rise somewhat 
less  vigorously  than  in  1969.  Lastly,  private 
consumers'  expenditure may well also be boosted 
by a change in the propensity to save  of house-
holds,  since  when  prices  are  climbing  fairly 
sharply, expenditure on consumption often rises 
more vigorously  than disposable incomes. 
On the  demand  side,  the  stage  would  thus  be 
set for  a further rapid expansion of production 
and employment.  But the extent of the expan-
sion of domestic production in 1970 will depend 
mainly  on  the  scope  for  stepping  up  supply. 
So  many  firms  in  many  industries  are  running 
at or near  capacity  and  so  few  workers  can  be 
recruited on the domestic labour market or, for 
that matter, from abroad, that growth definitely 
cannot  exceed  certain  limits.  In  industry  in 
particular, productivity is  likely to advance at  a 
considerably slower pace  than in 1969, particu-
larly  as  a  tendency  for  manufacturers  to  give 
the  domestic  market  relatively  more  attention 
may well cause strain at many points.  With the 
contribution  of  the  services  sector  probably 
continuing  at  a  high  level,  the  growth  in  real 
gross national product for 1970 can in the pres-
ent circumstances be put at 4.5 %, which would 
imply  a  slowdown in the  trend for  the second 
half of the year. 
The trend of imports is  fairly  certain to gather 
additional momentum,  since  German firms  can-
not  cope  with  demand  and  import  prices  will 
be lower  owing  to  revaluation.  Although  the 
theoretical reduction  in import prices  ( 8.5 %) 
may  be partly offset by  a tendency  for foreign 
suppliers to put up their prices and is  automat-
ically  reduced  by  the  wihdrawal  of  the  4 % 
import  rebate,  imports  of  raw  materials  and 
finished products are likely to rise vigorously-
were  it  only,  in  respect  of  finished  products, 
because of the rapid expansion of consumption. 
Any estimates of the foreign trade surplus made 
at present are bound to be very tentative.  How-
ever,  the upward trend of imports and the im-
pact  of  revaluation  (stimulating  imports  and 
inhibiting  exports)  are  likely  to  reduce  the 
"external  contributions"  substantially.  For 
1970 the figure may be put somewhere between 
DM  11  000  and 12 000  million. 
Keener competition from imports and the resul-
tant reduction in the pressure of costs on firms 
may facilitate a return to price stability in 1970. 
It is  true  that costs  have  begun  to climb,  that 
the autumn wave of wage increases in particular 
will  still  weigh  heavily  on  prices  in the  early 
months of the year, and that managements may 
well  attempt  to  recoup  from  their  domestic 
customers any  reduction in their profit margins 
on  exports.  But  through its immediate  effects 
on consumer prices  (lower German farm prices, 
lower prices for imported products due to reval-
uation)  and through  the resultant stiffening  of 
competition  from  imports,  revaluation  has 
created more favourable conditions for a gradual 
stabilization  of the price level  in the course  of 
1970. 
Purely in terms of the merchandise markets, the 
revaluation  of  the  German  mark  should,  by 
forcing  a  reduction  in  net  exports,  widen  the 
margin  of supply  available  to  satisfy  domestic 
demand.  But if it is  borne in mind  that  the 
full  effects  of revaluation will  make  themselves 
felt only when keener competition from imports 
has  begun  to  bite  and  managements  have  had 
time to switch  to  some  extent from the export 
trade to  the home  market,  the  margin  of mer-
chandise  supply  becoming  available  will  proba-
bly  remain  too  small  at  first.  The  current 
strength  of  the  internal  factors  of  expansion 
argues  in  favour  of  the  maintenance,  for  the 
time being, of measures to curb demand, despite 
revaluation.  This would no doubt facilitate  an 
adjustment  in  the  pattern of  supply,  and  help 
to guide the upswing along more balanced lines. 
The  authorities  should,  however,  monitor  the 
economic trend very carefully so that short-term 
economic policy can,  as  appropriate, be adjusted 
promptly  should  the expansion of demand  lose 
appreciable momentum. 
Great flexibility  will  be needed in the field  of 
budgetary  policy.  The need  for  a  policy  cur-
tailing  the  expansion  of  demand  has  certainly 
become less pressing but has,  so  far,  not disap-
peared  altogether.  The  budgets,  and  notably 
the draft budget for  1970 to be laid before the 
Bundestag by  the  new  Federal  Government  in 
the  spring,  should  therefore  in  the  aggregate 
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under the medium-term "finance plan", particu-
larly since  tax concessions  will  come  into force 
on  1  January:  the  tax-free  personal  allowance 
under the wage  tax  system  will be doubled,  as 
will be the ceiling for income not attracting the 
supplementary income tax levy.  Should domes-
tic  demand  slacken  appreciably  later  on,  the 
authorities  could  still boost  activity  by  making 
the appropriate adjustments.  Where necessary, 
the draft budget could include special appropria-
tions  for  use  only  if there  are  signs  that  the 
growth of  demand is  getting too  slow.  In ad-
dition,  the instrument of  debt management can 
be  used  to  make  rapid  adjustments  to  the 
liquidity trend. 
The  restrictive  monetary  and  credit  policy 
should  be maintained  for  the  time  being.  In 
the  monetary  field,  however,  the  outflow  of 
substantial  quantities  of  speculative  funds  will 
lead to a  sharp  contraction of domestic  liquid-
ity.  If the restrictive measures  of  the Bundes-
bank  were  not  relaxed  somewhat,  this  would 
amount  to  a  corresponding  tightening  of  the 
squeeze,  involving  the  danger  of an  abrupt re-
versal in the propensity to invest.  On 6 Novem-
ber the Bundesbank therefore lowered the min-
imum reserve  requirements  by  10 %, relieving 
the  pressure  on  bank  liquidity  by  a  good 
DM 2 000 million.  At the same  time it abol-
ished the 100 %  reserve requirement applicable 
to any  increase in liabilities to non-residents. 
A  feature  of  the  balance-of-payments  trend  in 
1970  will be fairly  vigorous  exports of capital. 
The outflow of long-term capital that has  built 
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up  in  the  past  few  years  is  not  only  due  to 
general  business  conditions  and  is  likely  to 
continue, although with decreasing intensity.  It 
must also be expected that a further part of the 
speculat,ive  funds  that entered  the Federal  Re-
public since  October 1968  will flow out again. 
From  29  September,  when  the  exchange  rate 
was  allowed  to  float,  to  mid-November,  the 
official  foreign  exchange  reserves  fell  by  some 
DM  13 000  million.  The  balance  of  foreign 
exchange  payments  will  also  probably  come 
under pressure,  mainly  because  the  speculative 
effect of leads and lags  and of foreign exchange 
transactions  between domestic  and foreign  sub-
sidiaries  of  the same  firms  are  likely  to be re-
versed.  In this connection it should be remem-
bered that between October 1968 and Septem-
ber  1969  the  residual  item  in  the  balance  of 
payments showed a surplus of DM 10 400 mil-
lion-mainly a matter of leads  and lags. 
After  revaluation,  the  trend  of  the  German 
balance of payments and the resultant return to 
normal of the foreign  exchange position of the 
Federal Republic of Germany will thus make an 
important contribution to better equilibrium in 
international payments.  Consequently,  this ap-
pears to be the time to review the differences in 
tax  treatment  between  residents  and  non-resi-
dents in respect of long-term capital movements. 
For  the  rest,  the  tendency  for  prices  to  rise, 
which at present continues, should be combated 
by  a  structural policy  that mobilizes  the latent 
productivity reserves.  Competition policy,  too, 
should take as  active a form as  possible to help 
check demands for unduly high prices. TABLE 1 : Key indicators 
1966  1967 
II_  19~~~-- 1965 
% change by volume 
on preceding year 
Germany 
---------1 
1968  1968 
~------------~~~  I 
Indices 
1958=100 
--~------- --~---c-·  ~- I 
I  Gross national product 
Industrial production 
Total imports 
Private consumers' expenditure 
Public current expenditure on goods 
and services 
Gross fixed asset formation 
Total exports 
Gross national product per head of 
population 
Gross national product per person in 
employment 
Gross income per employee 
6.6 
8.4 
10.9 
5.4 
1.0 
12.0 
10.3 
5.4 
6.2 
8.3 
5.6 
6.8 
15.2 
6.4 
6.9 
6.6 
7.7 
4.2 
4.9 
9.0 
2.3 
2.0 
2.7 
3.5 
1.0 
0.2 
10.8 
1.3 
2.6 
0 
0  change by value 
on preceding year 
7.5 
0.2 
1.7 
0.4 
0.6 
3.4 
7.4 
9.6 
0.2 
3.3 
3.4 
TABLE 2 : Indicators for internal and external equilibrium 
7.6 
9.8 
16.9 
3.6 
0.2 
8.2 
15.6 
7.0 
7.4 
6.5 
I 
164 
174 
297 
159 
171 
179 
254 
147 
159 
205 
-----~~~~---------~----~19_6_4--:--- -1-9-65~-'---~~~~--~1--96-7~-'---
1968 
Balance exports less imports 
in million u.a. 
as petcentage of GNP 
Unemployment rate 
prices to private consumers 
(% change on preceding year) 
+ 1 328 
1.3 
0.6 
+  2.3 
150 
0.1 
0.5 
+  3.2 
+ 1 625  + 4 050  + 4 593 
1.4  3.3  3.5 
0.6  1.7  1.2 
+  3.9  +  8.1  +  2.0 
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TrlBLE 3: Foreign trade (at current prices) 
- -
I 
i  % chaw2,e  on preceding year  lndices  Million  ~~of 
I 
195<'>~100  u.a..  totals 
I  I  I  I 
--~~ 
1064  1965  1%0  10G7  1968  1968  1908  1~08 
-------- ---
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Visible exports  i  Total  10.9  10.3  13.5 
I 
s.o  14.3  282  24  ~43  100.0  ! 
8.4  6- 16.0  16.7  38S  u 340  37.6  lntm-EEC' 
I 
·' 
!l.4  I 
To non-EEC countries  12.5  12.4  I  10.6  i  -~  :  l~.H  :!±~  15 503  l\~.4 
i 
I 
Exports of food, beverages and tobacco  i 
I 
Total  20 :)  25.0  - :2.0 
I 
2H.U  2l.S  300  fi.>S  2.6 
Intra-EEC  22.1  ~~.6  6.0  t>1.2  32.8  :\i'U  370  1.5 
To non-EEC countrws  19.5  26.!1  - 7  :3 
I 
2.6  9A  :238  279  1.1 
Exports of raw materials, fuel and power 
Total  1.1  :3.4  i  1 
i 
1 3  10.7  192  1 569  6.4 
Intm-EEC 
I 
- 1.1  ± 1  t~  r,  1.5  10.6  180  057  3.9 
To non-EEC countries 
' 
4.5  2.3  5.0  0.4  11.5  19<'>  612  2.:> 
I 
Exports of semi-finished and finished industrial ~oo1b 
I 
Total  11.7  10.1  13.8  6.6  15.1!  290  22 615  iJl.O 
Intra-EEl'  9.3  5.3  18.9  ±.7  ~Ul  J:)(j  8 00±  32.2 
To non-EEC' countries  12 8  12.7  11.3  7.6  13.0  :2±J  14 611  58.8 
I 
I  --- -- -----
! 
I 
I  Visible imports  ' 
! 
Total  1•)  ·)  19.6  3  ·> 
I= 
3.7  16.1  :274  20 1:>0  100.0 
Intra-EEC  17.4  :)0.7  4  ·>  1.0  21.7  H1  8  359  41.5 
From non-EE(; countries  9.7  13.0  2.5  5A  12.5  216  11 792  58.5 
Importg of food, beverages and tobacco 
I 
Total  8.3  21.6  2.±  - 4  ·>  3.7  101  3 712  18.4 
Intra-EEC  9.3  28.0  6.8  0.1  11.9  320  1  613  8.0 
From non-EEC countries  7.8  18.1  - 0.1  - 6.9  - 1.9  1-!6  2 099  10.4 
Imports of raw matenals, fuel and llOWer  I 
I 
I 
Total  16.4 
I 
4.\l  2.S  - O.fl  Hi.'l  176  5 190  ~.).8 
Intra-EEC  16.x  .'i ..  3  H.l  '  iU  1~.1  B~O  970  ±.8 
I 
}~rmn non-EE.C  l'Ouutrie~  16.4  I 
3.0  1.~  - ~.G  15.3  I  100  4 ±20  21.0 
I 
llnvorb of Retni-tinished and fiuished Judm,tnaJ  guod~  I 
Total  11Ji 
I 
27.2  :1.6  - 5.0 
I 
~1.1  -1G6 
I 
11 420  55.8 
lntra-EEC  ~0 3  35.7  :2.S  - 3.ll  25.4  fi:lO  5 776  28.7 
From non-E}JC countrie:;  5.2  20.0  ±.3  1-
6.9  16.8  397  5 473  27.1 
I 
TABLE 4 .·  Selected monthly indicators 
I  Year I Jan.  I :Feb.  11\lar.  I Apr.  llllay  I June  I July  Au(!.  I tlept.l  Oct.  -~  Nov.  I Dec. 
--- ---~---- ----------
I  I 
109.41 
I  I  t  I 
111X.2  i 
I 
Industrial production  1967  111.0  110.6  111.1  112.0  1  114.9  111.7  I  11  ),;'  1  115.5  11 i .u  120 ..  ) 
(1963  ~ 100)  196&  116.4  11/i.i  1:!:! .7  122.41  123.0  IJ~.5 I  123.3  JJ,J .  .J  I  1., ,  I  1JU .  .J  139.3  142 .  .3  <)  ~ ·' 
1969  137.3  14U.Y  14ol.3  142.9  146.u I  14i'.1 I  143.6  1JII. I  I  1D.1 
I  I  I 
~  ew orders received  19U7  112.91  II  I .6  11/.8  111.6  11 '.6  1:!1.5  112 ..  )  1:!.1:;  l'J.! ,;  IJU.O  130.1  1.11  y 
(1963  ~ 100)  1908  120.5  I  1.Jl.4  127 .li  J,JJ.i  145.1  l;!li.1  1.39.5  144~  14~.4  /[)~.7  148.1;  152 4 
1969  164.6 I  1bU.9  167  -~  167.5  161.5  }(),),6  176.0  D  1.8  1i"4.4 
'  I 
Unemployed  1967  3.!4  0  408.5  48:!.9  5J3.8  529.4  487.5  48U.3  469.6  450.7  417.2  443.5  44/i.O 
(1  000)  1901l  4J6 .7  31iX.8  J95.3  355.0  316.6  293.8  282.9  :!66.7  233.2  'J.J,).fJ  232.5  208.3 
1969  202.4  236.4  200.6  170.8  134.5  1.50.2  1DJ .I  154.2  1J.J.5  153.7 
Construction :  permits for  1967 
46.41 
4->.2  44.3  48.1  39.9  10 .I  42.&  44.2  40.2  43.6  48.8  42.6 
residential const.ructiun  1968  41.7  48.9  54.fi  49.9  U.l  41.1  41.8  45.6  44.6  43.6  42.6  43.4 
(1 000)  196~  41.5  46.2!  49.4  47.7  45.7  48 .fJ  47.2  45.7 
Private com~umers' expen~  1967  142 0  I  13~.6  145.6  131.6  1.3/i ..  5  14J.~  1.17 .s  146.2  147.6  140.8  146.1  166.0 
diture:  departnwut  store  1968  14ii.7'  147.7  141.:3  156.9  1-53.6  141.4  I58.7  1fii .3  H9 .  .3  1/)9.2  169.0  154.6 
turnover (1963  ~ 100)  1969  165.4  155.3  16:!.2  158.4  170.4  IU7 .  .3  170.1  1ll.U  (179) 
Consumer prices  1967  111.1  111.1  111.3  111.3  111.:,  111.6  111.7  111.2  111.1  111.3  Ill 5  111.5 i 
(1963  =  100)  190~  11:!.~  112.8  1U.9  112.9  11~.9  lULl  113.1  112.8  112.0  112.3  11B  9  114.3 
1969  115.1  115.4  11:>.5  115.7  11:i.U  116.2  110.1  115.~  116.1  116.5 
Visible importK  1967  1  460  1  J9.3  1  382  1  J9i  1  .]~!}  1  52ft  1  J,~3  1  476  1  J~l,)'  1 505  1 5,)6  1  559 
(million u.a.)  1968  1  .)7 5  I  G/4  1  5!)8  1  6.)3  1  679  1 498  1  8'!:!  1 fi54  1  661i  1 5-59  1  740  1  702 
1969  2 015  I  8611  1  977  2  061  I  z  010  2  OJ1  2  13J  1  9.55  2  llU  (~ 250) 
Visible exports  1967  1  8.37  1  i:!:::.  1  725  1  li66  I  66J  1 929  1  1:!5  1  7 88  1  789  1 fJ12  1  90.1  1  b80 
(million u.a.)  106-~  1 981  1 [}I 1  1  9/ib  1921  1  [},)]  1814  ;!  ],\!)  :!  1?5:!,  :!  (},):!,  :!,  :!16  2  JU4  ~ 104 
1969  2 144  2  Ji9  2  253  2  401  2  261  2427  2  ,)Jh  2  124  2  -J,j(j  (:! 540) 
Balance of trade  1967  +  387  +  3.35  +  34.]  +  474  + 2'14  1- 400  +  .]4~'  + :J1:J  + J'l1  +  404  +  347  + .121 
(million u.a.)  196/l  +  389  +  357  +  J90  +  288  + 27Z  +  316  + J58  + 5:!8  -I  .JS6  357  +  564  +  4S2 
1969  +  129  +  319  + 2/li  +  340  + 2fi7  +  3!16  +  .J-;J.j  +  469  + .l48  290) 
Official  gold  and  foreign  1iJ67  6 490  6 684  6 759  6 723  6  759  6 1m  6 639  6 690  0 608  n 737  6914  6 X53 
exchange reserve~  196R  II  486  6 749  7 030  6 842  6 732  6  73:3  6  7:!1  0 fiGiJ  6 962  o o<ib  -~  j.j~  7 497 
(million u.a.)  1969  6 229  6 169  5  9~6  6 4/H  7 326  7 738  7 7ti2  t1  32~  9 6fo4 
1\loney supply  1967  77.0  77.1  77.4  II'  .h  18.2  7 S.6  /,0,1}  79.5  80.0  !hJ.S  R 1.7  li2 .) 
(Dl\I '000 million)  106.~  84.1  83.1  8.3.9  8.') ,,)  SJ.S  X4.1  84.8  85.1' 
(9~:~) 
li6.~ I  87.9  88.-3 
1969  89.4  89.1  90.7  90.:.!  91..5  92.2  9.3.1  Ul.3 
I  i  I 
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1\:0TES  TO  GRAPHS  AND  TABLES 
Source:  Statistical Office of the European Communities (except as  otherwise indicated). 
Conversion into units of account (1  u.a.  =  0.888671  g of fine  gold =  US $ 1)  at official exchange rates. 
Graph  1 
Trade  with  non-member  countries:  series  adjusted  for  seasonal  variations;  three-month  moving  averages; 
exports fob, imports c1f. 
Graph 2 
Labour  market:  series  adjusted  for  seasonal  variations;  three-month  moving  averages;  position  at  end  of 
month. 
Graph 3 
- lndustrial production:  trend  curve;  estimate  established  on  the  basis  of indices  adjusted  for  seasonal  and 
fortuitous variations, excluding construction, food, beverages and tobacco. 
Graph  ..J 
- Trade with other member countries:  series  adjusted for  seasonal  variations;  three-month moving averages; 
exports fob, imports cif. 
Graph 5 
Wages  and  consumer  prices:  index of average  hourly  gross  earnings  in industry  (including  construction); 
cost-of-living index (all households) at middle of month, not adjusted for seasonal variations. 
Graph 6 
- Bank lending:  short-term loans  to  business  and  private  customers  within  the  country;  position  at  end of 
month, not adjusted for seasonal variations. 
Table  1 
- Gross national product at market prices. 
- Industrial production: value added by industry (including small workshops). 
- Total exports and imports: goods, services and factor income. 
Gross income per employee: income from paid employment (including employers'  share of social insurance 
contributions). 
Table 2 
- Balance exports less imports: as  defined for the national accounts. 
Unemployment rate:  number of unemployed  as  percentage of total labour force  (annual  averages);  source: 
Statistisches Bundesamt and Bundesanstalt fi.ir Arbeit. 
Price index:  price index of private consumption adjusted by the GNP deflator, computed from the national 
accounts. 
Table 3 
Exports fob, imports cif. The products have been regrouped on the basis of the Statistical and Tariff Classifi-
cation for International Trade (CST): food, beverages and tobacco (Groups 0 and 1 CST), raw materials, fuel 
and power (Groups 2-4 CST), semi-finished and finished industrial goods (Groups 5-9  CST). 
Table 4 
- Industrial production: adjusted for seasonal variations, excluding construction, food, beverages and tobacco. 
- New orders received:  manufacturing industry  (excluding food,  beverages  and tobacco);  seasonally adjusted 
value index. 
- Unemployed: position at end of month, adjusted for seasonal variations. 
Construction: seasonally adjusted number of dwellings authorized. 
Private consumers' expenditure: seasonally adjusted value index of department store turnovers. 
Consumer prices: cost-of-living index (all households), not adjusted for seasonal variations. 
Imports cif, exports fob; value, adjusted for seasonal variations. 
- Balance of trade: difference between values of imports and exports seasonally adjusted. 
- Official gold and foreign exchange reserves: gross reserves of gold and convertible currency with Bundesbank 
at end of month. 
- Money supply: notes and coin in circulation (excluding cash holdings of credit institutions) and sight deposits 
of domestic non-banks (excluding public authorities' deposits with the Bundesbank);  seasonally adjusted end-
of-month figures. 
51 B.  France 
~~~~--~~~~-------
The  internal  and  extemal imbalance  into  which  the  French  economy moved after 
the social crisis  of May  and June  1968 grew even more serious in  the early  part of 
1969. The excessive liquidity of the economy,  the uncertainties connected with tbe 
state of political or social affairs and the deterioration of the international monetary 
climate influenced the behaviour of those engaged in  the economic process in  such 
a  way  that,  with production capacity already  being  used to  the  full,  the excess  of 
overall demand  persisted.  The  forces  thrusting prices  upwards were still powerful, 
but the main  development  was  the deterioration  of the  balance  of payments.  By 
the  end  of  June  1969  France's  net  foreign  exchange  holdings,  which  one  year 
previously still amounted to $  5 469 million,  had dropped to $  1 363 million. 
The  French  Govemment's  decision  of  10  August  1969  to  devalue  the  franc  by 
11.11  %  and  in  particular  the  intensification-linked  with  devaluation-of  the 
restrictive economic policy probably bad no appreciable effects on trends in the last 
months  of  1969·  the  impact  of  the  new  policy  should  be  felt  mainly  in  1970. 
Strict  implementation  of  the  measures  adopted,  particularly  in  the  budget  and 
credit field,  will  probably make it possible  to  restore in  1970 the durable  internal 
and  external  equilibrium  without which  rapid  and  steady  growth  in  the long  run 
is  impossible.  The  increase  in  the  real  gross  national  product  for  1970  should,  if 
due regard  is paid to present priorities, amount to about 3.5 %. 
1.  Balance sheet for 1969 
In by far  the greater part of  1969  production 
continued at a high level and the serious  over-
heating of the economy  persisted.  The imbal-
ances  on  the  goods  and  services  markets  in-
creased further and the external financial  situa-
tion  suffered,  in addition,  from  lack  of  confi-
dence in the currency. 
As  early as  November 1968 a restrictive budget 
and  credit  policy  had  been  implemented  to 
counteract  the  considerable  speculative  capital 
movements  which  were  undermining  the 
strength of the franc.  The deficit of FF 11 700 
million  budgeted  for  in  1969  was  reduced  to 
FF 6 350 million:  on the revenue side, indirect 
taxation  was  jncreased  (the  payroll  tax  was, 
however, abolished so as  to ensure that the com-
petitiveness of  French firms  on foreign  markets 
was  not impaired when the special  export aids 
expired  at the  end  of  January  1969);  on the 
I 
___  _j 
expenditure  side,  appropnatlons  were  cut  by 
FF  2 500  million.  These  budgetary  measures 
were supported by monetary measures, including 
increases  in  Bank  rate  and  in  the  minimum 
reserve ratio of the banks and the introduction 
of a credit squeeze  which, if the standards laid 
down had been respected, would have kept the 
volume  of  short-term  credit  practically  un-
changed during the first half of 1969.  Exchange 
control was also reintroduced. 
Changes in the behaviour of producers, dealers 
and  consumers  as  a  result  of  certain  political 
and  social  devlopments  largely  offset  this 
policy.  Indeed,  in  spring  1969  the  infla-
tionary  process  was  gathering  further  momen-
tum.  The  authorities  therefore  devalued  the 
franc  on  10  August  1969  and implemented an 
"austerity" programme.  Even if these measures 
began to "bite" before the end of the year, they 
would not greatly modify the overall picture of 
the economic situation in the year  1969, during 
53 which all  the components  of  demand  grew  too 
fast. 
For despite  the heavy  pressure of  domestic  de-
mand on available resources, exports also climb-
ed  rapidly  during  the  year.  According  to  the 
seasonally  adjusted  foreign  trade  returns,  the 
value of the monthly visible exports in June and 
July  1969  was  almost  13  % higher  than  the 
results reported for  the fourth quarter of 1968. 
This increase is  mainly  due  to  the dynamic  de-
velopment of demand on international markets, 
particularly  within  the  Community,  where 
French exports increased by over 20  % during 
this  period.  All  categories  of  products  shared 
fairly  equally in the expansion of exports, with 
the exception of agricultural products:  exports 
of the latter rose very sharply on the markets of 
the  Community,  partly  because  francs  bought 
forward  were  relatively  cheap  in the first  half 
of  1969.  Devaluation cannot  as  yet  have  sub-
stantially affected the volume of exports.  From 
the direct and the usual reactions  to a devalua-
tion it may be surmised-and the export figures 
for  the  months  of  August  to  October  provide 
some  confirmation  of  this-that  the  monthly 
foreign  exchange  earnings  from  visible  exports 
will  probably  hardly  be  higher  for  the  second 
half of 1969 on average than for June and July. 
For  the  full  year  1969  compared  with  1968 
there will probably have been an increase in vis-
ible exports of nearly 24 %  calculated in francs 
and  19  % by volume.  With increased income 
from  services,  particularly  from  the  tourist 
trade, the increase in exports of goods  and ser-
vices  as  a  whole  (as  defined  for  the  national 
accounts)  calculated in francs  should be  about 
22  %. 
Trade with non-member 
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The vigour of export and domestic demand, the 
pronounced  increase  in  profits  and  ample 
liquidity in the economy,  the shortage of spare 
production capacities, the tax reliefs temporarily 
granted  for  the  purchase  of  capital  equipment 
(though these were cancelled ahead of schedule 
on 3 September)  and, finally,  the deterioration 
of  the  price  climate  caused  and  facilitated  an 
unusually  rapid  expansion  in  fixed  investment 
by  private firms;  it is  estimated that in  1969 
this  demand  component  expanded  22  %  by 
value and 16 % by volume.  On the other hand, 
as  a result of the curb on subsidies, investments 
by  public  enterprises  rose  by  less  than  3  %  . 
Investments in residential construction showed 
an  appreciable increase,  put at  15  % for  value 
and  7  % for  volume.  The  demand  for  new 
housing  was  particularly lively  during  the first 
half of  1969, but it looks  as  if restrictions  on 
the  granting  of  building  loans  have  slowed 
down sales in recent months.  The development 
of investment by  the public authorities suffered 
from  the restrictive budget measures:  it is  un-
likely that the increase for 1969 exceeded 6.5% 
(value)  or 4 % (volume) . 
All in all,  the expenditure on fixed  investment 
will  have  increased  by  16.5  % for  1969-an 
increase in volume of about 10  %. 
The drive by dealers and manufacturers to speed 
up  investment in stocks in order to bring them 
into  line  with  the  development  of  production 
and sales was severely hampered by the vigorous 
expansion of final  demand,  inadequate supplies 
and  the  consequent  lengthening  of  delivery 
dates.  However, stocks  as  a whole were prob-
ably  well  above  the  extraordinarily  low  level 
reached by the end of 1968. 
Public current expenditure on goods and services 
rose  sharply,  mainly  because  the  considerable 
wage  increases  granted  in  1968  exerted  their 
full effect in the 1969 budget year and the num-
ber of public  officials  and  employees-particu-
larly in education-was further increased. 
The  expansion  of  private  consumers'  expendi-
ture had lost a  little momentum  at the  begin· 
ning of 1969, but social and political uncertain-
ties and the general increase in inflation led to a 
perceptible  increase  in  the  propensity  to  con-
sume in subsequent months.  At the same time, 
the gross incomes of households were still defi-
nitely  rising,  although  distinctly  more  slowly 
than  in  the  second  half  of  1968.  Firstly,  the France
BUSINESSMEN'S  VIEWS ON TIIE INDUSTRIAL SITUATION
Aorwor to queetions in the EEC busin€ss  surv€lr,  ca'rried out in Franoe by INSEE.
GRAPES A, B, C a,nd D : The three oolours  (groon, yellow and red) show the percenteg€s of tho three differont
anawors. The black curves, the ecalo for whioh is givon between the graphs,  show the ffgurea  obtained by adding
together the perconteges  weighted  as followe  :
by 0.03 for tho a'nswer "abovo normal", or "up";
by 0.02 for the anrsrver "nomal", or "no change";
bt 0.01 for the anawor "bolow normal", or " down".
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55conclusion  of  wage  negotiations  at  firm  or  in-
dustry levelled to wage increases  that were all 
the  more  vigorous  because  the  satisfaction  o± 
wage  claims,  themselves  strongly influenced by 
the  upward  trend of  prices,  was  facilitated  by 
the  favourable  financial  position  of  the  firms. 
Thus,  hourly  wage  rates  rose  in  the  course  of 
1969  by  rather  more  than  8  %;  taking  the 
average  for  the  year,  the  increment  over  1968 
was  almost  10.5  %.  Secondly,  the  number  of 
persons  in  paid  employment  increased  sharply. 
Apart from  farming,  the increase  was  probably 
almost 2.5 %.  Finally, although a shorter work-
ing week had been agreed,  the number of paid 
working hours in the year 1969 was higher than 
in  the previous  year  because  of  the  strikes  of 
May  and June 1968.  All in all,  it is  estimated 
that  income  from  wages  and  salaries  rose  by 
more  than  15  % for  1969.  With  the  rapid 
growth of the other types of income, the overall 
gross incomes of households will probably have 
risen  by  approximately  14  %.  Although  the 
direct  tax  burden  was  heavier  because  taxes 
are on a graduated scale  and because restrictive 
measures were adopted at the end of  1968, the 
disposable  incomes  of  households  in  1969 
exceeded by approximately 13.5 % the total for 
1968.  The  fact  that  during  the  same  period 
private  consumers'  expenditure  expanded  by 
nearly  15  % is  a clear indication of the weak-
ness of the propensity to save. 
With  the  vigorous  growth  of  overall  demand 
and  the  difficulties  which  stood in  the  way  of 
any  rapid expansion  of capacities,  the elasticity 
of domestic supply steadily declined.  It is  true 
that  industrial  production,  expressed  as  value 
added  at  constant prices,  rose  by  about  12  % 
but  nearly  all  of  this  increase  was  already 
accounted for  at the beginning of the year.  In 
July/  August  1969  the  seasonally  adjusted 
INSEE  Index  of  industrial  production
1  was 
only  2% higher than in December  1968/Jan-
uary  1969.  The  limitation  on  investment  by 
general  government  and  public  enterprises 
probably curtailed the growth of production in 
building and construction; here the growth rate 
is  unlikely  to have  exceeded  6 %.  Compared 
with  this,  value  added  in  the  services  sector 
increased  noticeably,  with  the  result  that  the 
gross  national  product  in  real  terms  may  have 
1  Provisional figures  (not including the construction 
and food industries). 
attained  a  growth  of  somewhat  more  than 
8  %,  although  agricultural  production  only 
slightly  exceeded  the-admittedly very high-
output of 1968. 
Industrial production 
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The  improvement  in  production  was  achieved 
mainly  through  the  employment  of  more  la-
bour, for the advances in productivity, which in 
the  second  half  of  1968  had  still  been  very 
rapid, declined throughout 1969.  As a result, the 
position on the labour market quickly improved; 
in  a few  industries  there  was  indeed  an  acute 
shortage  of  manpower.  Thus,  the  seasonally 
adjusted number of vacancies  rose from  61 600 
at the end of December 1968 to 82 100 in Sep-
tember 1969.  The number of unemployed con-
tracted sharply in the first half of the year but 
showed  little  change  thereafter.  This  level  of 
unemployment  is  in  fact  still  high,  the  reason 
being  that  the  unemployed  workers  lack  the 
required skills  or are  not available  in the areas 
where  there are  vacancies. 
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Prices,  stimulated  by  the  rise  in  the  cost  of 
wages and capital and facilitated by the vigorous 
57 expansion of  overall demand,  rose  very briskly 
at all  marketing  stages  during  the  greater  part 
of the year.  In July, wholesale prices exceeded 
the  level  of  the  previous  year  by  7.6  %,  in-
creases being strongest in  the case  of industrial 
products.  The cost of living also  rose very per-
ceptibly as  the increase in the TVA rates, which 
occurred on 1 January 1969  (the impact of  this 
measure  can  be  estimated  at  approximately 
1.5 %)  ,  strengthened  essentially  "economic" 
factors forcing prices up.  During the first seven 
months  of  1969  the retail  price  index  rose  by 
3.8  %;  in July  it was  6.9  % above  the July 
1968  figure.  The  additional  increase  in  prices 
caused by  the devaluation appears  so  far  to be 
relatively  limited as  a general  price  freeze  was 
decreed  until  15  September  and  the  policy  of 
concerting  action  with the business  federations 
was intensified.  In any  case the rise in the cost 
of  living  between August  and October did not 
exceed 1.3  %. 
Wages and consumer prices 
180 
(1962 = 100) 
170  v 
.0) 
v v  -=- 160 
150  w  lees  J. 
140  _... I--" v  :~ 
_.. ~  -
130 
1---------
---
~ 
_v  [Cot s~  ller pric  ~s 
120 
110  ·,. 
1967  1968  1969 
The inelasticity of domestic supply and the vig-
our of  demand were  the main factors  account-
ing  for  the  heavy  f:ow  of  imports  in  1969. 
According  to  the  seasonally  adjusted  foreign 
trade returns, visible  imports in June and July 
were running almost 13  % by volume and 15 % 
by  value  ahead  of  the  very  high  level  reached 
at the end of  1968.  In the  months  following 
devaluation  the  rise  continued  at  a  rapid  pace 
both in  terms  of  volume  and  value.  For  the 
year 1969 as a whole, the increase in the volume 
of  imported goods  is  estimated at  23  %.  The 
volume  of goods  and services imported  (as de-
fined  for  the  national  accounts)  probably  in-
creased  a  little  less  (approximately  20  % )  , 
mainly  because of  restrictions  on  travel abroad 
due to exchange control. 
58 
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In these  circumstances,  the  trade balance dete-
riorated.  The deficit of the first  seven months 
of  the  year  had  already  increased  substantially 
before the immediate effects of the devaluation 
(which  are  usually  unfavourable)  strengthened 
this  trend in  the following  months:  the direct 
adaptation  of  prices  expressed  in  francs  has  a 
much more immediate impact for  imports than 
for  exports.  On the  whole  the  deficit  of  the 
balance  of goods  and  services  probably rose  in 
1969 by approximately FF 4 000  million.  The 
deterioration  of  the  current  account  was  still 
further aggravated by a "leads and lags"  effect. 
On the other hand, as  a result of exchange con-
trol,  exports of  short-term capital were smaller 
than  in  1968.  Thus,  at  $  1 800  million,  the 
total payments  deficit  for  the  first  six  months, 
while  still  high,  was  somewhat  lower  than  in 
the second half of  1968, when it had exceeded 
$  2 300  million.  The  deficit  was  offset  by 
$  600 million from  official  gross  gold and cur-
rency reserves, the balance being provided from 
a reduction in the net foreign exchange holdings 
of the commercial banks and by the use of part 
of the short-term credits granted by a number of 
foreign  central banks. 
The  contraction  of  foreign  exchange  holdings 
only  slightly  impaired  the internal liquidity of 
the  economy,  for  the  cash  transactions  of  the 
Treasury and the trend of loans to business and 
private  customers  had  very  buoyant  effects. 
The  budget  deficit  stood  at  nearly  FF  7 000 
million  at  the  end  of  July,  i.e.  at  almost  the 
same  amount  as  for  the  first  seven  months  of 
1968;  it was largely financed by recourse to the 
money market, the funds held by the Treasury's 
traditional  financing  partners  (savings  banks, 
postal  cheque  offices)  having  contracted.  The strict  implementation  of  the  measures  adopted 
by  the  Government  in  September  1969  in  the 
budget policy  field  and  the relatively heavy  in-
creases  in  receipts  from  taxes  which  are  to  be 
expected in the last months of  1969 should, by 
the  end  of  the  year,  enable  the  196 9  budget 
deficit to be cut back under the new limit fixed 
by  the  Government  ( FF  5 000  million).  The 
expansion of lending  by  banks  to  business  and 
private customers  in  the  first  months  of  1969 
was  still lively and appreciably more rapid than 
the  quantitative  restrictions  allowed;  in  July 
1969  loans  outstanding  exceeded  the  level  at-
tained  at  the end of  1968  by  nearly  6  % and 
were  about  16.4  % higher  than  one  year  pre-
viously.  However,  action  taken  to  extend  and 
apply  more  strictly  rules  restricting bank lend-
ing probably curbed very sharply the expansion 
of credit in  the final  months of  the year. 
Bank lending  FF. '000 million 
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The lively  demand  for  credit,  the  weakness  of 
liquid and short-term saving and the heavy out-
flow  of  foreign  currency  cut  back  sharply  the 
banks' margin of available liquidity.  The money 
Demand  for  and supply of goods and services 
Exports 4 
Gross fixed asset formation 
Public current expenditure on goods and 
I  services 
Private consumers' expenditure 
Gross national product 
Imports 4 
1  Source:  Statistical Office of the European Communities. 
2  Commission estimates. 
8  Commission forecasts. 
'  Goods, services and factor income. 
Note: 
19671 
At 
current 
prices 
inFF 
'000 
million 
82.4 
144.0 
70.5 
345.9 
572.4 
80.2 
1968 1  1969 2  1970 8 
------
% change on preceding year 
Volume  Value  Volume  Value  Volume 
+  7.8  +  8.2] + 17  +  22  +  12 
+  5.2  +  8.0  +  10  +  16%  +  4% 
+  5.2  +  13.0  +  4%  +  12%  +  2 
+  5.0  +  10.0  +  4%  +  15  +  3 
----
+ 4.2  +  9.3  +  8  +  15%  +  3% 
+10.6  +  11.1  +  20  + 26  +  4 
(a)  The difference between the figures for demand and those for supply is  accounted for by movements in stocks. 
(b)  The estimates and forecasts  are approximations based on certain hypotheses, worked out by the Commission 
and generally mentioned in the Quarterly Surveys. They have been discussed with the experts from the member 
countries but are established and published on the sole responsibility of the Commission. 
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59 market came under very heavy  strain although, 
in  the first  months  of  the year,  the Banque de 
France was  still intervening, especially by  mak-
ing  funds  available  at  variable  interest  rates. 
Apart  from  a  few  fluctuations,  the  call-money 
rate  rose  persistently.  In  October  1969  it 
reached  9.5 %.  In June  1969  the  monetary 
authorities  changed  to a more restrictive intel'est 
policy:  they  narrowed  the  difference  between 
Bank  rate  (which  in  October  1969  was  in-
creased  to 8 % )  ,and  the  money  market  rates 
and limited  the  special  concessions  granted for 
various  privileged types of credit (e.g. by raising 
the  interest  rates  for  equipment,  residential 
construction and export  loans  and for  loans  of 
the Credit Agrioole). 
The  position  on  the  capital  market  reflected 
particularly  clearly  the  economic  conditions  of 
1969.  The heavy demand for  assets  other than 
cash  caused  a  rise  in  share  prices  and led  to  a 
very  substantial  increase  in  issues  of  variable 
yield  securities.  In  the  first  nine  months  of 
1969,  these  issues  totalled  more  than  three 
times  the  amount  issued  in  the  corresponding 
period of the previous year.  On the other hand, 
on the market for fixed-interest securities, with 
its relatively low interest level, the sale of bonds 
hardly increased at all. 
2.  Outlook for 1970 
In view of the considerable contraction of for-
eign  exchange  reserves  and  the danger  of  fur-
ther  difficulties  on  the  international  foreign 
exchange  markets,  the French  Government  de-
valued  the  franc  on  10  August  1969  by 
11.11  %.  However,  as  French  firms  were 
working  to  capacity  and  as  the  attitudes  of 
those engaged in the economic process were still 
inflationary  in  their  effect,  the  conditions  on 
which  the  full  success  of  the  devaluation  de-
pended were not automatically fulfilled;  in the 
short  term  there  was  even  a  danger  that  the 
change  might  strengthen  inflationary  forces. 
The authorities have  therefore gradually imple-
mented  an  "austerity"  programme  the  pur-
pose of which is  to restore  the basic  equilibria 
of the French economy in three short stages: by 
1 January  1970, strict budget equilibrium;  by 
1 April  1970, balancing of  production and  do-
mestic  demand;  by  1  July  1970,  equilibrium 
of  foreign  trade.  These economic  and financial 
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measures  are  designed  to influence directly do-
mestic  demand  and  strengthen  the  restrictive 
monetary and credit policy.  They can be divided 
into two groups, one of which was  immediately 
implemented  before  the  end  of  1969  whereas 
the others maintain into  1970 the drive  to res-
tore the economy to sound health. 
The first set of measures entails, in the field of 
public  expenditure  and  taxation,  freezing  half 
the  equipment  appropriations  (with a  few  ex-
ceptions)  unexpended on  11  August 1969, sus-
pension  of  recruitment  to  the  public  service 
until  the  end  of  1969  and  the  transfer  of 
FF 5 230 million worth of planning licences  to 
an  "economic  contingency  fund";  in  addition 
the provisions for  the advance payment of cor-
poration tax have been altered in order to speed 
up collection;  the "pro rata temporis" rule has 
been  introduced  for  the  calculation  of  depre-· 
dation  allowances;  finally,  the  temporary  tax 
relief  for  the  purchase  of  capital  goods  was 
abolished earlier than planned,  on 3  September 
1969.  Thanks to these measures  the deficit on 
the  1969  budget  should  be  cut  to  less  than 
FF 5 000 million.  In the field of monetary and 
credit policy a strict observance was  ordered of 
the  quantitative limitation  on  the  non-mobiliz-
able  short- and  medium-term  loans-already 
applied to other types  of loan-and strict sanc-
tions  are  provided  for  in  the case  of infringe-
ment  (obligation  to  keep  non-interest-bearing 
deposits  with the Banque de France).  Interest 
policy  was  made  more  restrictive:  Bank  rate 
was  raised  in two steps  to  8  % and  the rates 
for  preferential loans  (residential  construction,' 
equipment  investments,  exports,  agriculture) 
were stepped up.  In addition to this, the terms 
for  granting consumer credits for  certain items 
were made much more severe.  A general "price 
pause" was decreed for the period 15 August to 
15  September  1969;  then the previous  system 
of controlled price formation regulated by con-
tract  came  into  force  again  and,  except  in  the 
case of special agreements, only services are still 
controlled by the price freeze. 
Most  of  the  longer-term  measures  are  written 
into  the draft Finance Law for  1970.  The ap-
propriations  are  to  increase  considerably  less 
than the gross national product in money terms, 
i.e. by only about 6.5  % over the 1969 budget; 
the recruitment of civil servants is to be curbed, 
State  subsidies  (especially  for  public  enter-
prises)  are  to be curtailed and  central govern-ment  investment  expenditure  strictly  limited. 
"Optional" sums  totalling FF 2 230 million are 
to  be  paid  into  the  "economic  contingency 
fund",  which  brings  to  FF  7 000  million  the 
sums  available  for  injection  into  the  economy 
should  the  business  trend  show  signs  of flag-
ging.  Tax receipts should be some 11  %  up on 
those predicted in the 1969 budget.  In spite of 
the considerable tax concessions for households, 
the yield from personal income tax is  to rise by 
more  than  10  %  ;  this  should be attributed to 
the vigorous rise in incomes in 1969 and  to the 
fact-though the effect  of this is  limited-that 
the income  tax scale  is  a graduated  on~.  What 
is  most  important,  however,  is  that  the  yield 
from  the corporation  tax  will  climb  sharply  in 
1970  not  only  as  a  result  of the  rapid  rise  in 
profits  in  1969 but also  because  of  the  effects 
of certain official measures adopted in the same 
year.  By  contrast,  only  a  relatively  small  in-
crease in the yield from indirect taxes is  expect-
ed,  since  simplified  arrangements  for  collecting 
the tax on value  added, with a lighter tax bur-
den, will cost the Treasury nearly FF 1 000 mil-
lion in lost revenue. 
The budget is  supplemented  by  specific  meas-
ures,  chiefly  in  the  field  of  savings  and  prices 
and in the social  sphere.  The prices  policy  is 
designed  to  keep  the  upward  price  trend 
-particularly  the  direct  effects  of  the  de-
valuation-within  close  limits:  "concertation" 
with  industry  and  severe  price  control  will 
be  continued  and  increases  in  charges  for 
public services  will be small  in 1970.  Various 
measures,  such  as  the  raising  of  deposit 
rates, temporary savings bonuses and additional 
tax concessions will constitute additional incen-
tives  to  save.  Provision has  also  been made  to 
extend  the  system  of  tax  credits  for  incomes 
from  securities  to non-residents  as  well.  In the 
social  field,  measures  have  been  taken  to  help 
the  poorer  sections  of  the population.  By  the 
end of 1970 the official old-age special assistance 
will have been raised, by stages, by approxima-
tely  15  %,  and  family  allowances  are  being 
improved by approximately 5  %.  Furthermore, 
a  reform  of  the  legally  guaranteed  minimum 
wage  ( SMIG)  is  being envisaged  by means  of 
which  the latter would be  more  closely  related 
to the average wage trend. 
A  study  of  the  various  aspects  of government 
economic  policy  suggests  that  the  measures 
announced or already adopted are largely in line 
with  the requirements  of the current situation. 
They  will  very  considerably  enhance  the  pros-
pects  of  achieving  the  objectives  governing  in-
ternal and external equilibrium:  the curbing of 
general  government  expenditure  and  expendi-
ture by the public enterprises, the slowdown in 
the  expansion  of  the  money  supply,  and  the 
difficulties  which  firms  may  have  in  respect  of 
finance  are  all  factors  which limit the opportu-
nities for those engaged in the economic process 
to hamper efforts to restore a sound basis to the 
economy.  However,  the  climate  of  opinion  is 
also probably an essential factor if the anti-infla-
tionary policy is  to achieve an  early success. 
Of  the  components  of  domestic  demand,  the 
sharpest slowdown will be in  the expansion of 
public  expenditure.  For  1970  the  growth  of 
public  consumption  should  be  about  7  % in 
terms  of value  and  less  than  2  % in volume, 
while  public  investment  is  unlikely  to  exceed 
9%  in value  and  4%% in volume. 
In 1970 managements are likely to be inhibited 
by financing difficulties due to the tighter credit 
squeeze, a heavier burden of direct taxation and 
a  substantial  slowdown  in  the  expansion  of 
sales.  It  is  therefore likely that during the com-
ing  year  the propensity  to  invest will  weaken: 
the  maintenance  of  an  annual  growth  rate  of 
9  %  (value)  and  5  %  (volume)  for  private 
productive investment for  1970 will be mainly 
a reflection of the high level reached at the end 
of 1969 and the execution of investment orders 
already  made.  In  the  public  enterprises,  it is 
expected that the volume of investment in 1970 
will be  much the same  as  in 1969.  Lastly,  the 
recent  increase  in  difficulties  in  obtaining  fi-
nance  for  housing  will  almost  certainly  help 
further  to  slow  down demand in this  sector in 
1970: it is unlikely that the year-to-year growth 
rate of investment by households  in new hous-
ing will be more than 3  % (volume). 
The expansion of private consumers' expenditure 
should also  slow  down sharply.  It is  true that 
the increase in wages and salaries and in certain 
other classes  of personal incomes  could still be 
fairly  rapid early in  1970.  In particular, strain 
on  the  labour  market  could  well  continue  for 
some  months.  But  the  slowdown  in  economic 
activity and the gradual change in conditions on 
the  labour  market  should  subsequently  bring 
wage  increases  down  to  a  rate  of  about  6  to 
7  % per year.  All  in  all,  total  gross  incomes 
61 are  unlikely  to  expand  more  than  10  % for 
1970.  It is  true  that  the  burden  of  taxation 
borne  by  households  will  be  lightened  by  the 
tax  reliefs,  but the effect  of these  will  be felt 
mainly  when the balance  of  income  tax due  is 
paid at the end of  1970.  Lastly, the slowdown 
in  business  activity,  a  change  (which  seems 
likely)  in  the situation  on  the labour  market 
and official incentives could well make possible a 
recovery in household saving, although it is  un-
likely that a savings ratio similar to that record-
ed  in  1967  can  be  reached  as  early  as  1970. 
All in all, it is expected that disposable incomes 
and  household  consumption  will  expand  by 
10  % and 9 % respectively in 1970. 
It is  likely that exports will make  an  important 
contribution to expansion in 1970:  even if the 
slowdown in business activity expected in major 
industrialized  countries  is  liable  to  inhibit  the 
development of world trade, it is  likely that, at 
least  in  the  first  half  of  the  year,  the  rate  of 
expansion of demand will remain high in all the 
other five  Community countries, which account 
for nearly half France's exports.  In addition, the 
combined effects of the devaluation of the franc 
and  the  revaluation  of the  mark  are  bound to 
improve  the competitive position and  the  sales 
of  French  products  on  foreign  markets  as  the 
slowdown of  domestic  sales  and  the  disappear-
ance  of  bottlenecks  gradually  help  to  improve 
delivery capacity.  Assuming  that French expor-
ters  cut  their  selling  prices  abroad by half  the 
devaluation rate, it may be expected that exports 
of  goods  and  services  will  increase  by  about 
18  % in current francs  and 12  % in volume in 
1970. 
The marked slowdown in the expansion of  de-
mand in 1970 should entail a lower growth rate 
for domestic supply.  Assuming "normal" expan-
sion  for  agricultural  production,  the  gross  na-
tional  product  should  increase  by  about 
3 % %  (volume).  Additional  production  ca-
pacity created by investments now being made 
should  allow  productivity  gains  to  improve  a 
little;  in  annual  average  terms,  the number of 
persons in paid employment should rise by only 
a  small amount.  Strains  on  the  labour  market 
should ease. 
In  these  circumstances,  it  is  probable  that 
external equilibrium  will  gradually  be  restored 
in  1970:  the  deterioration  of  the  competitive 
position of foreign products as  a result of price 
increases  entailed  by  parity  changes  combined 
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with the slackening of domestic demand should 
cut  the  expansion of merchandise  imports  into 
France to about 4 % (volume) and 10  % (cur-: 
rent francs)  for  1970.  This  figure,  which  is  a 
comparison  of  annual  averages,  will  entail  an 
actual decline from month to month during the 
year.  With exports climbing  rapidly,  the trade 
balance should therefore achieve equilibrium for 
the full year 1970, i.e. a deficit during the early 
months  should  be  offset  by  a  surplus  !in  the 
second half. 
It would be  a mistake,  however, to regard the 
trade balance trend or the payments trend as  the 
only yardsticks of economic and financial recov-
ery.  In fact,  it is  arguable  that in the longer 
term  the  restoration  of  conditions  of domestic 
equilibrium is  even  more important, since upon 
this  depend the prospects of a further phase of 
lasting  and  sufficiently  rapid economic  growth. 
It  is  true  that  the  policy  of  supervision  and 
"contractual"  freedom  of  prices  suggests  that 
once the direct effects of devaluation and of the 
increases  in  public  service  charges  have  been 
absorbed,  the  upward  price  movement  should 
slow down in 1970.  But price intervention can-
not  be  regarded  as  a permanent  aspect  of eco-
nomic development:  a reform of production and 
trading structures and the elimination of obsta-
cles  of all kinds to the free play of competition 
are the right ways to reach stability. 
The  "policy  mix"  should  be  closely  related  to 
the  need  for  comprehensive  measures  having 
prompt  effect,  the  main  considerations  being 
that  the  greatest  possible  advantage  should be  j 
taken  of world business  conditions  while  they 
are  still  dynamic  and  that  the  deterioration in  j 
the psychological climate which the maintenance 
of  restrictive  measures  would  cause  should be 
avoided.  The  French  Government  has  often 
emphasized the importance it attaches to obtain-
ing  early  results.  In  this  connection,  new 
measures  have been adopted recently to tighten 
up  monetary  policy:  on 8 October 1969 Bank 
rate was raised to 8 % and the rate for advances 
on securities  to  9.5  %,  the banks' compulsory 
holdings of medium-term bills were raised from 
14% to 15 %  of  customers' deposits  ( coeffi-
cient  de  retenue),  strict control of the limita-
tion  of  credit  expansion  was  imposed  and  ex-
tended until 30 June 1970.  All  these decisions 
should serve to reduce the liquidity of the econ-
omy  as  rapidly  as  possible.  The  authorities 
should  not hesitate  to  take further steps  if the measures should prove insufficiently effective or 
if the return of funds  held abroad should tend 
to counter their effects. 
The  Government's  budgetary  arrangements 
made in 1969 take account of the need for rapid 
intervention.  The  freezing  of  a  large  quantity 
of unexpended appropriations should enable the 
Treasury  to  curb  demand  and  liquidity  by  the 
end of 1969;  this should be all  the more effec-
tive  if  total general  government  expenditure  is 
kept strictly within the limits set and the excess 
revenue  from  taxation  which  is  expected  to 
accrue  is  not  used.  There  is  also  a  case  for 
extending  the  restrictive  effects  of  the  Treas-
ury's action during the early months of 1970 by 
controlling carefully the use of unexpended bal-
ances  and  the implementation  of the  1970  Fi-
nance  Law  in  the  course  of  the  year.  Lastly, 
care  should be  taken to ensure  that the impact 
of budget retrenchment is  not weakened by the 
development  of  the  financial  situation in other 
sectors of the public administration, such as  the 
social  security agencies  or the local  authorities. 
Neither  the  requirements  of  the  current  situa-
tion nor the necessary impact of short-term eco-
nomic  policy  measures  on  growth  in  1970 
should,  however,  lead  the  authorities  to  relax 
their efforts  to improve essential economic and 
social structures.  In this connection, the French 
Government's  new  guidelines  concerning  the 
management of public enterprises and the trans-
fer to the private sector of the financing of cer-
tain  collective  investments  represent  a  definite 
improvement.  A more  vigorous  drive  to  adapt 
the occupational training of workers to the real 
needs  of  the  economy  and  the  implementation 
of an  appropriate policy with regard to housing 
would also  facilitate  inter-industry and regional 
mobility  of  labour,  thus  enabling  the  opportu-
nities for growth and for higher living standards 
which  the  increase  in  the  working  population 
offers  to be fully  exploited. 
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TABLE 1 : Key indicators 
1964 
I 
1965 
I 
1966 
I 
1967 
I 
1968  1968 
I 
%  change by volume  Indices 
on preceding year  1958=100 
Gross national product  +  6.6  +  4.7  +  5.5  +  4.7  +  4.2  168 
Industrial production  +  8.5  +  5.1  +  7.6  +  4.4  +  4.2  178 
Total imports  + 12.9  +  3.3  + 14.0  +  7.2  + 10.6  238 
Private consumers' expenditure  .+  5.6  +  4.4  +  4.7  +  4.8  +  5.0  165 
Public current expenditure on goods 
and services  +  3.6  +  2.7  +  2.7  +  3.6  +  5.2  144 
Gross fixed asset formation  + 13.8  +  7.2  +  8.9  +  5.7  +  5.2  216 
Total exports  +  7.8  + 11.8  +  8.3  +  6.5  +  7.8  232 
Gross national product per head of 
population  +  5.4  +  3.7  +  4.6  +  3.9  +  3.4  151 
Gross national product per person in 
employment  +  5.3  +  4.3 
I  4.8  +  4.4  +  4.4  163  T 
%  change by value 
on preceding year 
Gross income per employee  +  8.6  i+ 
6.6  i+ 
6.2  i+ 
6.2  I + 11.2  233 
TABLE 2 : Indicators for internal and external equilibrium 
I 
1964 
I 
1965 
I 
1966 
I 
1967 
I 
1968 
Balance exports less imports 
in million u.a. 
~  26  + 1012  +  353  +  420 
~  8 
as  percentage of GNP 
~  0  +  1.0  +  0.3  +  0.4 
~  0 
Unemployment rate  1.1  1.3  1.4  1.8  2.1 
consumer prices 
(%change on preceding year)  +  3.4  j+  2.5  +  3.0  +  2.8  +  4.7 
'  --- --
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TABLE 3: Foreign trade (at current prices) 
~------ --~-~--------;---------------------~----;---------1 
o/ 0  change on preceding year  Indices 
19:)8=100 
Million  %of 
u.a.  totals 
--~----~----~--~--·1-------------1 
1964  1196ii  11966  11967  11968  190~  1968  1968 
-------~ ------- -- -----'-.--..!---"-._----"----'-----:--~  --~---
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To non·  BEC couutne~ 
Export::; of raw nmterials, ftwl awl power 
Total 
lntra-E~x· 
To non~B}~C eountrir::; 
+  11.3  +  11.8  +  8.3  +  4.5  +  11.~ 
+  12.8  +  1ts.O  +  12.0  +  2.0  1- 1!\.0 
+  10.3  +  7.H  +  5.8  +  li.3  +  .~.2 
+ 14.4 
+ 16.6 
+ 13.0 
1~- 9.7 
+ 19.1 
- 1.1 
+ 11.4  +  7.5  +  2.9  + 19.8 
+  26.a  t  19.4  +  6.0  +  26.6 
i- 2.0  - 2.0  - 1.0  +  12.8 
+  4.4  +  7.3  -
+  8.9  +  'iA  -
- u  1,+  7.2  -
:~.7  +  1.6 
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3.6  T  ~.(j 
Exports of "rmi-tini"hetl and finbhrd industrial gootls 
Total  + 10.8  +  13.21 +  P-.7  +  6.1  + 11.1 
Intra-EEC  1  +  10.4  +  18.3  + 11.2  +  2.3  +  16.~ 
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!l24 
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226 
114 
260 
519 
197 
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Yisible Imports 
Total 
lntra-EEC 
}'rom non-EB<
1  c·onntries 
+ 15.4 
+  20.4 
+ 12.6 
+  2.7  + H.6 
+  6.7  + 20.8 
+  0.3  +  10.5 
+  10.7  +  23.1  539 
+  0.2  +  4.4  167 
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Total 
1ntra-EEC 
From non-BEC countries 
Imports of raw matPrials. fuel and power 
Total 
Intra-EEl' 
From non-EE(' countriet-~ 
Import" of s<"mi-fini"he:l an<l  finished industrial goods 
Total 
lntra-EB(' 
Fron1 non-EEr countrk.., 
I+ H.9 
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1- 12.5 
+  7.1 
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+ 23.2 
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+  5.6  +  22 ()  +  9.0 
+  1>.6  + 25.0  +  11.9 
+  1.5  + li.6  +  4.3 
TABLE 4: Selected monthly indicators 
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NOTES  TO GRAPHS AND TABLES 
Source:  Statistical Office of the European Communities (except as otherwise indicated). 
Conversion into units of account (1  u.a.  = 0.888671 g of fine gold = US $ 1) at the official exchange rate. 
Graph  1 
Trade  with non-member countries:  series  adjusted  for  seasonal  variations;  three-month  moving  averages; 
exports fob, imports cif. 
Graph 2 
- Industrial production: trend curve; estimate established on the basis of indices of the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities (excluding construction, food, beverages and tobacco), adjusted for seasonal and for-
tuitous variations. 
Graph 3 
- Labour market; source: INSEE; series adjusted for seasonal variations, three-month moving averages; position 
at end of month. 
Graph 4 
- Wages and consumer prices; source: INSEE; index of hourly wage rates,  all  activities,  all  regions; national 
index of consumer prices (259  items). 
Graph 5 
- Trade with other member countries:  series  adjusted  for  seasonal  variations;  three-month  moving averages; 
exports fob, imports cif. 
Graph 6 
- Bank lending; source: Conseil national du Credit; short-term loans (up to 2 years) from monetary institutions 
to business and private customers; end-of-period figures. 
Table  1 
- GNP at market prices (new series on 1962 basis). 
- Industrial production: value added by industry. 
Total exports and imports: goods, services and factor income. 
Gross income per employee: income from paid employment (including employers'  share of social  insurance 
contributions). 
Table 2 
Balance exports less imports: as defined for the national accounts. 
Unemployment rate: number of unemployed (persons available for and seeking employment, estimated on the 
basis of the number of job applicants, in the light of the latest population census) as  percentage of the total 
domestic labour force; source: INSEE. 
- Consumer prices: implicit price index of private consumption computed from the national accounts. 
Table 3 
- Exports fob, imports cif;  the products have been regrouped on the basis of the Statistical and Tariff Classi-
fication for International Trade (CST):  food,  beverages and tobacco  (Groups 0  and 1  CST),  raw materials, 
fuel and power (Groups 2-4 CST), semi-finished and finished industrial goods (Groups 5-9 CST). 
Table  4 
- Industrial production: adjusted for seasonal variations, excluding construction, food,  beverages and tobacco. 
66 
Number of persons seeking employment: seasonally adjusted figures, position at end of month. 
Construction: seasonally adjusted number of dwellings authorized. 
Private consumers' expenditure: seasonally adjusted indices of department store turnovers, constant samples. 
Consumer prices: national index of 259 items. 
Imports cif, exports fob, adjusted for seasonal variations. 
Balance of trade: difference between seasonally adjusted imports and exports. 
Official gold and foreign exchange reserves: gross reserves of gold and convertible currency held by the Banque 
de France and the Fonds de Stabilisation des changes at the end of month. 
Money supply: fiduciary circulation (total notes and coin in circulation, excluding notes and coin held by the 
Banque de France) plus sight deposits (deposits made with the Banque de France by private persons or enter-
prises, deposits with the Post Office giro or with public accountants, plus sight deposits relating to the activities 
of the banks within metropolitan France. Seasonally adjusted prices, at end of month. 
) 
{ C.  Italy 
In  1969  economic  actzvzty  gathered  further  momentum.  The  key  to  the  trend, 
particularly in  the first  half of the year,  was  still export demand.  The growth  of 
domestic  demand,  however,  especially  fixed  asset  formation,  was  very  rapid  and 
in  fact  there  was  a  distinct  acceleration.  Unexpectedly  violent  labour  disputes, 
particularly in  the last third of the year,  impaired production.  Imports as  a whole 
expanded extremely fast.  The level of prices,  which had been exceptionally  stable 
in  1968,  rose  more and  more appreciably  in  the  course  of the year. 
A  further  acceleration  of the  fast  upward trend  of demand  is  expected  in  1970, 
tvith the main contribution coming more and more from  domestic demand.  Besides 
a rapid  increase  in  investments,  there is  likely to be in  particular  a  very  vigorous 
apsurge of consumer spending.  The real gross  national product could well expand 
more than in  1969; this would again  be considerably  faster  than  the target growth 
rate  set  in  the  Italian  five-year  plan.  The  conditions  making  for  internal  and 
external equilibrium  may  well deteriorate  in  1970. 
1.  Balance sheet for 1969 
In  1969  the  economic  trend  registered  a  very 
vigorous  upswing,  but  this  was  accompanied, 
particularly  in the  second  half  of  the year,  by 
signs  of  increasing  strain.  From  September 
onwards  economic  activity  was  impeded  appre-
ciably  by  widespread  and  unexpectedly  violent 
labour disputes. 
Exports  were  again  the  most  dynamic  compo-
nent  of  demand,  although  their  growth-sea-
sonally  adjusted-tended  to  slow  down  some-
what  towards  the  end  of  the  year.  The  fast 
growth  of  exports,  which  was  only  a  litde 
slower than in 1968, is all the more remarkable 
because the import curve for non-member coun-
tries  was  climbing  more  slowly  than  in  1968 
and  there  was  greater  pressure  on  resources 
because  of  an  accelerated  growth  of  domestic 
demand.  The two main factors  contributing to 
the fast growth of exports were the very lively 
and,  at  times,  inflationary  demand  for  imports 
in  the  other  member  countries  and  Italy's 
favourable  competitive  position  on  the  inter-
national market.  Further factors were no doubt 
the tariff reductions resulting from the Kennedy 
Round  that took effect on  1 January  1969  and 
the  elimination  six  months  earlier  of  the 
remaining  customs  duties  within  the  Com-
munity. 
Exports  of  all  the  main  classes  of  products 
increased,  hut  the  mechanical  engineering  and 
garment industries were the ones which stepped 
up  most  their sales  abroad. 
Growth  of  visible  exports,  as  defined  for  the 
customs  returns,  is  estimated  at  19.5%  for 
1969 in terms of value  and  18.5 %  in volume, 
as  against  17 %  and  19.4 %  respectively  in 
1968. 
Despite a relatively weak growth of the tourist 
trade, exports of services also increased at a fast 
pace,  chiefly  owing  to a  very  rapid  expansion 
of  investment  income  and  earnings  from  mer-
chandise  transport. 
As  defined  for  the  national  accounts,  it  is 
estimated  that  the  value  of  exports  of  goods 
and  services  as  a  whole  was  some  18.5 %  up 
in 1969 as  against  14.7% in 1968. 
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The acceleration in the growth of domestic  de-
mand  was  due  primarily  to  the  investment 
trend. 
Investment  in  building  and  construction,  in 
particular,  continued  to  accelerate  in  1969, 
especially investment in residential construction, 
but this was due not so  much to the underlying 
trend as  to special factors.  According  to a law 
passed in  August  1967, building  permits could 
be granted up to the end of August  1968 with 
exemption from  compliance  with certain town-
planning regulations provided that building was 
begun  within  a  year  and  completed  in  the 
following  two  years.  This  concession,  which 
in  1968  provoked  an  extremely  rapid  increase 
in  building  permits-an  increase  far  beyond 
even  that  achieved  in  the  building  boom from 
1961  to  1963-prompted a  very  vigorous  ex-
pansion  of  building  starts  in  the  first  eight 
months  of  1969.  An  appreciable  contribution 
to building activity, however, was also made by 
the  sharply  growing  demand  for  dwellings  in 
the more  and  more  thickly  populated  areas  of 
industrial  concentration  in  North  Italy-new-
comers  are  mainly  from  the  South-and  by 
growing  industrial  investment  in  expansion. 
The trend of public works, on the  other hand, 
was  extremely sluggish,  at any  rate  in the first 
half  of  1969  (more  recent  information  is  not 
yet available). 
The growth of investment in plant and machin-
ery had lost momentum in 1968, but expansion 
was  more  rapid  in  1969.  Managements  ques-
tioned  in  March  and  April  for  the  EEC's  six-
monthly  business  survey  reported  plans  to  in-
crease their investments in 1969 by no less than 
30 %  (value).  Rapidly contracting reserves of 
technical capacity and the prospects of expanding 
68 
demand,  together  with the tax  and  other  con-
cessions made in the second half of  1968, were 
probably the main  reasons  for  this  upswing. 
Against  expectations,  investment  in  stocks 
seems  to have  declined.  Obviously firms  were 
forced  to  cut  deeply  into  available  stocks  on 
account  of production shortfalls  due to strikes. 
Expenditure  on  consumption  grew  at  a  faster 
pace:  the  Government's  latest  "Forecast  and 
Planning  Report"  estimates  that public current 
expenditure on goods and services gre:w in terms 
of value by  9 %;  but a  more important factor 
was  that  the  expansion  of  private  consumers' 
expenditure  was  significantly  more  vigorous 
than in 1968.  The propensity of households to 
consume  probably  remained  unchanged,  after 
declining  in  1968,  but a  more  significant  role 
was played by numerous factors  which led to a 
considerably  sharper  increase  in  disposable  in-
comes:  the employment trend (wage- and salary-
earners) gathered a little momentum;  minimum 
per capita wages grew appreciably faster because 
of  the renegotiation of  a  number  of  important 
collective  wage  agreements  towards  the end of 
the year  and  because  of  the  first  measures  to 
abolish  the  wage  zoning  system  and  of  the 
frequent  increases  in  cost-of-living  allowances 
due  to activation  of  the  sliding  wage  scales;  it 
is  also  probable  that  the  wage  drift  gained 
strength;  the  pay  of  public  officials  was  im-
proved; lastly, pensions were raised by a consid-
erable  margin,  the  higher  payments  beginning 
in  August. 
The distinctly  faster  growth of  registrations  of 
new  private  cars  is  one  factor  among  several 
suggesting  that  the  consumption  of  high-value 
goods probably grew at an above-average speed. 
On the  whole,  private  consumers'  expenditure 
(national  accounts  definition)  is  estimated  to 
have  been  about  9.5%  up  in  1969  (5.4% 
in  1968 ). 
On the supply side, the contribution to the real 
domestic  product  made  by  agriculture  rallied 
after a sharp decline in 1968.  While livestock 
production  made  further  brisk  progress,  there 
were  temporary  shortages  of  crop  products,  in 
particular vegetables, because of weather condi-
tions.  Had it not been for considerable produc-
tion losses  caused-mainly towards  the end of 
the year-by labour conflicts, industrial produc-
tion would have  risen  distinctly  faster  than in 
1968.  Production  expanded  in  practically  all Italy
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69the  main  industries,  including  textiles,  where 
output had  still been declining  during  most  of 
1968;  the most marked growth was  in the field 
of  capital  goods.  Because  of  the  production 
losses,  however,  industrial  production  (value 
added at constant prices) probably rose by only 
about  6 %  for  the  year,  as  against  8.3 %  in 
1968.  Building and construction  (also defined 
as  value  added  at  constant  prices)  represented 
by far the most dynamic component of domestic 
supply;  growth  rate  in  this  sector,  which  was 
7.5 %  in  1968,  may  be  put at  roughly  15% 
for  1969. 
Industrial production 
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1%7  1968  1969 
Including  services,  the  growth  of  the  gross 
national  product  for  1969  is  now  estimated  at 
some  6 %  (constant  prices),  compared  with 
5.7 % for 1968.  The figure forecast in the last 
Quarterly  Survey-7 %-has had to be adjusted 
downwards, because of production losses due to 
the  strikes. 
Despite  a  slight  acceleration  in  the  upward 
trend of the productivity of the economy  (pro-
duction  per  employed  person),  the  number 
of persons in paid employment increased by an 
estimated  1.5 %,  a  little  more  than  in  1968. 
The number of hours worked has  in the mean-
while  certainly grown far  less  rapidly  since  the 
number  of  days  lost  through  strikes  was  ex-
ceptionally high  (in the first  seven months,  ac-
cording  to  ISTAT  figures,  it was  nearly  three 
times  as  high in  1969  as  in  1968).  Although 
the  total  number  of  the  gainfully  employed 
again declined appreciably, the figure for unem-
ployment, which in 1968 was  for the most part 
still rising slightly, contracted both on a year-to-
year basis and in the course of the year, because 
the  working  population  decreased  further  for 
structural reasons.  The  number  of  persons  in 
paid employment in industry (including building 
and  construction)  again  climbed  sharply  and 
this  was  probably  an  important  factor  in  the 
general  productivity  improvement. 
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The faster growth of demand and probably also 
the  bottlenecks  in  production  (mainly  due  to 
the  strikes)  led  to  an  extremely  rapid  rise  in 
imports.  Visible  imports  in  particular  moved 
up sharply;  it is  estimated that the  1968 level 
was exceeded by about 24 % in terms of volume 
and by some  25.5 %  in value  (in 1968, 5.5% 
and  4 %  respectively).  Imports  of  finished 
products, notably capital  goods,  expanded  with 
particular  dynamism,  imports  from  the  other 
member  countries  again  deriving  above-average 
benefit. 
Figures  available  suggest  that the  trend  of ser-
vices  imports  also  rose  more  sharply. 
Imports  of  goods  and  services,  as  defined  for 
the  national  accounts,  grew  by  an  estimated 
22%  in  volume  in  1969  as  against  7.3% in 
1968. 
Trade with other member 
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71 In  contrast  to  1968,  prices  rose  distinctly 
throughout  1969  at  a  gradually  accelerating 
pace;  this was more marked at producer than at 
consumer level.  The trend,  which,  on account 
of  the  special  situation  in  1968,  was  not  re-
flected  in  the  early  part of  1969  in high  year-
to-year increases, was in part the result of some 
price increases decided on by  the public authori-
ties  (petrol,  cigarettes,  newspapers  and electri-
city)  and  also  of  strains  in  the demand-supply 
situation and higher costs.  In the building sec-
tor, in particular,  demand far  exceeded produc-
tion.  Demand for farm products and foodstuffs 
also  tended  at  times  to  outstrip  short-term 
supply.  At the  same  time  a  number  of  cost 
components were  on the increase:  the prices  of 
key  imported  raw  materials  rose  sharply  and 
labour  costs  also  rose,  especially  towards  the 
end of the year.  In addition, stoppages because 
of  strikes  added  to  fixed  costs  per  unit  of 
output. 
In the first nine months  wholesale prices  went 
up by 4.7% and consumer prices by 2.9% and 
in  September  they  were  5.8 %  and  3.5 % 
respectively  above  the  September  1968  levels. 
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After  falling  in  1968,  the  trade  deficit  rose 
again in 1969-from Lit. 43 000  million to an 
estimated  Lit.  450 000  million  (according  to 
customs  returns).  Despite  the further  growth 
of  net  receipts  from  services,  the  surplus  on 
current  account  may  therefore  have  decreased 
(in 1968:  Lit.  1 653 000 million). 
For  various  reasons,  among  them  the  higher 
interest rates abroad, exports of capital increased 
exceptionally  fast  in  1969,  especially  in  the 
form  of bank notes.  Although the commercial 
banks  were  urged  by  the  monetary  authorities 
72 
to  repatriate  foreign  currency  held  abroad  and 
claims  denominated  in  foreign  currencies  by 
30  June  1969-at  the  beginning  of  1969  it 
stood  at  some  Lit.  500 000  million-official 
gold  and  foreign  exchange  reserves  decreased 
further  (in  the  first  nine  months  by  Lit. 
195 000  million to Lit.  2 854 000  million). 
Transactions  with abroad had a sharply  restric-
tive  effect  on  the  domestic  liquidity  of  the 
banking  system  (this had not been the case  in 
1968).  In  the  first  eight  months  of  1969, 
minimum  reserves,  the  circulation of notes and 
coin  and,  with  gradually  increasing  intensity, 
the  rediscount  operations  of  the  monetary 
authorities were having  a similar effect.  Since 
these  factors  outweighed  the  tendency  for 
liquidity to expand as  a result of the Treasury's 
cash  transactions,  bank  liquidity  contracted  in 
this period.  Bank advances increased fast, with 
a  13 %  year-to-year  growth  rate  in  the  first 
eight months. 
Bank lending  Lit. '000 million 
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In 1969,  as  in  1968,  price  movements  on  the 
securities market were  far  from  uniform.  The 
most  striking  feature· was  that  while  equities 
rose,  though  by  no  means  steadily,  until  the 
autumn,  from  about March  onwards  the prices 
of  fixed  interest  securities,  which  for  several 
years had been virtually stable, dropped.  Equi-
ties rose because of favourable company reports, 
rumours of the imminent establishment of Italian 
investment  funds  and  some  measures  regarding 
the  capital  market,  whereas  the  weaker  trend 
of bond prices was  due to a change in the open 
market policy of the Banca d'Italia.  According 
to  the  Government's  "Forecast  and  Planning 
Report", however,  a further and  substantial in-
crease in the volume of bonds issued will prob-Demand  for  and  supply  of  goods  and  services 
-
1967 1  1968  1  1969  2  1970 3 
~---- __  " ____________ 
At 
current  % change on preceding year 
prices 
(in Lit. 
'000 
I  Volume 
million)  Volume  Value  Value  Volume 
I 
Exports 4  7 965  +  15.4  +  14.7  +16¥2  +  18%  +  10 
Gross fixed asset formation  8 233  +  7.4  +  9.9  +  12  +  18  +11 
Public current expenditure on goods and 
services  5 780  +  4.1  +  9.2  +  3%  +  9  +  4¥2 
Private consumers' expenditure  28 218  +  4.3  +  5,4  +  6¥2  +  9Yz  +  8 
------ -------
Gross national product  43  553  +  5.7  +  7.3  +  6  +  10  +  7% 
Imports 4  7 193  I+  7.3  +  6.7  +  22  +  24Yz  +  19 
I  -
1  Relazione generale sulla situazione economica del paese (1968). 
2  Commission estimates. 
3  Commission forecasts. 
4  Goods, services and factor income. 
Note: 
(a)  The difference between the figures for demand and those for supply is  accounted for by movements in stocks. 
(b)  The  estimates  and  forecasts  are  approximations  based  on  certain  hypotheses,  generally  mentioned  in  the 
Quarterly Surveys.  They have been discussed with experts from the member countries, but are  established and 
published on the sole responsibility of the Commission. 
ubly  have  been  recorded  in  1969  (an increase 
of  some  30 %  to  over  Lit.  4 000 000  million, 
net  of  redemptions).  Well  over  half  of  this 
amount, that is nearly twice as  much as in 1968, 
will  have  been  issued  by  official  agencies  or 
departments.  According  to  official  estimates, 
the  banks'  purchases  of  securities  will  have 
fallen  in  absolute  terms;  on the  other hand,  it 
is  thought  that  subscriptions  by  the  private 
sector and by  the Banca d'Italia will have been 
well above the  1968 total. 
Particularly  in  the  second  half  of  the  year, 
interest  rates  rose  on  the  Italian  money  and 
capital  markets,  though  less  than  on  those  of 
the  other  Community  countries  and  on  the 
Eurodollar  market.  Since  1  July  the  Banca 
d'Italia has  applied  a special  rate  ( 1.5 %  over 
Bank rate, which had stood unchanged at 3.5 % 
since  June  1958)  to  bills  presented  by  banks 
with a rediscount volume  exceeding  a specified 
ceiling  or  by  the  central  organizations  of  the 
commercial banks.  With effect from 14 August 
both Bank  rate  and  the  rate  for  loans  against 
collateral  were  raised  from  3.5 %  to  4 %  ex-
cept for bills of the state storage agencies.  The 
special rate and those  ( 0.5-1.5  points)  charged 
since  March  on  loans  against  collateral for  cer-
tain fixed  periods  were  consequently  raised  by 
the same  amount. 
2.  Outlook for  1970 
Although  there  are  important  variables  the 
future  behaviour  of  which  is  particularly  hard 
73 to predict, especially in view of the international 
payments  situation  and  the  outcome  of  wage 
negotiations  still in progress,  the upward trend 
of  the  Italian  economy  may  be  expected  to 
remain  very  vigorous  'in  1970.  Domestic  de-
mand  is  undoubtedly  assuming  greater  impor-
tance as  the key to expansion.  In addition,  in 
the  first  months  of  1970  expansion  may  well 
be accelerated by a special factor, that is  endeav-
ours  to make good production losses  caused by 
the strikes  in  late  1969. 
The  growth  of  export  demand  will  probably 
slow  down:  the world business  trend  is  likely 
to  weaken  mainly  because  of  restrictive  meas-
ures in the United States and the United King-
dom, but Italian exports will also suffer because 
the  growth of  supply  available  for  sale  abroad 
is likely to be slower.  On the other hand, there 
are  many  reasons  for  predicting  a  substantial 
increase  in  exports, for example  the continuing 
expansion  in  the  Community,  Italy's  strong 
competitive  position on the international market, 
the  effects  of  the  revaluation  of  the  German 
mark  and  the  third  set  of  tariff  reductions  to 
be made by important non-member countries on 
1 January 1970 as agreed in the Kennedy Round. 
Fixed asset formation will probably continue to 
make further vigorous progress.  The prospects 
of an  expansion of overall demand,  the narrow-
ing  reserves  of  technical  capacity,  and  the 
pressure of rationalization  (a result of the latest 
cost increases  and  the further reductions in the 
Common Customs Tariff agreed at the Kennedy 
Round  negotiations)  will  probably  lead  to  a 
sharp  growth  of  investment  in  plant  and  ma-
chinery.  Recent official measures in connection 
with  the  capital  market  could  well  facilitate 
such  a  trend.  The expansion  of  investment  in 
building  and  construction  will  no  doubt  also 
maintain  its  fast  pace,  but  in  residential  and 
industrial building expansion will probably lose 
momentum in the course of the year on account 
of the deadlines set by the law of August 1967. 
At present, therefore, it is likely that there will 
be a faster  growth of public works,  for  which 
extensive projects have long been ready. 
Investment in stocks, which in 1968  and 1969 
had been exceptionally low,  may  well  begin to 
make  an  appreciable  contribution  to  expansion 
c1nce again. 
Consumption  expenditure,  particularly  private-
sector  consumption,  is  likely  to  expand  more 
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vigorously than in 1969, for  there will probably 
be  an  increase  in  the  propensity  of  households 
to  consume-owing  in  part  to  the  declining 
expansion  of  residential  construction-and cer-
tainly a spurt in the growth of Italy's wage bill. 
The  rise  in  employment  is  likely  to  be  more 
insistent than in  1969.  In particular  the year-
to-year  growth rates  of  gross  per  capita  wages 
may  be  markedly  higher,  primarily  as  a  result 
of  the  latest  wage  agreements  but also  on  ac-
count  of  the  wage  drift,  which  is  expected  to 
continue.  In  1970  transfer  incomes  are  also 
likely  to rise  very  fast. 
On  these  assumptions  industrial  production 
should  rise  by  about  9 %  and  the  real  gross 
national  product  by  some  7.5 %.  Economic 
growth  would  thus  for  five  consecutive  years 
have been considerably  faster  than projected in 
the  Italian  five-year  plan. 
The  increased  requirements  in  raw  materials 
and  semi-manufactures  and  the  gap-likely  to 
widen-between overall  demand  and  domestic 
supply  potential  suggest  that  imports  will 
continue to climb.  In view of the outlook for 
exports,  the "external contribution" (as defined 
for  the national  accounts )  should  consequently 
decline very appreciably. 
The  upward movement  of prices  will  probably 
continue  to  accelerate,  so  that  for  1970  as  a 
whole  (having  due  regard  to  the level  reached 
at  the end of  1969)  there  is  a distinct  danger 
of a considerable  rise in the price level for the 
first  time  since  1963/64.  From  the  very 
beginning  of  the  year  the  economy  will  feel 
considerable  pressure from  costs,  which  can  be 
accounted  for  in higher  prices  relatively  easily 
because  of  the  lively  trend  of  demand.  The 
revaluation of the German mark  will probably 
not only mean  dearer imports, but should also, 
for  a time,  constitute a factor  tending  to force 
up  prices  in  general,  especially  as  Germany  is 
Italy's most important trade partner.  The latest 
EEC  business  surveys  leave  no  doubt  that 
businessmen  expect  price  increases  on  a  broad 
front. 
In view  of  the  outlook  those  responsible  for 
short-term  economic  policy  should  definitely 
pursue  a  restrictive  policy;  the  result  of  the 
wage negotiations, which will certainly influence 
the trend of costs and demand for a long time, 
will probably be the decisive factor to be taken into account in  shaping this policy.  Otherwise 
the  inflationary  pressures  that  would  emerge 
would be difficult to control and would not only 
jeopardize  the  results  of  the  successful  policy 
pursued  in  the  last  few  years-years  of  fast 
g11owth-in  order  to  achieve  stabiltity,  but 
would  also,  whatever  their  causes  might  be, 
constitute  a  threat  to  employment  and  might 
entail  serious  losses  of  growth.  Inflationary 
tendencies  in  Italy  must  be  checked  in  time 
for  another  reason:  at present the structure of 
the balance of payments is  unfavourable owing 
to  the large  net outflows  of capital  and  there-
fore  a  very  acute  deterioration  of  current  ac-
count coupled with persistent exports of capital 
would  create  a  serious  foreign  exchange 
problem.  The  results  of  the  present  wage 
negotiations, which in the near future will have 
a  lasting  direct  and  indirect  influence  on  the 
trend  of  costs  and  demand,  will  constitute  a 
decisive  factor  to  be  taken  into  account  in 
shaping economic  poJicy  in the future. 
The budget estimates submitted by the Govern-
ment for  1970  are  expansionary, mainly  owing 
to  extra  burdens  on  account  of important  re-
forms,  most of which had already been decided 
upon  some  time  previously,  in  the  fields  of 
pensions,  universities,  regional  financing  and 
public  officials'  pay.  In  particular  a  further 
appreciable  increase  in  the  budget  deficit  is 
proposed: from Lit. 1 011 000 million according 
to  the  original  preliminary estimates for  1969, 
which in  any  case  had been  swollen by  partic-
ularly  large  supplementary  estimates,  to  Lit. 
1 422 000  million,  if  borrowing  and  debt  re-
demption are eliminated from the official figures 
for  receipts  and  expenditure  respectively.  By 
comparison  with  the  estimates  for  the  1969 
budget,  the  authorities  plan  to step  up expen-
diture by  15.1  %  and revenue by  12.5%  (the 
estimates  for  1969  entailed  corresponding  in-
creases of 9.1  % and 10.3  % respectively over 
those for  1968).  In particular, current expen-
diture,  which  is  mainly  consumption  expendi-
ture,  is  expected  to  grow  fast  in  1970  (by 
16 % )  ,  and  consequently  its  relative  share  in 
total budget  spending will  increase  once  again 
and  saving  by  the  public  authorities  will 
decrease.  The  estimates  for  government  ex-
penditure  to  be  financed  initially  outside  the 
budget,  from  the  capital  market,  have  been 
raised  again,  from  Lit.  1 029 000  million  to 
Lit.  1 194 000  million. 
It must,  however,  be  borne  in  mind  that  ex-
perience shows that in Italy there can be a wide 
divergence between the estimates and the actual 
outturn.  Consequently the 1970 budget should 
be  implemented  with  the  greatest  caution. 
A  temporary  increase  in unexpended  appropri-
ations  ( residui  passivi),  however unsatisfactory 
this  might  appear  from  the  longer-term  angle, 
may  well be regarded in the circumstances as  a 
lesser  evil.  On  no  account  should  supple-
mentary budgets be allowed to add expansionary 
impetus.  Cash  deficits  should  be  financed  as 
far  as  possible  from  the  revenue  flow  and  as 
little as  possible from  the Central Bank.  How-
ever,  where the authorities make administrative 
price  increases,  which  in  themselves  are  not 
inappropriate  as  a  means  of  financing  govern-
ment  expenditure without recourse to the money 
market,  they  must do  so  with great caution in 
the present economic situation as  such increases 
help to activate  the sliding wage  scale. 
The  stricter  monetary  and  credit  policy  which 
has  been  applied  for  some  months  now  should 
be maintained and indeed strengthened in view 
of the danger  of the tendency  towards  internal 
and  external  imbalance  becoming  more  pro-
nounced because of restrictions on expansion of 
domestic  liquidity  and  a  higher  interest  level. 
Raising  interest  rates  would  not  only  have  a 
restraining  effect  on  the  trend  of  demand  but 
could  also  help  to  inhibit  exports  of  capital, 
which  are  too  large.  If they  persisted over  a 
long period, they could become  a serious obstacle 
to  rapid growth, especially  as  Italy has  a great 
need of investments. 
In addition,  structural reforms  should be vigor-
ously pressed forward.  Efforts should be made, 
in particular,  to promote  saving  by  individuals 
and  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  the  capital 
market.  More  private  saving  would  not  only 
have  favourable  social  effects,  but would  also 
help  to prevent  income  increases  from  flowing 
entirely  intp  private  consumption  and  would 
thus  diminish  the  danger  of  a  consumption 
boom.  The  Government  has  already  taken 
several  important  measures  this  year  regarding 
the capital  market in order to help firms  build 
up  their  own-capital  basis,  which  is  relatively 
weak at present, and at the same  time promote 
saving in Italy.  In the first place the shares of 
four government-controlled firms  (three leading 
banks  and  Alfa  Romeo)  were  quoted  on  the 
75 stock exchange  for  the first  time.  Secondly,  a 
law  has  been  drafted  stipulating  that tax  con-
cessions  are  to be granted on certain conditions 
for  capital  increases  of  quoted  companies. 
Another  bill  has  been  introduced to  deal  with 
the establishment-planned several years ago--
of  sufficiently  attracrive  Italian  investment 
funds. 
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Efforts  to  achieve  better  regional  balance,  to 
mobilize  resources  in relatively little developed 
regions, and to encourage the vocational training 
of  young  people  and  adults  must  be  pursued 
energetically,  as  here there are still considerable 
reserves  of  productivity  with  which  more 
favourable  conditions  for  rapid  growth  free  of 
strain can be ensured, particularly for the longer 
term. TABLE 1 : Key indicators 
% change by volume 
on preceding year 
---------------,-------
Gross national product 
Industrial production 
Total imports 
Private consumers' expenditure 
Pubhc current expenditure on goods 
and services 
C~ross fixed asset formation 
Total exports 
Gross national product per head of 
population 
Gross national product per person in 
employment 
Gross income per employee 
2.8 
2.1 
5.1 
2.5 
3.4 
6.5 
11.6 
1.8 
3.1 
+ 12.6 
3.5 
3.1 
1.9 
2.7 
- 3.7 
8.4 
20.1 
2.8 
5.5 
5.7 
8.0 
13.7 
5.9 
3.5 
3.4 
13.2 
5.0 
7.3 
% change by value 
on preceding year 
6.4 
8.1 
12.6 
7.3 
2.8 
10.5 
6.2 
5.1 
4.8 
5.7 
8.1 
7.3 
4.3 
4.1 
7.4 
15.4 
5.0 
5.6 
Italy 
-----1 
1968 
lndices 
1958=100 
(180) 
(202) 
(333) 
(181) 
(149) 
(177) 
(365) 
(167) 
(194) 
(353)  I +  8.2  I +  8.2  I +  7.4  I +  6.4 
--------------'------'------'-------'--------'--------'-----' 
TABLE 2: Indicators for internal and external equilibrium 
------------------------
Balance exports less imports 
in million u.a. 
as  percentage of GNP 
Unemployment rate 
price index of private consumers' expenditure 
(%change on preceding year) 
L_ _________  _ 
1964 
121 
0.6 
2.7 
5.6 
1965 
729 
3.3 
3.6 
4.2 
1966 
673 
2.7 
3.9 
2.9 
1967 
483 
1.8 
3.5 
2.9 
1968 
911 
3.1 
3.5 
1.i 
77 i 
I 
! 
Italy 
TABLE 3: Foreign trade (at current prices) 
Yioib!P  PxportR 
Total 
lntra-EEC' 
To non-E.Et' ronntric:-: 
Exports of food. b\'\Ternu;es a11d  tobacco 
Total 
Intm-EEC 
'L'o  non-EEU countrleb 
Exports of raw nmtl'fial~, tuel awl }JOWL'r 
Total 
Intra-EEC 
To non-EEU countries 
Exports of sru1i-finblwd awl finished  indu~trial ~ood:-:; 
Total 
Intra-EEl' 
To nou-EEt  • countrit·~ 
~  ~ r.hange on vrecediug year  I  Indices  I  ll1illion  °~ of 
·~~~F;l~o~~l~--~-106S 
11058 = 100
1 
u.a.  total' 
--------------
1  196S  !  1968  19G."i 
I-
I 
I 
1~.0 I  ~0.7 ,  11.7 i  ·' 31 
~6.-l I  27 .o  12.~  3.3 I 
13.4 ,  1u.4  11.0  11.ti I 
2.4 I  :lO.G  1.5  4.7 , -
cUl  31.4  0.4  - 1.7 1--
3.3  9.5  2.8  12.4 I-
I  I 
H.G 
23.3 
11.2 
21.2 
31.0 
1o.1 
11:>.7  ! 
34.2 
12.4 
20.9 
26.2 
17.81 
10.61 
21.5 
5.21 
13.41  14.6 
12.6 
9.1 
15.9 
5.3 
8.8 
3.2 
12.4 
17.0 I 
~O.P I 
14.5 
B.7  I 
1.3 : 
IJ.1  I 
1+.1, 
14.7  1 
13.7 : 
20.21 
25.41' 
16.7 
395.2 
670.6 
310.1 
170.5 
239.3 
129.9 
303.8 
606.8 
231.4 
474.7 
905.9 
364.1 
10 1~3.2  100 
4 079.1  40.1 
6104.1  59.9 
:>70.1  K.5 
453.4  4.4 
416.7  ~.1 
ss;;.o  b.7 
3H.O  3.3 
544.0  5.4 
8  421'\.1  t-12.8 
3 2S4.7  32.4 
5143.4  50.4 
\"h;ible  llllllOl't~ 
Total 
Intra-BEl' 
--I~.1  I 
16.71 
I 
1.61 
12.9 
I 
4.31  325.0  10 252.(}  100 
36.2 
63.~  Frmn non-EE(_'  ('OUH1 rieH 
Imports of food. hewmge,; and tohacco 
Total 
Intra-EEU 
J:!,rom non-EEC countrif-·~ 
Imports of raw materials, fuel and powc·r 
Total 
Intra-EEl' 
From non-E_I,~U countries 
Imports of semi-finibhed and !iuished indust.rial goods 
Total 
Intra-EEC 
~'rom  non~EEC couutril''l 
i- 4.5 
:- 3.9 
2.4 
i- 1g:~ 
I_  0.7 
0.1 
0.8 
3.1 
3.\l 
I 
18.9 i 
20.6 I 
18.4! 
~.5 
18.7 
7.0 
21.6 
14.4 
9.7 
13.5 
8.7 
i 
15.1 I  18.2 
14.6 
i 
21.5 
l:LK 
0.7 
26.6 
- 6.4 i 
! 
13.71  14.2  -
13.61 
I 
9.1 
1.8 
8.5 
29.0 
0.9 
1.0 
3.0 
1.7 
22.0!  18.81  - ~.9  - 10.8  ll.6 
22.3  ' 
542.6  3 709.2 
204.9  6 543.4 
353.6  1 931.1 
799.9  622.3 
279.4  1  308.~ 
232.7  3 691.1 
323.1  495.6 
223.0  3 195.5 
24.21  19.4  14.51 
1 - 7.7·~-10.8  S.11 
~- 10.2 1- 10.9-'-'-----'-----'--n-.z-1 '---------'--· 
453.3 
572.8 
358.3 
4 630.4 
2 591.3 
2 039.1 
TABLE 4: Selected monthly indicators 
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I  I  I  '  I 
1~U :!  I 
I 
I 
1:!  I AI  1 J./.9 I  Iwlustli.tl production  I  19Gi 
I 
124.9  1:! \.5  1311.;  1'.!!1.1  12fJ)j  130.9  12.9.8  133  .  .51 
(1Uti3  .c  100)  1\)()H  JJ2 .7  }.),).9  ],] ).2  136.3  136.1  1Ji 1  ].);  ()  139.1  143.5  143.9  f,-J!J.6  I 
H.lfiD  141.8  14:!.0  IJI .8  149.3  145.6  149.8  l.JS .:!  IJ6.6 
I  I 
Unem]Jlo)·ed  19fi7  1 0.)6 .:!  J  062.0  1  u1r1.8  1  o.;u.1  1 038.7  1 1Nfl.8  I  01J.8  1 019.6  1 005.7  995.1  1  981.0 
(1 000)  1Vti8  96b.7  965.7  !J5U.l  !}3!1.7  962.7  96,~ .!J  960.2  962.6  !)78,4  981.5  I  Y.il.D 
1969  v:J4.8  fi.J-2.6  Vl4.8  ~91.4  880.8  !JO:! ••  J  883..5  883.0 
' 
ConHtructiou :  permit~ fm  1967  18.5  17.5  17 .S  :!0.6  20.7  21.2  ,  18.5  :13.1  20.5  16,8  ::7.7 
reHidt•nt ial cou-;truction  1968  ;!2,0  u.;  :!4.rJ:  ~1.1  25.1  28.5 i  32.3  161.5  31.4  37.3  :!3.0 
(1 000)  1960  16.2  13.1  10.2  !  Y.2  1:!.2 
! 
Private  (."(lll~UilH'D;'  eXlll'n- 1~67  l:!S.:I  1J0.8  1/J.J  1:!3.1  141,9  140.J  J40,~ I  U2,9  14~.0  128.!}  ].J.] •• ; 
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turnover (1963  ~ 100)  1969  134.N  1.)1.6  160,4  11J1.1  U2.4  1H3.1  }i:J.J  I 
Con~mner  ]ll'H~e~  1967  11u.1  11ti.4  110.6  116.8  117.1  117.4  117.7  117.[1  11>;.4  11~.3  111:>-4 
(196:{  0  1011)  1068  118.7  11~.7  llii.K  119.0  119.1  119.0  118.1:>  11t>.8  111<.9  119.0  119.2 
1\_HiU  119.9  120.1  120.6  121.1  121.J  121.~  122.5  1:l2.9 
I 
Visible hu]  H)  It:;  HH57  fiU.U  756.4  746.3  806.4  734.3  848 .  .3  847.1  781.1  814.4  867.5  i'j/6.4 
(ruillion u.a )  1961:>  709.[1  732.9  783.4  843,8  846.5  873.0  860.2  839.2  930.3  818.8  !1  031.0 
1~69  981.1  989.1  893.0  !J{J5.5  1 00.9 .7  1 109.8  1 093.0 
Visible ex]Jorts  1907  727.8  112..3  728.7  (J,J,{J  1  767,7  707.5  684.2  687.2  714.3  71>1.7  754.1 
(million u.a.)  196!;  807.7  797.7  015.4  s21.o I  8u.o  830.2  832.2  833.5  82J  ..  5  :55:1.5  1 003,3 
1969  981.9  .9.38 .2  !II  1.5  1 O:!i .1  J 07i'.711 011J ..  5  1 0.9·1.5 
I 
- 91..9  !_  .JJ.2  - 140.8 1-162  .  .91-
I 
HalanrP of  1  radr- 10U7  48.4  44.1  - 17.6  9.].:1  -100.1 ;-102.8  122.3 
(million lUI.)  1968  97.8 ,  1;4.8  32.0  - 22.8  - ;!,,; '- 42,8  - 28.U  - 5.7  -1o7.o I  3J.7  4/.7 
196U  1- 19.:!  - 0.!1  7'8.5  Jl.6  68.0  - 99.3  1.5 
Olhcial  gulU  and  fqn'lU:Jl  1067  !4  514.0  4 472.8  4 535.5  4  646.8  4 708.2  4 721.0  4 876.2  5 135.2  5 232.5  5 359.5  5 335.3 
e-x(·hange rPsern·s  1\J68  5 1:3o:>.7  5149.6  ~ !~~:~ ~~ g~u 
5 042.4  5 OHG.4  5 140.9  5 269.7  5 188.3  5 194.9  5 069.1 
(net million u.a.)  1069  4 727 -~  4 636.3  4 305.8  4 514.2  4 5Hl.9  4 645.9  4 567.0  4 568.0 
J\Ioney supply  HHJ'i'  15 840  15 ti(\2  15 981  16 157116 417  16 576116 778  16 623  16 964  16 958  17 075 
(Lit.. '000 million) 
I 
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NOTES TO GRAPHS  AND  TABLES 
Source:  Statistical Office of the European Communities (except as otherwise indicated). 
Conversion into units of account (1  u.a.  =  0.888671  g of fine  gold  =  US  ~ 1)  at official exchange rates. 
Graph  1 
Trade with non-member  countries:  series  adjusted  for  seasonal  variations;  three-month  moving  averages; 
exports fob, imports cif. 
Graph 2 
Industrial production: excluding construction, food, beverages and tobacco; trend curve; estimates established 
on the basis of indices adjusted for seasonal and fortuitous variations; provisional indices from January 1967 
because of introduction of new series. 
Graph 3 
- Labour market: number of registered unemployed; series prepared by the Ministero del Lavoro e della Previ-
denza  Sociale  and adjusted for seasonal  variations  by  the  Statistical  Office  of the  European  Communities; 
three-month moving averages. 
Graph 4 
- Trade with other member countries:  series  adjusted for  seasonal variations;  three-month moving averages; 
exports fob, imports cif. 
Graph 5 
-Wages and consumer prices;  source: ISTAT; agreed minimum wages  in industry (incl.  family  allowances); 
from January 1967 new series  (base year 1966)  with wider coverage and based on hourly wages.  Consumer 
prices: from January 1967 new series. 
Graph 6 
- Bank lending; source: Banca d'Italia; short-term loans to business and private customers; position at end of 
month. 
Table  1 
Source for 1967 and 1968: Relazione generale sulla situazione economica del Paese  (1968).  Owing to revision of 
the national accounts by ISTAT, the 1967 and 1968 figures are not strictly comparable with those for the 
preceding years. 
GNP at market prices. 
- Industrial production: value added by industry at factor cost. 
- Total exports and imports: goods, services and factor income. 
- Gross income per employee: income from paid employment, not including social insurance contributions borne 
by the State. 
Table 2 
- Balance exports less imports: goods, services and factor income. 
- Unemployment rate: number of unemployed as  percentage of labour force; source: IST  AT. 
- Private consumer prices: implicit price index computed from the national accounts. 
Table  3 
- Exports fob, imports cif; conversion at official exchange rates; the products have been regrouped on  the basis 
of the Statistical and Tariff Classification for International Trade (CST): food, beverages and tobacco  (Groups 
0  and 1  CST), raw materials, fuel and power (Groups 2-4  CST), semi-finished and finished industrial  goods 
(Groups 5-9 CST). 
Table 4 
- Industrial production: adjusted for seasonal variations, excluding construction, food,  beverages and tobacco. 
- Unemployed: series of the Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, adjusted for seasonal variations by 
the Statistical Office of the European Communities. 
Construction: dwellings authorized in the capitals of the provinces and in other communes with more than 
20 000 inhabitants. 
- Private consumers' expenditure: value index of department store turnovers, adjusted for seasonal variations. 
Consumer prices: unadjusted index. 
- Imports cif, exports fob; conversion at official exchange rates; adjusted for seasonal variations. 
- Balance of trade: difference between seasonally adjusted exports and imports. 
- Official gold and foreign exchange reserves (net); source: Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi; position at end of month. 
Money supply: notes and coin in circulation excluding cash holdings of the Treasury; sight deposits of non-
banking sector with credit institutions; bank drafts in circulation (whether vag/ia  or assegni)  issued by the Cen-
tral Bank and other banks and credit institutions; position at end of month. 
79 D.  The Netherlands 
The Dutch  economy  enjoyed  boom  conditions  in  1969.  Against a background of 
very dynamic export demand,  investment by firms and private consumers' expendi-
ture  rose  vigorously.  Industrial  production  continued to  expand  very  appreciably 
but tended to lose  some momentum in  the second half of the year,  mainly because 
more  and  more  firms  were  running  at  or  near  capacity.  Unemployment  shrank 
further. The current payments position deteriorated and prices climbed very sharply. 
The introduction of tax on  value added at the beginning of 1969 led many firms to 
raise  their prices.  In addition the vigorous expansion of demand during the rest of 
the  year  encouraged  the  tendency  for  prices  to  rise,  but  this  had  only  a  limited 
influence on  the  price  index on  account of the price  freeze  which  was imposed by 
the Government in  April and not relaxed until September. 
Production  and  employment  will,  it is  expected,  expand appreciably  in  1970  too, 
though less  fast  than  in  1969.  The underlying  upward trend of exports may level 
off,  but the expansion  of domestic demand will probably remain quite lively.  Any 
slowdown  of  investment  activity  would  probably  be  largely  offset,  in  terms  of 
volume at least,  by a more vigorour boost from  private consumption. Strains on the 
merchandise markets may well continue to  be very appreciable as  improvements in 
productivity  will  be  smaller  than  in  1969 because  of the  high  degree  of capacity 
utilization  and  because  the  opportunities  for  offsetting  planned  shorter  working 
hours  by recruiting  additional  manpower are  limited.  It is therefore  to  be  feared 
that the upzoard  trend of the general  price  level will continue to  be  quite marked. 
1.  Balance sheet for  1969 
In 1969 the Dutch economy enjoyed boom con-
ditions.  The introduction of a value-added  tax 
at  the  beginning  of the  year  not  only  resulted 
in some  changes  in the price structure but also 
led to an upsurge of prices because demand was 
climbing at the same time.  Although the Gov-
ernment  took  administrative  measures  to calm 
the economic and social climate, in particular by 
introducing  a  temporary  price  freeze,  the  eco-
nomic  trend  was  marked,  in  the period up  to 
the end of the year, by open or latent tendencies 
towards disequilibrium. 
Growth on  this  scale  had  not  been  registered 
since  1964.  The  export  boom  was  mainly  a 
response  to  demand  from  the  other  five  EEC 
countries,  in  particular  France  and  Germany, 
but exports  to  non-member  countries  also  con-
tinued to make gains.  Exports advanced  partly 
because  supply  was  relatively  elastic,  especially 
in  newly  established  firms,  but partly  perhaps 
also  because  the  improvement in  the  competi· 
tivity of Dutch industry aimed  at in 1967 and 
1968,  notably  in  respect  of  unit  labour  costs, 
was  largely achieved. 
Export  demand,  which  had  forged  ahead  in 
1968, continued to expand vigorously.  The in-
crease in the value of visible exports was  about 
19  % in 1969  (customs returns), despite a ten-
dency to level off in the second half of the year. 
In comparison with 1968  income from  services 
grew more  slowly and factor  income  rose more 
vigorously.  The net result was an estimated in-
crease in total exports in 1969 of about 15.5 %, 
at current prices  (the corresponding  1968  fig-
ure was  11.9% ). 
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The  expansion  of  domestic  demand  in  money 
terms  accelerated  in  1969;  here  the effects  of 
the introduction of tax on value  added speeded 
up  the growth of monetary expenditure. 
Gross  fixed  asset  formation  as  a  whole contin-
ued to expand, especially industrial fixed invest-
ment,  which,  encouraged  by  the  improvement 
in profits in 1967 and the outlook, continued to 
grow  quite  fast.  Another  expansionary  influ-
ence on investment activity was  the continually 
increasing expenditure in  the petrochemicals in-
dustry,  mainly because  of  the location of  plant 
on the coast  and  the enlargement  of  ports.  In 
general,  purchases  of plant and machinery,  par-
ticularly the latter, accelerated  appreciably.  In-
vestment in building, on the other hand, expand-
ed  distinctly  slower  than  in  1968,  while 
investment  in  transport  equipment  actually 
declined, mainly because deliveries of ships  and 
aircraft were smaller. 
If the effects  on  prices  of the value-added  tax 
are disregarded, it is  evident that the expansion 
of  expenditure  on  residential  construction 
slowed down in 1969.  The main factors  here 
were the execution of building projects in 1968 
in anticipation of the introduction of tax on value 
added  and  the  reduction  of working  hours  in 
the  building  trade,  which  could  not  be  offset 
by  recruiting  more  workers  because  of  the 
shortage of manpower. 
Public  investment  slowed  down because it be-
came  more  difficult  to  procure  funds  and  the 
price  rises  caused  by  the  tax  on  value  added 
could not be accounted for by additional appro-
priations because of the more restrictive budget 
policy.  The  former  factor  probably  played  an 
important  role  particularly  in  connection  with 
82 
the local  authorities' capital expenditure, which 
by  comparison  with  1968  even  diminished 
slightly. 
All  in all  it is  estimated  that gross  fixed  asset 
formation increased  by  11  % at current prices 
as  against  12.5  % in  1968.  At the same  time 
the growth of industrial investment in terms of 
volume  was  probably  only  small;  on  account 
of the sharp price increases the volume of public 
investments  and  residential  construction  may 
even not have  advanced  at all. 
The impetus  given  by  stockbuilding to  the un-
derlying trend became considerably livelier once 
again in  1969, since firms  abandoned their ear-
lier  reluctance  to  place  orders  for  additional 
stocks in view of the introduction of the added-
value tax system and tried to restore their stocks 
of  raw  materials  and  semi-finished  products  to 
a normal level. 
The  expansion  of  expenditure  on consumption 
was  very  dynamic  in  1969.  Public  current 
expenditure on goods  and services  grew, mainly 
because  wages  and  salaries  in the public  sector 
were  adjusted  to  the  fast  rise  in  the  private 
sector, and expenditure on goods, chiefly owing 
to increasing military purchases, went up faster. 
Private consumers' expenditure also climbed.  At 
the beginning of 1969 expenditure on consump-
tion  declined,  mainly  because  the  demand  for 
consumer durables fell, as  a reaction to the wave 
of  "beat-the-tax"  buying  at  the  end  of  1968. 
This  development,  however,  soon  gave  way  to 
a  fresh  upward  movement.  As  a  whole,  it is 
estimated  that  private  consumers'  expenditure 
at  current  prices  rose  by  10.5  % in  1969,  as 
opposed  to  8.4  %  in  1968.  Because  of  the 
upsurge of prices, however, growth in terms of 
volume, particularly in the first half of the year, 
was  appreciably  slower  than in  1968. 
The  more  vigorous  growth  of  private  consu-
mers' expenditure  (in money terms) in 1969 is 
due  to a faster  increase  in employment and, in 
particular,  the faster  raising  of wage  rates.  It 
is  estimated  that  the  gross  wage  bill,  on  the 
year's  average,  rose  by about  11.5  % in  1969 
as  opposed to  an  increment of 9.5  % in  1968. 
Income transfers, moreover, expanded consider-
ably  throughout  the year.  The disposable  in-
comes  of  households,  however,  increased  less 
rapidly than gross  incomes  as  the tax reduction 
resulting from the raising of the personal allow-
ance was  more than outweighed by the progres-Netherlands
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83sively heavier incidence of graduated taxes.  The 
savings  ratio  of  households  may  well  have  de-
creased  temporarily  as  a  result  of  the  upsurge 
of prices. 
The elasticity  of  domestic  supply  grew  weaker 
in  the course  of  the  year.  Although industry's 
contribution  to  the  gross  national  product  at 
constant prices  increased  by  10  %,  i.e.  by  the 
same  margin  as  in  1968, growth in  the  second 
half  of  the  year  tended  to  level  off  as  many 
industries are now working to capacity.  On the 
year's average, production in energy and chemi-
cals  once  again  registered  the heaviest growth; 
in other industries too, for example metal-work-
ing,  a  considerable  increase  in  production  was 
achieved.  Production in building  and construc-
tion declined appreciably on account of the fac-
tors  already  mentioned  in  connection  with the 
trend  of demand;  for  the  first  time  in  years 
productivity  actually  diminished.  Agricultural 
production,  too,  made  very  little  progress  in 
1969  as  the  output  of  livestock  products  fell 
short of the 1968 figure. 
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If the  contribution  made  by  services  is  taken 
into account, it may be estimated that the gross 
national product as  a whole increased by  about 
5  % in  1969  as  opposed  to  6.2  )'~  in  1968 
(constant prices). 
On the labour market the number of vacancies 
continued to increase,  especially in  the  west of 
the  country,  so  that  strain  became  even  more 
acute.  Unemployment  diminished  further  and 
the  unemployment  rate  (percentage  of  number 
of unemployed, seasonally adjusted, as  a percen-
tage  of  the  total  civilian  labour  force)  was 
1.4 % in October 1969 as  against 1.8 % in Oc-
tober 1968. 
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1967  1968  1969 
The upswing  of production in the  manufactur-
ing industries and the distinct upward trend of 
overall  demand,  particularly  related  to  invest-
ments  in  plant  and  machinery  and  stocks, 
entailed  a  heavy  increase  in  visible  imports. 
According  to customs  returns  they went up by 
15  % at  constant prices;  the growth rate was 
consequently  even  somewhat  higher  than  the 
14.5  %  registered  in  1968.  The  growth  of 
expenditure on services abroad and in particular 
the  increase  in  factor  incomes,  on  the  other 
hand, may have been smaller than in 1968.  All 
in all, therefore, the growth of imports of goods 
and  services  is  estimated  at  13.8  % (constant 
prices), that is  about the same  as  in 1968. 
Trade with other member 
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The general price level  rose  considerably.  Part 
of the upsurge of prices is,  as  has  already been 
said,  due  to  the  introduction  of  tax  on  value 
added on 1 January 1969, which coincided with 
an  unfavourable  phase  of  the  business  cycle 
(this had not been the case  in Germany a year 
earlier ) .  The higher  prices,  however,  are  also 
a direct consequence of internal economic influ-
85 ences,  in  particular  the  very  high  level  of  de-
mand,  which  made  it  easier  for  firms  to  pass 
on the higher costs of labour and raw materials 
and to widen their profit margins.  Agricultural 
prices  also  went  up  appreciably.  The  implicit 
price index of the gross national product rose by 
about  6.5  %  (  1968:  4  %  )  .  The  consumer 
price index rose particularly sharply in the first 
few  months,  until  a  general  price  freeze  was 
imposed in  April.  As  this  price  freeze  was  re-
placed  in  September  by  provisions  allowing 
firms  to  account  for  most  of  their  "external" 
costs by raising their prices, the index has been 
rising  again  since  the autumn months.  For the 
full year 1969 it probably rose by about 7.5  7c . 
The wholesale price index increased less  sharp-
ly,  especially  as  the tax  on  value  added  is  not 
taken  into  account  in  it;  all  the  same  it  was 
3 % higher in July than at the end of 1968. 
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1967  1968  1969 
Since the very dynamic growth of exports large-
ly  counterbalanced  the  vigorous  movement  of 
imports, the balance on current account on the 
basis of transactions scarcely changed in the pe-
riod up to the autumn.  In the first nine months 
of the year it closed with a deficit of Fl.  13 7 mil-
lion as  opposed to a deficit of Fl.  51  million a 
year  earlier.  The  deficit  on  the  basic  balance 
increased  sharply  in  1969  owing  to  growing 
private exports of long-term capital.  However, 
with Dutch firms  borrowing  large  amounts  of 
foreign  currency  at  short  term,  the  deficit  on 
the overall balance of payments from January to 
September 1969 was Fl.  333 million as  opposed 
to Fl.  376 million in the same period of 1968. 
The  commercial  banks'  foreign  exchange  posi-
tion improved by Fl.  421  million, while official 
gold  and  foreign  exchange  reserves  fell  by 
Fl.  754 million. 
86 
Despite  the  restnct1ve  effects  of  transactions 
with abroad, domestic liquidity again  expanded 
considerably.  The handling of budgetary expen-
diture by the authorities, in particular the Cen-
tral  Government,  again  made  a  considerable 
contribution, though smaller than a year earlier. 
The deficit on the Government's budget in 1969 
was  probably  only  a  little  smaller  than  the 
exceptionally  heavy  deficit  of  1968,  when  it 
stood at Fl.  3 300 million.  Part of  the deficit, 
though  a  distinctly  smaller  part than in  1968, 
was  covered by the  Treasury  through recourse 
to the money  market. 
Private-sector  demand for  bank loans  was  still 
very  brisk,  although  the  restrictions  on  loans 
from  the  commercial  banks  and  farm  credit 
banks  were  maintained during  the whole year. 
Indeed, from September onwards, the expansion 
of loans exceeded the ceiling established by the 
Central Bank, which in  1969 corresponded for 
short-term loans to a year-to-year growth rate of 
about 10  % after adjustment for seasonal varia-
tions.  Since then the non-interest-bearing depos-
its  to be maintained  by the  commercial  banks 
at  the Central Bank  when  the  loan ceiling  has 
been  exceeded  have  increased  constantly;  they 
amounted  between  15  November  and  14  De-
cember  to  Fl.  282  million.  Independently  of 
the  limit  on  domestic  lending,  the  Nederland-
sche  Bank also  called  on  the commercial banks 
in July to limit their loans abroad too, in order 
to mitigate the effects of the international trend 
of interest rates on the Dutch money market. 
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1967  1968  1969 
The  capital  market  was  subject  to  increasing 
strains.  The  Government,  for  example,  made 
very  heavy  calls  on the  capital  market,  espec-
ially in the second half of the year.  There was also  vigorous  demand  for  long-term  capital, 
which  was  largely  covered  outside  the  Bourse 
through institutional investors. 
In the  course  of  the year  interest rates  on  the 
money  and  capital  markets  l.'eached  a  recol.'d 
level.  Since December 1968 the Nederlandsche 
Bank  has  raised  Bank  rate  in  two  steps  from 
5  % to  6  %;  it has  done  so  not only  in  view 
of the situation at home but also because of the 
general  sharp  upward  movement  of  interest 
rates  in the world.  In October,  however,  the 
money  market  became  less  strained  owing  to 
large  speculative inflows  of  capital. 
Demand  for  and  supply  of  goods  and  services 
-
1967 1  1968 1  1969 2  1970 3 
--~---------------
At 
current  % change on preceding year 
prices 
(in Fl. 
'000 
million)  Volume  Value  Volume  Value  Volume 
Exports'  37.48  + 13.1  + 11.9  + 14Y2  + 15Y2  +  9Y2 
Gross fixed asset formation  I  21.53  + 10.1  + 12.6  +  112  +  11  +  3 
Public current expenditure on goods and 
services  13.11  +  1.8  +  7.1  +  4  + 13Y2  +  3Y2 
Private consumers' expenditure  47.29  +  5.7  +  8.4  +  3  + 10Y2  +  4Yz 
---------
Gross national product  82.97  +  6.2  + 10.1  +  5  + 12  +  4 
Imports 4  37.54  + 13.8  + 10.6  + 13Yz  + 16Yz  +  9 
----------------
1  General Statistical Bulletin 1969, No. 7,  Statistical Office of the European Communities. 
2  Commission estimates. 
3  Commission forecasts. 
4  Goods, services and factor income. 
Note: 
(a)  The difference between the figures for demand and those for supply is  accounted for by movements in stocks. 
(b)  The  estimates  and  forecasts  are  approximations  based  on certain  hypotheses,  generally  mentioned  in  the 
Quarterly Surveys.  They have been discussed with the experts of the member countries but are established and 
published on the sole responsibility of the Commission. 
2.  Outlook for  1970 
In 1970  overall demand  will  in all  probability 
expand less  sharply than in 1969, but since the 
elasticity of production is likely to diminish fur-
ther,  the  strains  between  demand  and  supply 
may  well  remain  quite marked,  at least  in  the 
first  half  of  the year. 
Exports  of  goods  and  services  will  probably 
expand  less  dynamically  than  in  the  last  two 
years.  In particular, the growth of demand from 
non-member  countries  should  lose  momentum, 
despite  the  new  tariff  reductions  agreed  to  at 
the  Kennedy  Round.  Even  in  trade  with  the 
other Community countries  it is  scarcely  likely 
that  the  high  growth  rates  of  1968  and  1969 
87 will be attained.  Although the growth prospects 
in  the  Community  as  a  whole  are,  despite  an 
expected  slowdown in  real expansion here  too, 
substantially  better  than  for  some  major  non-
member  countries  and  although  exports  to 
Germany, easily  the Netherlands' biggest custo-
mer, will be spurred on by the revaluation of the 
mark,  the  increase  in  bottlenecks  holding  up 
production in  Dutch  industry may  well  inhibit 
the  expansion  of  exports.  All  in  all  the  Com-
mission  calculates  that  as  things  stand  exports 
of  goods  and  services  (as  defined  for  the  na-
tional accounts)  will increase by about 11  % in 
terms of value in 1970. 
In the  field  of domestic  demand  the expansion 
of  expenditure  on  gross  fixed  asset  formation 
will probably slow down in 1970.  Several  fac-
tors  should  discourage  industrial  investment: 
the  effects  of  the  restrictive  monetary  and 
credit policy,  tighter depreciation rules, and the 
pressure  on  profit  margins,  which  is  likely  to 
increase.  On the other hand, there are still con-
siderable investment incentives, particularly the 
pressure  on  Dutch  managements  to  streamline 
operations  and  reorganize.  The  increase  in 
expenditure  on  residential  construction  may 
well  decline  appreciably.  Since,  however,  the 
average rise in prices over the year is  not likely 
to be so high as  in 1969, even a slight accelera-
tion  in  the  growth  rate  in  terms  of  volume 
cannot be  ruled  out.  On account  of  the  more 
restrictive  budgetary  policy  planned  for  1970 
and growing financing difficulties on the capital 
market, the growth of public investment, espec-
ially  that  of  the  local  authorities,  may  slow 
down  rather  sharply;  at  constant  prices  there 
may  even  be  hardly any  progress  at  all.  Gross 
fixed asset formation as  a whole may be expect-
ed to grow in  1970 by about 8.5  % at current 
prices  and  3  % at constant prices. 
Most  firms  re-established  a  normal  level  of 
stocks in 1969, and stock  building will therefore 
probably make a somewhat less vigorous contri-
bution to economic activity in 1970. 
The opinion issued by the Dutch Economic and 
Social  Council  in  June  1969  on  the  trend  of 
incomes  from  wages  may  have  a decisive  influ-
ence  on  the  movement  of  private  consumers' 
expenditure in 1970.  The opinion recommend-
ed  that  for  1970  the  increase  in  wage  rates 
should  still  be  held  to  5  %  so  long  as  the 
average  growth  of  consumer  prices  does  not 
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exceed 3.5  %.  Should prices rise more steeply, 
wages are to be raised correspondingly;  likewise 
if  the  increase  in  productivity  per person  em-
ployed  exceeds  the present  target of  3  %.  In 
this  case  the  additional  wage  increase  should 
take  the  form  of  an  improvement  in  indirect 
wages or blocked bonuses.  As long as the guide-
lines  S'et  out in  the  opinion  are  not  reviewed 
-the danger  of  this  happening  may  increase 
because of the continuing boom-money wages 
per person employed may  rise more slowly than 
in  1969.  According  to  the  assumptions  of the 
Economic and Social Council, the slower growth 
of  the gross  wage bill  (from 10  % in  1969 to 
7  % in  1970)  may  be  accompanied by an  im-
provement per person in employment of dispos-
able real income of about 2.5 % in 1970 ( 1969: 
only about 0.5  %) . 
While  transfer  incomes  will  probably  continue 
to climb,  the growth of incomes  from  property 
and entrepreneurship may become notably slow-
er.  In addition,  the  planned  reduction  in  in-
come and wages tax (involving about Fl. 600 mil-
lion)  will  help  to  increase  the  disposable 
incomes of households.  Assuming  (rather opti-
mistically,  given  the price  trend)  that  the  sav-
ings  ratio  will  show  little change,  private  con-
sumers'  expenditure at current prices  may  well 
grow as  fast as  in 1969. 
The  Economic  and  Social  Council's  opm10n  is 
also  of particular  significance  for  the  trend of 
public  current  expenditure  on  goods  and  ser-
vices,  as  wages  in the public sector are  aligned 
on  changes  on  those  in  the  private  sector. 
According  to  the budget  estimates  government 
procurement  is  also  likely  to  increase  appreci-
ably  again,  though  somewhat more  slowly than 
in  1969. 
The expansion of domestic supply will probably 
continue to lose pace in 1970, especially because 
in  important  manufacturing  industries  many 
firms  will be running at or near capacity at the 
beginning  of  the  year;  consequently  in  the 
economy  as  a  whole  productivity increases  are 
expected  to be smaller  and  the  shortage  of  la-
bour may  become  even more  acute  on  account 
of  a  substantial  shortening  of  agreed  working 
hours, which can only in part be offset by extra 
overtime.  In addition, changes in the structure 
of demand may have unfavourable effects on the 
growth of production in the course of the year. 
Production in building and construction, where the  underlying  trend  declined  in  1969,  may 
nevertheless pick up again  a little in  1970.  On 
the  assumption  of  a  normal  growth  of  farm 
production, the growth rate of the gross national 
product  is  now  put  at  about  4  % for  1970 
(constant  prices) . 
Employment is  likely to rise further:  unemploy-
ment  will  decline  and  more  foreign  workers 
will be engaged.  As  a whole strains on  the la-
bour  mavket  will  ease  hardly  at all;  in partic-
ular,  the demand/supply  imbalance  in  respect 
of  skilled  labour  will  probably  grow  even 
severer. 
Given  the outlook for  overall  demand  and do-
mestic  supply,  the  expansion  of  imports  of 
goods  and  services  will  once  again  be  quite 
lively,  but  the  growth  rate  for  the  full  year, 
taken  on  the  average,  will  be  lower  than  for 
1969 since the level at the end of 1969  ("over-
loop")  was  relatively  low.  In  these  circum-
stances  and  given  unfavourable  terms  of  trade, 
the current  account  will,  if  anything,  probably 
deteriorate  in  1970. 
The general price  level  should  rise  a good  deal 
more  slowly  in  1970  than  in  1969, but this  is 
chiefly  because  the  effects  of  the  introduction 
of  the  value-added  tax  will  by  then  have 
worked themselves out.  Since September 1969 
firms have been able to account for the bulk of 
increases in external costs by raising prices, and 
consequently  the  tendency  for  production costs 
to  rise  faster,  taken  with higher  import prices 
(due  partly  to  the  revaluation  of  the  mark), 
could  well  help  to  force  consumer  prices  up 
sharply. 
The conditions governing equilibrium are by no 
means  fulfilled:  in particular,  the quite marked 
tendency  for  prices  to  rise  has  persisted.  It is 
therefore  essential  that  the  authorities  should 
maintain-at any  rate  to  begin with-the res-
trictive  short-term  economic  policy  introduced 
at the end of 1968 and even strengthen it.  Fail-
ing this the support from both sides of industry 
for  the  anti-inflation  policy  advocated  in  the 
Economic  and  Social  Council's  opinion  might 
be lost.  A rapid removal of the source of infla-
tion is  also  necessary  so  that  the  present price 
measures, which are regarded as  only temporary 
even  by  the Government itself,  may  be  relaxed 
gradually  and eventually withdrawn, since  such 
measures  would  inevitably  influence  the  effi-
ciency  of the economy  in  the long  run by  pre-
venting prices  from  arbitrating between supply 
and demand. 
In addition to maintenance of restrictive money 
and  credit policies,  budgetary  policy  in partic-
ular should be tailored  to the  requirements  of 
short-term economic policy.  Here the estimates 
for  1970 are crucial.  By comparison with those 
for  1969 they  provide for  an  11  % increase in 
expenditure,  which,  as  against  the actual  1969 
outturn,  represents  an  increase  of  just  under 
8 %.  The contribution to be made by the busi-
ness  trend ranks  more or less  at the same level 
as  in  the  estimates  for  1969;  it  will,  it  is 
thought,  be  smaller  than  the  monetary  growth 
of  the  gross  national  product.  The  deficit  on 
the budget is  estimated at Fl. 2 200 million and 
would therefore be appreciably  smaller  than in 
1968  and  1969.  The  reduction  in  wages  tax 
and  income  tax  as  planned  originally  will  for 
the most part-i.e. in  respect  of some  Fl.  600 
million-have already been completed by  early 
1970, and this should give  a further impetus to 
demand from households;  the second instalment 
of the tax reduction, involving some Fl. 300 mil-
lion,  is  not to be implemented until  1 January 
1971.  Furthermore  the  raising  of  the  tax  on 
value  added  planned for  1 July  1970 has  been 
put off until 1 January 1971  on the recommen-
dation of the Economic and Social Council;  this 
is certainly an  advantage from the angle of price 
policy,  and  the  measure  should  not  mean  a 
larger  budget  deficit,  as  it was  decided  at  the 
same  time  to  postpone  further  the  restitution 
of turnover tax on old stocks.  The Government 
budget  should  be  implemented  as  strictly  as 
possible  and  the  authorities  should  at  all  costs 
ensure that the outturn does not exceed the esti-
mates  as  happened in previous  years.  Full use 
should be made of the opportunities for stagger-
ing  certain expenditures.  In this  way  most  of 
the  additional  contribution  made  by  public 
spending would be brought to bear only in the 
second  half  of  the  year,  when  the  growth  of 
expenditure  may  give  less  cause  for  concern 
than in the first half if world business  activity, 
as  is  expected, slows  down. 
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TABLE 1 : Key indicators 
----~-~~~  ~--~~  ~~-------
1964 
I 
1965 
I 
1966 
I 
1967 
I 
1968  1968 
% change by volume  Indices 
on preceding year  1958=100 
Gross national product  8.9  5.4  2.6  6.1  6.2  168 
Industrial production  11.0  6.3 
I 
5.9  5.6  9.8  199 
Total imports  14.9  6.5  7.3  6.2  13.8  264 
Private consumers' expenditure  6.0  7.4  3.4  5.1  5.7  173 
Public current expenditure on goods 
and services  1.7  1.6  1.6  4.1  1.8  134 
Gross fixed asset formation  18.0  4.9  8.5  7.8  10.1  224 
Total exports  11.6  7.6  5.2  6.9  13.1  224 
Gross national product per head of 
population  7.5  4.0  1.2  4.9  5.1  148 
Gross national product per person in 
employment  7.1  4.5  1.8  6.5  5.5  150 
% change by value 
on preceding year 
Gross income per employee  16.4 
I 
11.7 
I 
11.1 
I 
8.4 
I 
8.4  236 
TABLE 2: Indicators for internal and external equilibrium 
I 
1964 
I 
1965 
I 
1966 
I 
1967 
I 
1968 
~~ 
Balance exports less imports 
in million u.a.  - 154  +  76  - 135  - 17  +  113 
as percentage of GNP  - 0.9  +  0.4  - 0.6  - 0.1  +  0.5 
Unemployment rate  0.7  0.8  1.0  2.0  1.8 
prices to private consumers 
(% change on preceding year)  +  6.8  +  4.2  +  5.4  +  3.3  +  2.3 
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TABLE 3: Foreign trade (at current prices) 
% change on preceding year  Indices  Million  %of 
1958=100  u.a.  totals 
1964  I 
1965 I 
1966 I 
1967  I 
1968  1968  1968  1968 
I Visible exports 
I 
Total  + 17.0  + 10.1  +  5.6  +  7.9  + 14.5  259  8 342  100 
lntra·EEC  + 22.1  + 10.2  +  5.3  +  6.7  + 19.7  358  4 790  57.4 
I  To non-EEC countries  + 11.2  + 10.0  +  6.0  +  9.4  +  8.2  178  3 552  42.6 
Exports of food, beverages and tobacco 
Total  +  9.5  + 13.0  +  0.3  +  9.9  + 15.9  224  2 002  24.0 
Intra-EEC  + 12.8  + 19.7  - 0.2  +  9.6  + 22.1  308  1 295  15.5 
To non-EJJ:U countrie•  +  5.1  +  3.6  +  1.0  + 10.5  +  6.1  150  707  8.5 
Exports of raw materials, fuel and power 
Total  + 10.9  +  7.4  - 0.4  + 10.1  + 12.8  205  1 374  16.5 
Intra-EEG  + 12.3  +  3.4  - 0.7  + 10.7  + 22.5  292  797  9.6 
To non-E:i!]G  counkie8  +  9.3  + 12.3  - 0.1  +  9.5  +  1.7  146  577  6.9 
Exports of ,;emi-flnished and finished industrial goods 
Total  + 22.6  +  9.7  +  9.7  +  6.6  + 14.4  300  4 966  59.5 
Intm-EEC  + 30.4  +  8.1  +  9.8  +  4.5  + 17.8  420  2 69t!  32.3 
To non-EEC countries  + 14.3  + 11.7  +  9.6  +  9.0  + 10.6  224  2 261l  27.2 
Visible imports 
Total  + 18.2  +  5.9  +  7.5  +  4.0  + 11.5  256  9 297  100 
Intra-EEC  + 19.0  +  8.7  +  8.7  +  5.0  + 13.2  339  5 146  55.4 
]'rom non-EEC countries  + 17.4  +  2.9  +  6.0  +  2.9  +  9.5  197  4151  44.6 
Imports of food, beverages and tobacco 
Total  + 16.2  +  3.5  +  3.9  + 11.3  +  9.7  224  1253  13.5 
Intra-EEC  + 22.0  + 13.1  +  8.8  + 22.7  + 28.1  484  387  4.2 
From non-EEC countries  + 14.9  - 1.2  +  2.5  +  7.6  +  3.2  181  1'66  9.3 
Imports of raw materials, fuel and power 
Total  +  8.5  +  1.0  +  0.9  +  5.2  +  8.6  167  1945  20.9 
Intra-EEG  - 23.8  +  5.7  +  7.7  +  9 9. +  4.8  228  432  4.6 
From non-EEC countries  + 21.1  - 0.2  - 0.9  +  3.9  +  9.7  155  1513  16.3 
Imports of scmi-flnbhed and finished industrial goods 
Total  + 22.9  +  8.0  + 10.5  +  2.2  + 12.8  320  6 099  65.6 
Intra-EEC  + 26.4  +  8.0  +  8.8  +  3.3  + 12.9  347  4 327  46.5 
]'rom non-EEC countries  + 15.2  +  8.1  + 14.7  - 0.3  + 12.6  270  1 772  19.1 
TABLE 4 : Selected monthly indicators 
I  Year I  Jan. I 
Feb. I 
Mar. I 
Apr. I 
May I 
June I 
July I 
Aug. I 
Sept.,  Oct. I 
Nov.' I  Dec.  I 
I 
I 
Industrial production  1967  126.8  126.5  126.5  128.8  126,0  130.5  128.2  137.3  135.4  133.6  1J6.4  140.0 
I 
(1963  =  100)  1968  141.7  141.1  141.3  140.0  142.7  146.1  142.1  164.2  149.1  150.0  165.2  161.5 
1969  158.1  159.8  160.9  159.4  162.5  162.2  164.5  168.3 
Unemployed  1967  76.3  76.2  84.6  87.2  86.3  87.3  88.6  87.6  88.3  90.4  91.3  89.6 
! (1  000)  1968  96.3  88.6  90.7  85.0  81.4  80.7  79.5  76.8  74.5  74.0  70.3  65.2 
1969  68,0  68.1  68.6  62.1  60.7  59.6  60.7  61.2  59.4  58 
Construction :  permits for  1967  9 981  9 236  17 110  10 348  10 255  13 454  5 438  12 696  16 648  9 362  9 367  10 351 
residential construction  1968  10 980  7 151  14 0~~  13 566  12 071  11  904  7 528  11 523  15 272  8 046  7 158  10 858 
(1 000)  1969  8 199  8 128  14 640  12 948  10 720  9 456  6 Oti9  14 896  8 910 
Private consumers' expen·  1967  150.3  U7.9  156.1  U8.9  156.9  165.2  147.1  178.0  167.0  167.6  171.6  167.9 
diture :  department  store  1968  160  164  169  164  176  177  170  197  173  183  186  189 
turnover (1963 = 100)  1969  162  186  193  187  210  198  183 
Consumer prices  1967  118.5  119.4  119.9  120.7  120.7  120.8  121.2  122.2  122.6  122.8  122.7  122.7 
(1963  =  100)  1968  123.3  124.1  124.6  125.1  125.2  125.5  125.0  126.2  126.6  127.3  127.4  127.8 
1969  132.3  133.4  134.4  135.6  135.4  135.4  134.1  134.9  135.7  136.3 
Visible imports  1967  679.6  652.9  708.4  689.5  692.8  736.4  633.0  680.6  70ti.1  711.3  744.9  717.0 
(million u.a.)  1968  822.0  719.0  757.2  703.8  813.9  696.5  751.ti  790.0  806.7  828.8  815.4  809.7 
1969  815.2  840.4  844.3  881.6  914.6  946.4  864.8  869.7  1 007  1 010 
Visible exports  1967  600.4  o31.s  605.8  ti81.9  391.1  641.2  534.9  634.4  614.5  649.2  664.0  600.0 
(million u.a.)  1968  692.6  642.3  669.5  661.7  724.3  ti96.6  685.1  702.3  688.3  743.1  749.3  734.7 
1969  774.1  761.2  796.5  779.4  815.1  867.9  787.4  822.0  881  910 
Balance of trade  1967  - 79.2  - 121.1  -102.6  -107.6 -101.7- 95.2  - 98.1  - 46.2  - 90.6  - 62.1  - 80.9  -117.0 
(million u.a.)  1968  -129.4  - 76.7  - 87.7  - 42.1  - 89.4 - 99.9  - 66.4  - 87.7  -118.4  - 85.7  - 66.1  - 75.0 
1969  - 41.1  - 79.2  - 47.8  - 102.2  - 99.5 - 78.ti  - 77.4  - 47.7  -126  -100 
Official  gold  and  foreign  1967  1 970  1 995  1 998  1995  2 065  2 094  2104  2064  2104  2 229  2271  2 268 
exchange reserves  1968  2194  2164  2 082  2 028  2 008  1 988  2 000  2 030  2 001  1 972  1 968  1 967 
(million u.a.)  1969  1 892  1 937  1 954  1 981  2 046  1 965  2 031  1 999  2 005 
Money supply  1967  18.20  18.41  18.81  18.89  18.94  19.47  19.17  18.98  19.56  19.44  19.56  19.50 
(]'1. '000 million)  1968  19.85  19.70  20.27  20.33  20.49  21.10  20.76  20.79  21.14  21.27  21.47  21.66 
1969  22.12  22.07  22.24  22.41  22.59  22.91  22.54  22.41 
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NOTES TO GRAPHS  AND  TABLES 
Source:  Statistical Office of the European Communities (except as  otherwise indicated). 
Conversion into units of account (1  u.a. = 0.888671 g of  fine gold = US $ 1) at the official exchange rates. 
Graph  1 
Trade  with non-member  countries:  series  adjusted  for  seasonal  variations;  three-month  moving  averages; 
exports fob, imports cif. 
Graph 2 
- Industrial production: trend curve; estimate established on the basis of indices of the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities (excluding construction, food, beverages and tobacco), adjusted for seasonal and for-
tuitous variations. 
Graph 3 
- Labour market: series adjusted for seasonal variations; three-month moving averages. 
Graph 4 
Wages and consumer prices: indices of gross hourly earnings in industry (excluding mining, quarrying and 
construction); index of agreed wages. Cost-of-living index, source: CBS. 
Graph 5 
Trade with other member countries:  series  adjusted for seasonal vanations;  three-month moving averages; 
exports fob, imports cif. 
Graph 6 
Bank lending: short-term bank loans. 
-----------------------
Table  1 
- GNP at market prices. 
- Industrial production: value added by industry. 
- Total exports and imports: goods, services and factor income. 
- Gross income per employee:  income from paid employment, including employers'  share of social insurance 
contributions. 
Table  2 
- Balance exports less imports: as  defined for the national accounts. 
- Unemployment rate; source: CBS; number of unemployed as  percentage of the civilian labour force in em-
ployment. 
Prices to private consumers: price index of private consumption adjusted by the GNP deflator, computed from 
the national accounts. 
Table  3 
- Exports fob, imports cif; conversion at official exchange rates; the products have been regrouped on the basis 
of the Statistical and Tariff Classification for International Trade (CST): food, beverages and tobacco (Groups 
0  and 1  CST), raw materials, fuel and power (Groups 2-4 CST), semi-finished and finished  industrial goods 
(Groups 5-9 CST). 
Table 4 
Industrial production: adjusted for seasonal variations, excluding construction and foodstuffs. 
Unemployed: end-of-month figures, adjusted for seasonal variations. 
Construction: seasonally adjusted number of dwellings authorized. 
Private consumers' expenditure: seasonally adjusted indices of department store turnovers. 
Consumer prices: not adjusted for seasonal variations. 
- Imports cif, exports fob; conversion at official exchange rates; figures adjusted for seasonal variations. 
- Balance of trade: difference between seasonally adjusted imports and exports. 
- Official gold and foreign exchange reserves: gross reserves of gold and foreign exchange at end of month. 
- Money supply: notes and coin in circulation excluding cash holdings of monetary institutions, plus sight depos-
its with credit institutions; seasonally adjusted end-of-month figures. 
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Belgium 
The  Belgian  economy  experienced  a  vigorous  economic  upswing  in  1969,  the 
strongest stimulus coming from  demand from  other Community countries.  Invest-
ment activity increased sharply,  while public and private consumption also  expanded 
rapidly.  The elastici!J'  of domestic  supply was  progressively  reduced  as  reserves  of 
production capacity  were brought into use.  There was  a distinct drop  in  unemploy-
ment and,  in the second half of the year, signs of mounting tension appeared on the 
labour  market.  Despite  an  accelerated  increase  in  imports,  the  upward  trend  of 
domestic  prices  was  appreciably  more  vigorous  than  in  the  previous  year.  Till 
September  the  boom  caused  a  steady  deterioration  in  the  current  account.  The 
situation Oil the money and capital markets became distinctly tighter than before. 
In  1970,  economic activity  will expand further,  but, largely  because  of an  increase 
in  the number of bottlenecks,  the growth rate  of production  is  likely to  be  lower 
than  in  1969.  With  world  demand  expanding  at  a  distinctly  slower  pace,  the 
main  stimulus  will  come  from  domestic demand.  Investment by enterprises  will 
again  expand in very lively  fashion,  and private consumption, too,  will rise rapidly. 
As the pressures affecting overall demand,  employment and production threaten to 
be more acute,  the current account  will probably  deteriorate.  The upward move-
ment of prices could also  be more marked than in 1969. 
1.  Developments in  1969 
The vigorous upswing in economic activity which 
has  been  discernible in Belgium  since  the sum-
mer  of  1967  gained  in intensity  during  1969. 
As  a result of  the accelerated growth of overall 
demand  and  the  progressive  exhaustion  of  re-
serves  of  production  capacity,  there  have been 
signs  of  growing  stress  on  the  markets. 
Demand from abroad was the main expansionary 
factor until the autumn of 1969.  In the closing 
months  of  the  year,  however,  there was  some 
tendency for  the expansion of exports of goods 
and  services  to  lose  momentum  because  of  a 
slackening  in demand from  a  number  of coun-
tries  which  are  major  customers  of  the  Com-
munity,  and  also  because  of  the  increasing 
bottlenecks  in  production.  Customs  statistics 
indicate  that  up  to  the  end  of  the  summer 
visible exports tended not only to increase more 
vigorously  than in 1968,  hut also  more rapidly 
than  world  exports.  While  for  the  year  as  a 
whole the average rate of expansion for exports 
to  non-member  countries  slackened  somewhat, 
this was more than offset by the acceleration of 
deliveries  to  other Community countries.  The 
overall growth rate of exports at current prices 
may  be more  than 20 %, as  against  15.3% in 
the  previous  year.  The  increase  in  terms  of 
volume  will  not  have  been  quite  so  high,  as 
export prices have hardened considerably. 
Since  earnings from  services  increased less  than 
earnings  from  visible  exports,  total  exports  of 
goods  and  services  as  defined  for  the  national 
accounts  are  likely  to have  increased  by  some 
18.5 % between 1968 and 1969, compared with 
93 11.7  rrr_,  a year earlier.  This is  the highest year-
to-year rate recorded since the Common Market 
was  established. 
Trade with non-member 
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Gross  fixeJ  asset  formation,  which  has  been 
making  an  appreciable  contribution  to  the 
economic upswing only  since  the second half of 
1968,  provided  a  strong  stimulus  to  domestic 
demand  throughout  1969.  The  rise  was  par-
ticularly  marked  in  investment  by  enterprises, 
where  the  trend was  influenceJ  largely  by the 
widening  of  profit  margins  which  has  been 
noted since  196  7,  and by the expansion of pro-
duction capacity made necessary by the growing 
pressure of demand.  In addition, investment by 
foreign  firms,  which  had  been  stagnating  in 
1968,  may  have  picked  up  again.  Residential 
construction, too, has shown a distinct recovery 
from the downward trend of the previous three 
years.  Similarly,  public investment in building 
and  construction  showed  a  further  fairly  sharp 
increase,  although  the  rate  of  growth  has  un-
mistakably  been  easing  largely  because  of  the 
greater  difficulties  encountered  in  providing 
finance.  All  in all,  gross  fixed  asset formation 
at  current prices  is  likely  to  have  increased  by 
about  14.5 %,  against  a  mere  1.8%  in  the 
previous year. 
The stimulus  provided by investment in stocks 
recovered  somewhat,  particularly  in  the  second 
half  of  the year,  firms  having  decided  that,  in 
view of the postponement of the introduction of 
TV  A,  they  should  do  something  about  replen-
ishing  their heavily depleted stocks. 
Consumer demand expanded slightly faster than 
in  1968.  Public current expenditure on goods 
and  services  maintained  the  very  high  growth 
94 
rate  alreaJy  noted  in  1968,  with  wages  and 
salaries,  in  particular,  rising  vigorously.  The 
expansion of private consumers' expenditure was 
even  steeper  than  in  the  previous  year;  it  in-
creased  by  about  9 %,  compared  with  7.1  % 
between  196  7  and  1968;  in  terms  of  volume, 
however,  the  increase  was  only  of  the  same 
order of magnitude as  in  1968  ( 5 % ) , because 
the rise in prices \\'as  appreciably more marked. 
Demand from households was affected mainly by 
the brisker expansion of gross incomes,  as  there 
has been only a  slight increase in the burden of 
taxation  and  the  savings  ratio  has  shown  no 
noteworthy change  on  1968.  The total  wages 
and salaries bill rose more rapidly than in  1968 
owing  to  the  greater  speed  with  which  both 
wage  rates  and  the  number  of  hours  worked 
have  been  advancing.  The  improvement  in 
hourly earnings  in industry can be estimated at 
some  8 %,  compared  with  5.5 %  in  1968. 
Public  transfer incomes,  too,  rose  considerably, 
in large  part as  a  result of the higher pensions 
introduced  in  the  middle  of  the  year.  As 
against this, incomes from entrepreneurship and 
property  may  bave  expanded  somewhat  more 
slowly  after the spurt noted in 1968. 
Parallel with the sharp increase in the pressure 
on  production  capacity,  the  elasticity  of  do-
mestic  demand  declined  appreciably  in  1969. 
The growth rate of industrial production, which 
had been somewhat more rapid until mid-1969, 
lost some of its dynamism in the second half of 
the  year.  For  the  year  as  a  whole,  the  value 
added by industry at constant prices  may  have 
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increased  by  some  9. 5 %, compared with  7 % 
in  1968.  Output  in  the  building  industry, Beltium
BUSINESSMEN'S  VIEWS ON THE INDUSTR,IAL SITUATION
AnswerB to the queetions iu tho EEC buginoes Burvofr carried out in Belgium by the National Bank.
GRAPIIS A, B, C and D : The throo coloure  (groon, yellow a,nd red) ehow the percenteges of the three different
onswora. Tho blaak curves, the eoale for which is given botween the graphs,  show the figures obteinod by adding
togother  tho percontagee  weighted  as follows :
by 0.03 for the &nawor "abovo Dormal",  or "up";
UV O.OZ for the angwer "normol", or "-go ohan[e";--
bi 0.0f for tho onawer "below normal", or "down".
Stocks offfnlehed products  B
Trend ln production  C Trend ls s6iltng prlcee
95which  was  no  more  than  moderate in  1968,  is 
likely to have expanded hardly less  rapidly than 
industrial  production  as  .a  whole.  It  appears 
on  the  other  hand  that agriculture,  because  of 
smaller  harvests  of  crop  products,  will  have 
made  only  a  very  limited  contribution  to  the 
growth  of  GNP.  Taking  increased  activity  in 
the services sector into account, GNP at constant 
prices should have risen by fully 6 %, compared 
with  a  3.8 %  increase  in  the  previous  year. 
This would be  the highest growth rate recorded 
since  1964. 
Since  growth  was  still  relatively  moderate  and 
because  productivity  gains  were  high,  the  im-
proved  level  of  economic  activity  in  1968  led 
to  no  more  than  a  slight  increase  in  numbers 
in  paid  employment.  In 1969, however,  there 
were signs of a larger increase : the  average for 
the  year  will  apparently  turn  out  to  be  some 
1.5 %  higher  than  in  1968.  The  decline  in 
unemployment  which  got  under  way  in  mid-
1968  continued  and  even  accelerated;  in  Sep-
tember  the  unemployment  rate1  was  down  to 
2.1  %, compared with 2.7% in  the correspon-
ding period of  the previous year.  At the same 
time  the  number  of  unfilled  vacancies  reached 
a  higher  level  than  at  any  time  since  1963, 
causing  fresh  signs  of  strain  to  appear  on  the 
labour  market. 
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for  certain  industrial  and  agricultural products, 
meant that in 1969 there was  a heavier demand 
for imports.  In contrast to 1968, imports from 
Community  countries  expanded  till  autumn 
more  rapidly  than  imports  from  non-member 
countries.  Customs  statistics  indicate  that  in 
terms  of  volume  total  visible  imports  were 
about  19  % higher than in 1968.  The increase 
in  overall  imports  of  goods  and  services-as 
defined for the national accounts and at constant 
prices-will have been about 16.5 %, compared 
with 12.9 % in the previous year. 
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The rise in domestic price levels was appreciably 
faster  during  1969.  This  was  due  in part to 
the vigorous increase in prices for farm products 
and  the  higher cost  of imported raw materials, 
but  also  to  internal  factors,  in  particular  the 
bias  towards  a seller's  market which  developed 
as  a  result  of  the  brisk  expansion  of  overall 
demand for manufactures and semi-manufactures. 
Wages and consumer prices 
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The  livelier  expansion  of  demand  and  produc-
tion,  coupled  with  bottlenecks  on  the  markets 
1  Fully unemployed in receipt of benefit as  percentag 
of civilian labour force.  Excluding the unemployed 
with  severely  limited  employability,  the  rate  was 
1.2 %, against 2.2 % in September 1968. 
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97 The  wholesale  price  index  rose  some  5 %  in 
the first nine months of the.  year.  At the same 
time  construction  costs  moved  upwards  as  a 
result of a boom in building activity.  Consumer 
prices  also  increased  appreciably;  in  October 
they were 3.5 %  higher than at the turn of the 
year,  and almost 3.9 %  above  the level reached 
in the corresponding period of  1968. 
Because  of  the  way  in  which  the  pattern  of 
foreign  trade  was  developing,  and  with  the 
terms  of  payment moving  against Belgium,  the 
tendency  for  the current account  to deteriorate 
which  had  been  discernible  since  early  1968 
persisted  in  1969.  On a  payments  basis,  the 
current account for the first eight months of the 
year closed with a deficit of Bfrs. 8 500 million, 
against  a  surplus  of  Bfrs.  400  million  in  the 
corresponding  period  of  the  previous  year. 
While the capital account  closed with a sizable 
surplus,  the  pattern  of  movements  involved 
developed  along  rather unsatisfactory lines:  net 
private  portfolio  investment  abroad  rose,  but 
there was a decline in direct foreign investment 
in  the Belgo-Luxembourg  Economic  Union and 
an increase in the foreign indebtedness of finan-
cial institutions in the public sector, particularly 
the  Societe  Nationale  de  Credit  a l'Industrie 
and the Belgian railways. 
Because  of  the  surplus  on  capital  account,  the 
overall  balance  of  payments  for  the  period 
January/  August  closed  with  a  deficit  of 
Bfrs.  400  million,  against  a  deficit  of  Bfrs. 
1 100  million  in  the  corresponding  period  of 
1968. 
Central  Bank  reserves  (including  foreign  trade 
claims)  were  nevertheless  Bfrs.  6 900  million 
down  in  the first  eight months  of  the year,  as 
the commercial banks, attracted by the relatively 
high  interest  rates  ruling  on  the  Eurodollar 
market,  stepped up  their  net  foreign  exchange 
holdings  by  Bfrs.  6 500  million.  After  the 
revaluation  of  the  Deutsche  Mark  in  October, 
the Central Bank increased its  foreign exchange 
reserves considerably. 
The incomplete data  now  to hand  suggest  that 
domestic  liquidity  expanded  more  slowly  than 
in  1968;  at  the  same  time  the  demand  for 
credit from business  and private customers  was 
growing more rapidly than in the previous year. 
In September bank lending to the private sector 
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was  16.5 %  above  the  level  reached  twelve 
months earlier. 
Because  of  the  vigorous  expansion  of  total 
lending  and  the  higher  interest  rates  ruling  on 
the  major  foreign  markets,  the  Central  Bank 
again  tightened  up  on  monetary  and  credit 
policy.  By September Bank rate had been raised 
from  4.5 %  to  7.5 %  in  five  stages  and  the 
conditions  for  bank  lending  were  repeatedly 
made  more  stringent.  The  ceiling  on  the 
growth of bank lending up till the end of  1969 
was  fixed  at  11.2 %  of  the level  of  lending  at 
31  December  1968.  The  rediscount  ceiling 
introduced  in  May  was  on  18  August  cut  to 
14 %  of liabilities and lowered in further stages 
till  it  was  12 %  on  31  December  1969.  On 
3 November the banks were in addition invited 
to  keep  the  total  volume  of  credits  for  hire 
purchase,  personal loans  and credit for  the pur-
chase or construction of buildings to be used for 
industrial, agricultural or artisan activities down 
to  the  level  obtaining  at  the  end  of  October 
1969. 
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A  more  determined  effort  was  made  in  1969 
to follow  a restrictive policy  in  the handling  of 
budgetary  expenditure,  but this  has  so  far  not 
proved entirely successful.  The ordinary budget 
should  none  the  less  remain  balanced,  as  was 
expected  when  the  draft  was  presented.  The 
net  borrowing  requirement for  the  year  should 
have fallen from  the  1968 level of  Bfrs.  33 000 
million  to  Bfrs.  30 000  million.  It  should, 
however,  be  noted  that  the  public  authorities 
made  considerable  use  of  short-term  borrowing 
to finance  their  deficits. Demand  for  and  supply  of  goods  and  services 
Exports 4 
Gross fixed asset formation 
Public current expenditure on goods and 
services 
Private consumers' expenditure 
Gross national product 
Imports 4 
1  Belgian Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
2  Commission estimates. 
3  Commission forecasts. 
4  Goods, services and factor income. 
Note: 
1967 1 
At 
current 
prices 
(in Bfrs. 
'000 
million) 
376.8 
216.7 
131.8 
614.0 
973.5 
368.7 
1968 1  1969 2 
I 
1970 8 
I 
% change on preceding year 
Volume  Value  Volume  Value  Volume 
+ 11.3  + 11.7  + 16Y2  + 18Y2  +  9Y2 
- 0.6  +  1.8  +  9Y2  + 14Y2  +  8Y2 
+  6.8  + 10.8  +  5  +  11  +  5 
+  4.9  +  7.1  +  5  +  9  +  5 
+  3.8  +  6.3  +  6  + 10Y2  +  5 
+ 12.9  + 13.8  + 16Y2  + 19  +  9Y2 
(a)  The difference between the figures for demand and those for supply is  accounted for by movements in stocks, 
(b)  The  estimates  and  forecasts  are  approximations  based  on  certain  hypotheses,  generally  mentioned  in  the 
Quarterly Surveys.  They have been discussed  with experts from the member countries but are established and 
published on the sole responsibility of the Commission. 
2.  Outlook for  1970 
A satisfactory assessment of the most important 
factors  which  could  influence  the  Belgian 
economy  in  1970 is  particularly difficult at this 
time.  It  is  to  be  expected  however  that, 
following  a  period  of  relatively  rapid  growth, 
the  expansion  of  production  will  slow  down 
largely  because  of  shrinking  productivity  gains 
but  also  because  of  a  possible  slackening  of 
demand.  At  the  same  time  there  is  a  danger 
that the conditions which influence  the  balance 
of the economy  may  as  a whole be even  more 
unfavourable than of late. 
Demand  from  abroad  will  certainly  not  be  as 
buoyant  as  in  1969.  It may  well  be  that 
developments  in  prices  and  costs  will  only 
slightly  impair  Belgium's  competitive  position, 
but  the  slower  growth  of  real  incomes,  both 
within the Community and elsewhere,  is  bound 
to  act  as  a  brake  on  the  rise  of  exports,  par-
ticularly in view of the existing export pattern: 
this  led,  during  the  period now ended,  to rela-
tively  rapid  advances  in  the  export  field  but 
may  well  work,  if  anything,  in  the  opposite 
direction  in  1970.  According  to  the  findings 
of the EEC Business Surveys, businessmen have 
been  less  optimistic  about  the  trend  of  foreign 
orders in recent months.  If the average growth 
rate of exports is  fairly high in 1970, it will be 
because  the level  reached  at  the  end  of  1969, 
adjusted  for  seasonal  variations,  was  already 
relatively high. 
99 The expansion of domestic demand may continue 
to be  very  lively  in 1970  and be  far  in excess 
of  any  increase  that  could  be  made  in  real 
domestic  supply. 
An  important  element  in  the  buoyancy  of  do-
mestic  demand  has  been  the  dynamism  of 
investment  activity.  Although  the  outlook  for 
business  activity  throughout  the  world  is  less 
rosy,  and  despite  the  restrictive  line  being  fol-
lowed  in  monetary  and  credit  policy,  the 
propensity to invest of managements is still high. 
Indeed,  the  latest  EEC  investment  survey  in 
industry shows  that they plan to expand invest-
ment outlay in 1970 by some 40 %. 
Investment in residential construction, however, 
having  been  boosted  in  1969  by  the  plan  to 
introduce TVA on 1 January 1970, may well be 
somewhat less buoyant, as  a large proportion of 
requirements will have  been covered by  invest-
ments  made  in  1969  and  as,  in addition,  more 
onerous  financing  conditions  are  likely  to  act 
as  a  damper  on  fresh  investment  in  this  field. 
In the public sector, the greater vigour expected 
in  local  authority  investment  may  be  offset  by 
the limits being placed  on the expansion  of  in-
vestment  expenditure  by  the  Central  Govern-
ment. 
Now that introduction of the tax on value added 
has  been postponed to  1 January  1971, invest-
ment  by  enterprises  in  stocks  will  provide  no 
more  than  a  limited  stimulus  for  economic 
activity. 
The rise in consumer expenditure may continue 
in  1969, mainly  because of heavier spending by 
individuals, but also because of outlays on goods 
and  services  by  the  public  authorities.  The 
upward thrust of wages and salaries may increase 
as  a result of the strained situation on the labour 
market.  Transfer  incomes,  too,  will  show  a 
further  appreciable  increase.  Even  if  it  is  as-
sumed  that  the  growth  of  income  from  entre-
preneurship  and  property will  be slower,  gross 
incomes  of  households  may  increase  more  than 
in  1969.  There  are  also  plans  to  introduce 
income tax reliefs  for  the lower income groups. 
Furthermore, the threatened upward movement 
of prices and a certain amount of advance buying 
in the second half of  the year to beat the intro-
duction of TV  A on 1 January  1971  could have 
a bad effect on the saving habits of households, 
so  that  the  expansion  of  consumer  demand  in 
100 
money  terms  could  be  stimulated  from  this 
quarter too. 
Despite the lower rate at which overall demand 
is  expanding,  the  degree  of  utilization  of  the 
factors of production will in general continue to 
be very  high.  In view  of the very  high  level 
already reached by the end of 1969, value added 
by  industry  at  constant  prices  could  come  to 
7 %,  a  little  more  than  the  average  growth 
recorded over the years  since  1958.  Given the 
slower growth of output in the building industry 
and activity in the service sectors,  and provided 
agriculture  enjoys  normal  weather  conditions, 
the  growth  rate  of  GNP  between  1969  and 
1970  at  constant  prices  can  be  estimated  at 
5%. 
Since the depleted reserves of production capac-
ity  mean  that  a  distinct  slackening  in  the ex-
pansion  of  output  per  man-hour  is  to  be 
expected,  industry's  manpower  requirements 
are likely  to increase;  unemployment can there-
fore  be  expected  to  decline  further  and  the 
situation on the labour market to become  more 
strained. 
As  the imbalance between domestic  supply  and 
the  expansion  of  demand  becomes  more  acute, 
imports are likely to go up considerably.  There 
should,  in particular, be an appreciable increase 
in  imports  of  finished  goods,  especially  invest-
ment  and  consumer  goods  from  other member 
countries.  Imports of raw materials and semi-
manufactures  on  the other hand should slacken 
somewhat, partly because of the reduced pace of 
domestic  production  and  partly  because  firms 
are likely to be more cautious in their approach 
to stockbuilding in the second half of the year. 
The  sharp  pressure  still  exerted  by  demand, 
coupled with the tendency for production possi-
bilities  to  decline,  the  probable  rise  in  wage 
costs per unit of output, and the increased cost 
of  imports  (due  in  part to  the  revaluation  of 
the DM), are so  many grounds for fearing  that 
the  internal  upward  movement  of  prices  will 
remain considerable if it does not actually gather 
more  speed.  In the circumstances,  it is  essen-
tial  that  the  restrictive  short-term  economic 
policy  adopted  in  1969  be  maintained  for  the 
time  being.  Indeed,  given  the  danger  of  a 
further  acceleration  of  the  upward  trend  of 
prices  and  the deterioration in the current  ac-
count,  a  tightening  of  restrictive  measures 
would seem to be in  order, especially as  existing sources of strain in the Belgian economy must be 
removed  well  before  the  introduction  of  TV  A 
if the  price  situation  is  not  to  be  aggravated 
by  the changeover  to the new  tax  system. 
In the  field  of  credit  policy,  the  Central Bank 
has already announced that the ceiling on lending 
will be maintained during the first half of 1970. 
The expansion of lending by the banks and other 
financing  institutions  will  be limited,  with due 
allowance for seasonal swings,  in  the same  way 
as  in the second  half  of  1969.  The rediscount 
ceiling,  too,  is  to  be  lowered  again  on 
31  March  1970,  bringing it to 10%.  Should 
it appear  in  the  next  few  weeks  that there  is 
a danger  of private consumers'  expenditure ex-
panding too rapidly, it might also become neces-
sary  to tighten up further on the conditions for 
hire purchase and  personal loans. 
The  draft  budget  for  1970,  drawn  up  on  the 
assumption that the introduction of TV  A would 
be postponed, provides for  the balancing of the 
ordinary budget, as in 1969.  When tax revenue 
that goes direct to the fund for economic expan-
sion  and  regional  conversion  is  taken  into  ac-
count, there is even a surplus of Bfrs. 5 000 mil-
lion.  If the ordinary and the exttaordinary bud-
gets  are  combined,  and  if  the  "conditional" 
appropriation to stimulate the economy (tranche 
conioncturelle)  is  taken  into  account,  total 
public expenditure would still be  rising by some 
13 %,  or more  than  the percentage  increase  in 
GNP in  money  terms.  Such  a  sharp  increase 
at  the  present  time  seems  completely  unjusti-
fiable from the angle of short-term policy, espec-
~ally  as  the  progressive  effect  of  taxation  is 
being weakened by  a partial alignment  of  rates 
on  the  rise  in  the  price  level  and  as  it would 
be  difficult  in  present  circumstances  to  gain 
acceptance  for  an  increase  in  the  burden  of 
taxation.  It  must  also  be  remembered  that, 
taken  overall,  the  expenditure  to  be  financed 
outside  the  budget  and  the  oudays  of  the  re-
gional  and  local  authorities  will  no  doubt also 
advance strongly.  In other words, no use ought 
to  be  made  of  the  contingency  appropriation; 
even if it is held in reserve, the Central Govern-
ment's  net  financing  requirements,  at  Bfrs. 
27 000  million,  will  once  again  be  higher  than 
in the years  prior to 1968. 
The full reduction in the borrowing requirement 
that is  desirable on grounds of short-term policy 
may  not in  fact  be  possible,  but it is  essential 
that considerably less use be made of short-term 
borrowing than was  the case  in  1969. 
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TABLE 3: Foreign trade (at current prices) 
% change on preceding year  Indices  Million  %of 
1958=100  u.a.  totals 
1964  I 
1965  I 
1966 I 
1967  I 
1968  1968  1968  1968 
Visible exports 
Total  + 15.5  + 14.2  +  5.2  +  3.0  + 16.0  267  8 155  100.0 
Intra-EEC  + 19.0  + 12.~  +  6.1  +  3.2  + 18.5  381  5 248  64.4 
To non-EEC countries  + 10.3  + 16.5  +  3.9  +  2.5  + 11.7  174  2 907  35.6 
Exports of food, beverages and tobacco 
Total  +  3 •)  + 31.5  +  8.4  + 18.8  + 15.5  418  640  7.8 
Intra-EEC  +  5.2  + 31.6  +  5.4  + 25.7  + 24.6  597  524  6.4 
To non-EEC countries  - 2.1  + 81.3  + 17.1  +  1.3  - 13.4  177  116  1.4 
Exports of raw materials, fuel and power 
Total  +  2.3  +  3.1  +  0.5  - 2.4  + 13.4  184  692  8.5 
Intra-EEC  +  5 •)  +  1.4  +  1.5  - 3.6  + 10.8  179  413  5.1 
To non-EEC countries  - 2.1  +  5.9  - 1.0  - 0.5  + 17.4  193  279  3.4 
Exports of semi-finished and finished industrial goods 
Total  + 18.5  + 14.4  +  7.7  +  2.3  + 16.4  271  6 823  837 
Intra-EEC  + 22.3  + 12.7  +  9.8  +  1.9  + 18.7  408  4 311  52.9 
To non-EEC countries  + 12.7  + 17.1  +  4.2  +  2.9  + 12.8  172  2 512  30.8 
Visible imports 
Total  + 15.9  +  7.6  + 12.6  0  + 15.3  264  8 276  100.0 
Intra-EEC  + 17.5  + 10.1  + 15.4  - 0.6  + 13.7  310  -!  533  54.8 
From non-EEC countries  + 14.0  +  -1.8  +  9.1  +  0.6  + 17.3  224  3 7-12  45.2 
Imports of food, beverages and tobacco 
Total  + 16.8  + 15.2  +  8.1  + 10.0  +  2.5  215  1 006  12.2 
Intra-EEC  + 16.3  + 22.5  + 10.6  + 11.8  + 23.7  334  519  6.3 
From non-EEC countries  + 17.2  + 10.6  +  6.4  +  8.6  - 3.3  156  487  5.9 
Imports of raw materials, fuel and power 
Total  + 14.3  +  1.5  +  1.1  - 2.1  + 22.8  193  1972  23.8 
Intra-EEC  + 12.9  +  3.1  +  5.2  - 5.5  + 17.6  160  678  8.2 
From non-EEC countries  +  4.4  +  0.6  - 1.3  - 0.2  + 25.7  217  1 29-1  15.6 
Imports of semi-finished and finished industrial goods 
Total  + 16.4  +  8.8  + 18.3  - 1.1  + 16.7  325  5 298  64.0 
Intra-EEC  + 18.9  + 10.3  + 18.4  - 1.1  + 13  383  3 336  40.3 
From non-EEC countries  + 12.1  +  6.2  + 18.1  - 1.2  + 23.6  258  1 962  23.7 
TABLE 4 : Selected monthly indicators 
I  Year I Jan.  I 
Feb. 
I 
Mar. 
I 
Apr. 
I 
J\Iay 
I 
June  I 
July 
I 
Aug. 
I 
Sept. I Oct.  I 
Nov.  I 
Dec. 
Industrial production  1967  111.1  112.1  110.9  113.2  108.4  111.8  110.4  112.7  111.5  113.8  112.4  119.3 
(1963  =  100)  1968  114.9  113.9  117.2  113.1  114.6  124.5  118.3  123.5  124.4  120.6  124.5  124.9 
1969  131.4  126.4  131.5  128.6  133.9  134.7  135.2  136.5 
Unemployed  1967  70.6  74.2  79.3  83.8  85.8  85.3  85.6  86.8  88.6  94.5  96.0  96.5 
(1 000)  1968  98.2  98.3  103.7  106.4  106.4  104.4  104.1  102.2  100.8  102.7  101.4  101.0 
1969  97.9  96.4  92.7  90.4  86.5  81.5  81.9  79.7  79.4  79.6 
Construction :  permits for  1967  2 861  3 048  2 944  3 18.3  3 464  3 644  3 449  3 054  2 790  2 864  2 772  3 057 
residential construction  1968  2 634  2 161  3 923  2 405  3 569  3 111  3 410  3 108  2 850  3 879  3 321  3 427 
(1 000)  1969  2 927  3 623  3 2.30  4 083  4 155 
Private consumers' expen  ..  1967  128  127  134  128  121  129  126  138  129  123  127  134 
diture :  department  store  1968  129  131  135  133  136  131  137  149  1~7  134  146  143 
turnover (1963  =  100)  1969  145  135  146  142  155  142  144 
Consumer prices  1967  114.24  114.45  115.02  115.83  116.23  116.31  116.10  116.42  116.90  117.14  117.49  117.65 
(1963  =  100)  1968  118.20  118.27  118.38  118.63  118.76  119.18  119.41  119.52  120.00  120.46  120.48  120.91 
1969  121.44  121.96  12~.62  122.95  123.32  123.65  124.10  12-!.28  124.78  125.18  125.42 
Visible imports  1967  605.0  565.9  594.6  572.2  603.8  651.7  490.4  641.6  511.9  618.9  687.2  629.6 
(million u.a.)  1968  633.4  706.0  702.6  643.5  704.3  609.7  658.1  690.7  665.9  769.7  703.1  692.1 
1969  765.6  778.2  775.4  809.7  826.5  883.2  850.5  794.5  864.9 
Visible exports  1967  608.5  571.1  583.4  599.3  586.8  582.5  526.0  573.4  530.5  648.5  619.0  650.1 
(million u.a.)  1968  622.2  675.7  654.5  705.8  667.5  603.4  695.1  681.8  676.9  747.1  706.0  758.0 
1969  844.2  698.9  737.6  804.1  831.5  806.8  867.9  753.0  914.5 
Balance of trade  1967  +  3.5  +  5.2  - 11.2  + 27.1  - 17.0  - 69.2  + 35.6  - 68.2  + 18.6  + 29.6  - 68.2  + 20.5 
(million u.a.)  1968  - 11.2  - 30.3  - 48.1  + 62.3  - 36.8  - 6.3  + 37.0  - 8.9  + 11.0  - 22.6  +  2.9  + 65.9 
1969  + 78.6  - 79.3  - 37.8  - 5.6  +  5.0  - 76.4  + 17.4  - 41.5  + 49.6 
Official  gold  and  foreign  1967  1 970  1 939  1 951  1 972  20-14  2118  2152  2 196  2 212  2 220  2 24-1  2 202 
exchange reserves  1968  2 168  2116  2 150  2116  2 090  1 996  1 972  1 964  1 888  1896  1 902  1 886 
(million u.a.)  1969  1 898  1 890  1 880  1 950  2 000  2 024  2 032  2 100  2106 
Money supply  1967  330.2  329.1  328.9  333.9  331.1  335.6  335.6  340.4  343.3  341.5  345.5  341.9 
(Bfrs '000 million)  1968  345.Y  346.4  352.4  355.7  358.5  361.8  337.3  365.6  361.9  363.0  368.0  367.3 
1969  368.0  373.8  374.7  378.0  377.4  382.2  375.1  380.1  374.0 
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NOTES  TO GRAPHS  AND  TABLES 
Source:  Statistical Office of the European Communities (except as otherwise indicated). 
Conversion into units of account (1  u.a.  =  0.888671 g of fine gold =  US $ 1) at the official exchange rates. 
Graph  1 
- Trade  with  non-member  countries:  s-.:ries  adjusted  for  seasonal  variations;  three-month  moving  a\·erages; 
exports fob, imports cif. 
Grapb 2 
- Industrial production: trend curve; estimate established on the basis of indices of the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities (excluding construction, food, beverages and tobacco), adjusted for seasonal and for-
tuitous variations. 
Grapb 3 
- Labour market: series adjusted for seasonal variations; three-month moving averages. 
Grapb 4 
- Trade with other member countries:  series  adjusted for  seasonal  variations;  three-month moving averages; 
exports fob, imports cif. 
Grapb 5 
- Wages and consumer prices: agreed wages for manual workers, all branches, source:  ,\linistere du Travml et 
de l'Emploi; consumer prices, source: i\rimstere des Affaires Economiques. 
Grapb 6 
- Bank lending: loans made by monetary institutions. 
Table  1 and 2 
Owing to revision of the national accounting arrangements in Belgium, the information needed for Table 1 
(Key indicators) and Table 2  (Indicators for internal and external equilibrium) was  not available when this 
Survey was prepared. 
Table 3 
- Exports fob, imports Clf;  conversion at official exchange rates; the products have been regrouped on the basis 
of the Statistical and Tariff Classification for International Trade (CST): foud, beverages and tobacco (Groups 
0 and 1 CST), raw materials, fuel and power (Groups 2-4  CST), semi-finished and finished  industrial goods 
(Groups 5-9 CST). 
Table  4 
- Industrial production; adjusted for seasonal variations, excluding construction, food, beverages and tobacco. 
Unemployed: end-of-month figures, adjusted for seasonal variations. 
Construction: seasonally adjusted number of residential bmldings authorized. 
Pn  vate consumers' expenditure: seasonally adjusted indices of departmc:nt store turnovers. 
Consumer prices: not adjusted for seasonal variations. 
Imports cif, exports fob; conversion at official exchange rates; tigures adjusted for seasunal variations. 
Balance of trade: difference between seasonally adjusted imports and exports. 
Official gold and foreign exchange resen·es: gross reserves of gold and foreign exchange at end of month. 
Money supply: notes and coin in circulation, excluding cash holdings of  the Treasury, the Central Bank and other 
banking institutions other than the Post Office giro; residents' sight deposits (up to one month) with bankmg 
mstitutions; sums held with the Post Office giro, the spec1al Treasury accountants and non-residents. 
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The Luxembourg economy expanded vigorously in  1969.  The main stimulus came 
frorn  greater activity in investment.  Production rose sharply.  Real GNP increased 
by about  7 %,  a  higher  growth  rate  than  any  attained since  1964.  The upward 
movement of prices  was  relatively  moderate. 
Economic growth  could slow down appreciably in  1970.  In particular,  there  may 
be  a distinct  easing  in  the  pace  at  which  exports  of iron  and  steel  products  have 
been expanding.  The expansion of gross  fixed asset formation could also  lose some 
of its dynamism.  As against this,  the upward trend of private consumers' expendi-
ture  should  gather  speed,  thanks  to  a  vigorous  increase  in  incomes.  There  is  a 
growing  danger  that  the  upward  movement  of  prices  will  gain  appreciably  in 
strength,  partly  because the cost of imports threatens to increase  further. 
1.  Developments in  1969 
The strong upswing in economic activity which 
got  under  way  in  Luxembourg  early  in  1968 
persisted  with  undiminished  vigour  in  1969 
without causing  undue  strain.  Although  there 
were signs  from  summer onwards  that produc-
tion  was  beginning  to  slacken,  real  economic 
growth in  1969 was  the highest achieved  since 
1964. 
The stimulus to production provided by demand 
from abroad gained further in strength until the 
summer.  The considerable  increase  in  exports 
can be attributed to a particularly brisk demand 
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1967  1968  1969 
for iron and steel,  and to growing sales  both of 
electric power and of goods produced by newly-
established  industries.  Exports  to  other Com-
munity  countries  speeded  up  very  appreciably. 
All  in  all,  the growth rate of exports  of goods 
and services should be distinctly higher ( 19.5 % ) 
than  in  the  previous  year.  The  increase  in 
terms  of  volume  will  be less  marked,  because 
1969 brought an  appreciable increase in export 
prices,  the first for  many years. 
The  expansion  of  domestic  demand  grew  per-
ceptibly  stronger,  largely  because  of  the  ex-
tremely  dynamic  trend  of  gross  fixed  asset 
formation.  Iron and  steel  enterprises  and  the 
industries  recently  introduced  to  the  country 
extended their investment programmes consider-
ably,  and  this  led  to  an  extraordinarily  rapid 
increase in fixed  asset  formation.  At the same 
time  investment  in  residential  construction  in-
creased  distinctly  faster  than  in  1968.  As 
against  this,  the  growth  of  public  investment 
expenditure was  not as  fast  as  in the previous 
year.  All in all,  it can  be estimated that gross 
fixed asset formation at current prices increased 
by 26.5% in 1969, against 7.5% in  1968. 
The  stimulus  provided  by  the  development  of 
public  and  private  consumption  continued  to 
be  very  strong in 1969.  Under  the  influence 
of  a considerable  increase  in  incomes,  expendi-
105 ture  by  households  on  consumption  again  ex-
panded with great  vigour.  Employment prob-
ably  incl'eased  somewhat  more  rapidly  than 
in  1968,  largely  because  there  was  no  further 
drop in numbers employed in the basic materials 
industries;  and in  the  iron and  steel  industry, 
where wage rates had risen considerably in 1968. 
gratuities  and  production  bonuses  were  also 
distinctly  higher.  Sizable  pay  increases  were 
awarded  in other industries  too,  and  the mini-
mum wage rate was  raised in June.  Although, 
in view  of  the heavier burden of  taxation  and 
social  security  charges,  the  increase  in  net  in-
comes  was less than the increase in gross incomes, 
the disposable incomes  of households  again  ex-
perienced  a  high  growth  rate  because  of  the 
increase  in  transfer  incomes  and  income  from 
entrepreneurship  and  property.  Private  con-
sumption at current prices  may  have  increased 
by  about  7.5 %  in  1969,  so  that  growth  was 
about the same as  in 1968. 
Domestic  demand  expanded  at  an  accelerated 
rate  in  1969.  Despite  some  weakening  of  in-
dustrial production towards the end of the year, 
industry's contribution to gross national product 
at  constant  prices  increased  by  about  12 % 
during  1969, against 6% in  1968.  Since  out-
put  in  the  other  sectors  of  the  economy  was 
also  more  vigorous  than  in  1968,  GNP  at 
constant prices should have risen by about 7 % 
as  compared with the 4 % of the previous year. 
Industrial production  1963  =  100 
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1967  1968  1969 
Although  the  more  lively  trend  of  production 
was  largely  explained  by  advances  in  produc-
tivity, employment increased faster than in 1968. 
This  led to  some  increase  in  the  pressures  felt 
on  the  labour  market  as  the  year  advanced-
106 
particularly in the building industry and in some 
service  industries;  the situation was  not helped 
by  the  fact  that efforts  to  step  up  recruitment 
of  foreign  workers  did not keep  pace  with the 
expanding  demand  for  manpower. 
Vacancies unfilled  number 
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1967  1968  1969 
There  was  an  appreciable  increase  in  recourse 
to supplies from  abroad.  Visible imports grew 
at  an  accelerated  pace  mainly  because  invest-
ment  in  plant  and  machinery  was  stepped  up 
considerably.  The  increase  in  total imports  of 
goods  and  services  between  1968  and  1969  at 
constant  prices  can  be  put  at  16.5 %, against 
9. 5 %  in  the previous  year. 
Because the elasticity of supply-and of imports 
in particular-remained high,  the price climate 
was  calm.  In  the  second  half  of  the  year, 
however, domestic prices  rose  somewhat faster, 
as  services  and  industrial  products-especially 
those  from  abroad-became  more  expensive. 
All  in  all,  the  consumer  price  index  rose  by 
2.3  %  during the first  nine months of 1969. 
Consumer prices  1965  =  100 
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196"  1968  1969 Luxembourt
BUSINESSMEN'S \rIEWS ON TIIE INDUSTR,IAL SITUATION
lnrq7616  to the questione in the EEC businoee survoy, oa,rried out in Grand Duohy of Luxombourg by STATEC.
)RAPES A, B, C and D : The threo oolours  (green, yellow and red) ehow the perc€ntages of the three difrersnt
r*-"o.  fire 6taot curvos, ths scale for whicf, is givbn botween the graphs, show tho figures obtained by edding
ogother  the percentagoo  woighted  as followg :
bv 0.03 for the &Dawor  "above normal", or "up";
bv 0.02 for the aDawor "nomal", or "no oha'ngo";
b; 0.01 for the aDawer "below nortrtal", or "down".
Stocks olflnlehed producte  B
Trend ln selltnP prlces  D
107Demand  for  and  supply  of goods  and  services 
119671  1968 1  1969  I  1970 a 
At 
current  % change on preceding year 
prices 
(in 
Lfrs. 
million)  Volume  Value  Volume  Value  Volume 
Exports 4  27 960  + 10.2  + 10.2  + 14Yz  + 19Yz  +  6Yz 
Gross fixed asset formation  8 883  +  3.2  +  7.3  + 18  + 26Yz  +  3 
Public current expenditure on goods and 
services  4 245  +  3.1  +  7.1  +  2Yz  +  7  +  2 
Private consumers' expenditure  21  648  +  4.3  +  7.0  +  5  +  7Yz  +  5 
Gross national product  35 412  +  4.0  +  7.1  +  7  + 13Yz  +  3 
Imports 4  27 324  +  9.4  +  9.5  +16Yz  + 19Yz  +  7Yz 
I 
1  Service central de la statistique et des etudes economiques (STATEC), Luxembourg. 
2  Commission estimates. 
3  Commission forecasts. 
4  Goods, services and factor income. 
Note: 
(a)  The difference between the figures for demand and those for supply is accounted for by movements in stocks. 
(b)  The  estimates  and  forecasts  are  approximations  based  on  certain  hypotheses,  generally  mentioned  in  the 
Quarterly Surveys.  They have  been  discussed  with experts from the member countries but are established and 
published on the sole responsibility of the Commission. 
2.  Outlook for  1970 
The  Luxembourg economy  will continue to  ex-
pand  in  1970  although  perhaps  with consider-
lbly  diminished  vigour.  Despite  the  progress 
Jeing  made  in  diversification,  exports  will  be 
:onsiderably  less  buoyant  in  view  of  the  ex-
Jected  easing  of  export  demand  for  iron  and 
>teel  products.  Even  if  the  slowdown  in  the 
!xpansion  of  sales  by  the  new  industries  is 
·elatively  modest,  it  appears  at  the  time  of 
;vriting  that total exports of goods  and  services 
Lt  current prices will increase between 1969 and 
l970  only  by  some  6.5 %. 
)omestic demand is likely to be affected by  the 
veaker expansion of gross fixed asset formation. 
nvestment by the new industries should admit-
tedly  show  a  marked  increase,  but investment 
in the iron and steel industry, which had made 
a  strong  recovery  in  1969,  may  flatten  out in 
1970.  There  should  be  a further vigorous  in-
crease in expenditure on residential construction 
despite  the  fact  many  building  projects  were 
brought forward  to 1969  to beat the introduc-
tion of TV  A.  The expansion of public invest-
ment could be slower in 1970.  All in all, gross 
fixed  asset  formation  at  current  prices  may 
increase  between  1969  and  1970  by  about 
12%. 
Consumption  expenditure  will  continue  to  ex-
pand very rapidly in 1970 and is likely to reach 
a higher annual growth rate than in 1969.  This 
is true of public, and particularly true of private, 
109 consumption,  as  wage  increases,  for  one  thing, 
could  turn  out  to  be  considerably  larger.  In 
the first  place,  it is  certain that further sizable 
improvements  in  wage  rates  will  be  approved 
in  connection  with  the  renegotiation  of  wage 
agreements, particularly in the iron and steel in-
dustry and in building.  In the second place, the 
increases  in  money  terms  resulting  from  appli-
cation of  the  sliding  wage  scale  will be higher 
than in 1969.  Moreover, because of the reval-
uation of the DM there may  well be a tendency 
for wages to rise to prevent manpower migrating 
to Germany. 
As  against  this,  employment  is  expected  to be 
less dynamic than in 1969.  If allowance is  also 
made for  the effect that purchases  brought for-
ward  to  beat  the introduction  of  TV  A  at  the 
end of  1969 will have on the pattern of spending 
by households,  it can  be estimated that private 
consumption  will  increase  between  1969  and 
1970 by about  11  %  at current prices. 
The expansion  of  domestic  supply  is  likely  to 
slacken  appreciably  in  1970.  Despite  the  high 
level  of  industrial  production  at  the  end  of 
1969,  the  average  growth  rate  for  the  year 
should-on the  assumption  that  the output of 
steel remains  practically unchanged-amount to 
no  more  than  3 %.  On the  assumption  that 
there will be a general  slackening  in the trend 
of output in other economic sectors, the growth 
rate of real GNP should be about 3 %. 
Imports  of  goods  and  services,  like  domestic 
production, will increase much more slowly than 
in  1969  as  there  will  probably  be  a  distinct 
slackening in imports of raw materials and semi-
manufactures.  None  the  less,  the  balance  on 
current transactions  is  likely  to be less  favour-
able  in  1970,  particularly  as  there  is  likely  to 
be a quite marked deterioration in the terms of 
trade. 
There  should  be  no  great  change  in  labour 
market trends in 1970.  Manpower requirements 
in the services  sector and in construction could 
increase  further,  while  industry's  requirements 
could decline. 
Forecasts  for  the  trend  of  prices  in  1970  are 
mainly influenced by the effects  that the intro-
duction of TV  A could have not only  on consu-
mer price levels but also on ,the cost of building 
projects  in  the  private  and  public  sectors. 
When  in  addition  allowance  is  made  for  the 
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higher cost of imported goods,  due in no small 
measure, but not exclusively,  to the revaluation 
of the Deutsche Mark, there is  clearly a risk of 
consumer  prices  hardening  appreciably  more 
than in  1969. 
The marked deterioration in internal equilibrium 
indicated by the forecasts for 1970 raises serious 
problems  with  regard  to  short-term  economic 
policy.  Early  in  November  the  Government 
announced  the  introduction  of  a  number  of 
restrictive  measures  which  can  be  summed  up 
as  follows:  credit,  and  in particular lending  to 
finance  expenditure  on  construction  and  con-
sumption, will be restricted; hire-purchase terms 
will  be  more  stringent,  a  closer  watch will  be 
kept  on  prices  and  trading  margins  will  be 
frozen  at their level of 1 November;  the sliding 
wage  scale  will  be  adjusted  to widen  the gap 
between the points at which it comes into opera-
tion,  and  the  two  sides  of  industry  will  be 
invited to stagger wage increases.  The proposed 
rates  of TVA,  and in particular those for some 
foods  and  pharmaceuticals,  are  to  be  lowered 
as  a temporary measure. 
Although  it  is  not  yet  possible  to  give  an 
accurate  assessment  of  the  effect  this  prog-
ramme will have, the general orientation of the 
measures  announced  does  seem  to  be  in  line 
with the requirements of the business situation. 
Special caution will still be needed in the matter 
of  budget  policy.  In  view  of  the  probable 
monetary and financial imbalances, the handling 
of budgetary expenditure and the methods used 
to finance any deficit should be such as  to help 
ease  the  strains  on  the  economy.  The  main 
lines of the 1970 budget, even allowing for  th~ 
latest  announcement  of  restrictive  measures. 
does  not  seem  to be entirely  in  line  with  thf 
requirements  of  the  situation.  It  shows  ar 
increase of about 6.5 % in ordinary expenditun 
and  overall  expenditure  will  be  as  much  a~ 
7.2 %  higher than in 1969.  The budget deficil 
stands  at Lfrs.  1 331  million as  compared  witt 
Lfrs.  1 096  million  in  1969, which means  tha1 
it will increase by  0.5 %  of GNP.  In additior 
to a higher deficit, there is  a risk of the author 
ities  making  even  more  use  of  short-term  bor 
rowing;  this  should  be  avoided  to the greates 
extent possible.  Moreover, care must be taker 
to ensure that there is no repetition of the  196~ 
pattern of considerable  over-spending  on item 
of ordinary expenditure. Luxembourg 
TABLE  1 :  Selected monthly indicators 
I  Year I  Jan.  I Feb.  I 
Mar. I  Apr.  I  May  I  June I July  I  Aug.  I  Sept. I Oct.  I  Nov.  I  Dec. 
Industrial production  1967  108.4  107.3  107.3  106.2  105.2  105.1  107.3  104.7  106.5  105.6  109.1  107.9 
(1963  =  100) 
1968  106.1  106.7  108.4  109.3  110.7  111.8  109.5  115.9  117.5  118.5  119.0  117.9 
1969  124.5  123.4  125.5  125.7  125.9  122.1  116.0  122.7 
Fnfilled vacaneies  1967  427  347  362  393  373  255  282  390  374  399  357  3.55 
1968  401  490  570  793  834  649  672  570  633  699  703  614 
1969  837  731  865  86li  983  554  831  658  733 
Construction :  permits for  1967  28  H  22  5  22  5  14  17  8  23  10  9 
re~idential construction 
1968  30  16  1.1  13  23  7  23  12  19  14  18  18 
1969  19  28  6  24 
Consun1er prices  1967  111.10  111.06  111.19  111.57  111.88  111.65  112.85  112.88  113.62  113.72  113.96  114.12 
(1963  =  100)  .... I"'·" 
1H.83  114.95  115.19  115.09  115.19  115.41  115.40  115.59  116.12  116.29  116.74 
1969  116.96  117.08  117.30  117.57  118.08  117.94  118.26  118.11  118.31  118.39 
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NOTES  TO GRAPHS AND  TABLES 
Source:  Statistical Office of the European Communities (except as  otherwise indicated). 
Graph 1 
- Orders in hand; source: EEC Business  Survey; balance between percentage of managements reporting order 
books to be above normal ( +) and those reporting them to be below normal (-). 
Graph 2 
- Industrial production: trend curve; estimate established on the basis of indices of the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities (excluding construction, food, beverages and tobacco), adjusted for seasonal and for-
tuitous variations. 
Graph 3 
- Unfilled vacancies: series adjusted for seasonal variations; three-month moving averages. 
Graph 4 
-Consumer prices; source: STATEC. 
Table  1 
- Industrial production: adjusted for seasonal variations, excluding construction and foodstuffs. 
Unfilled vacancies: seasonally adjusted end-of-month figures. 
Construction: seasonally adjusted number of residential buildings authorized. 
Consumer prices: not adjusted for seasonal variations. 
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Commission  Memorandum to the Council on  the 
maintenance of balanced economic growth 
'·  At a Council session of  12 December 1968, the 
; Commission  described  the  lines  of  short-term 
I  economic  policy  which  it considered  should be 
1 followed in the endeavour to deal with the prob-
i  lems  that the  economic  situation  in  the  Com-
, munity presented at the time.  Subsequently, in 
, the  first  half  of  1969,  the  economic  climate 
',  changed appreciably in several member countries 
and also  outside  the Community.  Some  of  the 
objectives which  the Commission had proposed 
in its Memorandum have been attained, but the 
problems  of  internal  equilibrium  are  still  far 
from  being  solved.  Most  Member  States  are 
faced  with the  emergence  or the  strengthening 
of inflationary  strains.  Arrangements  that pro-
vide  for  exceptions  to  the general  rules  impair 
the functioning of  the Common  Market. 
In  the  circumstances,  special  importance  at-
taches  to  the  Council's  examination  of  the 
economic situation and to the joint fixing of the 
lines  of  shorHerm  economic  policy  for  the 
coming  months. 
I. The situation  in  the  Community 
1.  General survey 
For  about  a  year  the  Community  has  been 
passing through a phase of boom in which eco-
nomic growth has  been unusually  rapid. 
Even  though there are  considerable  differences 
from  country  to  country,  essential  elements  in 
the  trend ,are  the  same:  investment  by  enter-
prises is  booming,  the expansion of expenditure 
on  consumption  is  gaining  speed,  and  intra-
Community  trade  is  growing  vigorously.  In 
most member countries, the expansion of produc-
tion  is  impeded  by  bottlenecks;  there  are  the 
characteristic  signs  of  a  very  high  degree  of 
utilization  of  the  available  capacities,  a  strong 
rise  in the level  of  orders  on  hand,  a  fall  in 
stocks  of  finished  products  held  by  industry, 
and a lengthening of delivery periods. 
When due allowance is made for probable devel-
opments  in  the  second  half  of  this  year,  the 
growth  of  the  real  gross  Community  product 
from  1968 to 1969 can already be put at about 
6.5  %,  a rate which has not been reached since 
1960. 
The rapid expansion of  production was  accom-
panied  by  an  appreciable  decline  in unemploy-
ment.  There are, however, fairly sharp contrasts 
in the pattern:  on the one hand there is  an un-
mistakable  manpower  shortage,  on  the  other, 
certain regions and industries are stjll faced with 
unemployment  because  workers  are  not  suffi-
ciently  ready  to  take  up  new  occupations  or 
move  to new areas. 
Price increases have in most  member countries 
assumed  disquieting  proportions.  The  key  to 
this  trend  is  the  strength  of  excess  demand 
coupled,  in  several  countries,  with  an  appre-
ciable  rise  in production costs. 
The  rise  in  wage  incomes  has  in  all  Member 
States  been lively  in  the  past  few  months;  in 
most  it  has  even  tended  to  gather  additional 
momentum.  The  other  types  of  income  have 
also been expanding distinctly. 
The  strains  inherent  in  the  business  situation 
are  also  evident  in  the  trend  of  foreign  trade. 
Since  the beginning of  the year,  the Communi-
ty's  balance  of trade has  tended to deteriorate; 
trends  in  the  individual  Member  States  have 
been  similar  although  differing  in  strength, 
particularly  as  import  demand  has  not  been 
showing  the same  vigour everywhere. 
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clear:  the Community has drifted into a process 
of inflation,  and what is  now needed is  action 
to prevent this process from gaining in strength 
during the next few  months. 
2.  The situation in the various Member States 
In France,  the  expansion  of demand continues 
to  exert  heavy  pressure  on  resources.  This 
expansion,  which is  based on the dynamism  of 
investment by  enterprises  and  on  the  strength 
of  private  consumption,  has  till  very  recently 
been  supported  by  the  creation  of  liquidity 
through  the  transactions  of  the  banks  and  the 
Treasury.  Strains  on  the  labour  market  have 
increased  and prices,  which in  the first  quarter 
had  shown  a  comparatively  satisfactory  trend, 
are  rising.  The closeness  to a state of full  em-
ployment  appears  to  be  conducive  to  sharper 
wage  increases.  Although  exports  are  doing 
quite well,  the balance of trade continues to be 
in heavy deficit as  a result of very high imports. 
Despite the restrictions placed on capital move-
ments by exchange control there have, for both 
commercial and speculative reasons, been further 
heavy  outflows  of  foreign  currency  since  the 
beginning of the year. 
In the Netherlands,  the upswing of production 
is  increasingly  hampered  by  bottlenecks.  The 
labour  market  in  particular  is  no  longer  suffi-
ciently elastic to satisfy the growing demand for 
labour, particularly as  the remaining pockets of 
unemployment  are  very  unevenly  distributed 
from  region  to  region.  After  the  introduction 
of the  tax  on  value  added,  prices  in  the  first 
four months showed such an unusually rapid rise 
that in April the Netherlands Government intro-
duced a temporary price freeze.  The deficits on 
current  account  (on  a  transactions  basis,  not 
adjusted for seasonal variations)  and on private 
movements of long-term capital were more than 
offset by an improvement in the leads  and lags 
and by imports of short-term capital. 
In Belgium,  production has  until recently been 
able  to  follow  the faster  expansion  of demand 
comparatively  well,  but  the  price  climate  has 
deteriorated.  Reactions to the plan to introduce 
the tax on value  added on  1 January 1970 are 
incidentally  likely  to  give  a  vigorous  boost  to 
private  consumption  even  now,  and  so  to 
strengthen the tendency  towards  imbalance. 
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The trend of the current account  in the Belgo-
Luxembourg Economic Union has been satisfac-
tory,  but  exports  of  private  capital  have  run 
at a very high level, mainly because of the higher 
interest rates on the international markets. 
Luxembourg is  facing problems similar to those 
in Belgium, but less pressing. 
In Germany,  the  scope  for  expansion  has  nar-
rowed considerably since the end of 1968;  this 
is  particularly evident  in the acute  shortage  of  ' 
manpower.  Demand appears  to be maintaining 
its  rapid  expansion.  Exports  and  investment  1 
continue  to  develop  along  decidedly  dynamic  . 
I 
lines  and the rise in pr.ivate  consumers'  expen-
diture is tending to accelerate.  The price climate  : 
is  deteriorating.  Despite  a  boom  that  has  i 
brought  full  employment,  the  balance  of  pay- '. 
ments  continues  to  show  heavy  surpluses  on  ! 
current  account;  exports  of  capital,  however,  ' 
have  been  substantial  enough  for  the  basic : 
balance to be  at present in deficit. 
1 
Italy appears  to be the country where there is 
currently the greatest chance  that the elasticity 
of supply  will  be high  enough  to  ensure  rapid 
expansion while maintaining stability of prices. 
Except in building and construction, the expan-
sion of output is  obviously not being hampered 
to any significant extent by either a shortage of 
manpower or lack of tedmioal production capac-
ity.  The  situation  may,  however,  deteriorate 
soon  if,  as  must be expected,  the expansion of 
domestic  demand  and  the  rise  in  wage  costs 
accelerate considerably.  The surplus on current 
account has been shrinking;  the heavy outflows 
of capital have led to a fall  in official gold and 
foreign  exchange  reserves  and  are  making  it 
more difficult to finance economic expansion. 
II. The problems 
1.  World economic problems 
The expansion of world trade is  still fairly vig-
orous,  ·even  though-as  foreoast  in  the  Com-
mission  Memorandum  of  December  1968-its 
tempo  slowed  down  further  in  1969,  mainly 
because of the efforts by the United States and 
Great Britain  to dampen  demand  at home. 
The  upward  thrust  of  prices  in  the  American 
economy  remains  strong.  Consequently,  the 
monetary  authorities  have  gradually  intensified their drive to limit the expansion of the volume 
of money.  The American banks, whose liquid-
ity  came  under  pressure  as  a  result  of  both 
'  the strong demand for credit and  the policy  of 
restriction,  made  such heavy  calls  on the Euro-
dollar  market that interest rates on this market 
reached  exorbitant  levels.
1 
For  the  Community,  the  American  policy  of 
dampening economic activity has had three con-
sequences.  Firstly,  the  rise  in  exports  to non-
member countries has slowed down, though not 
very  sharply  so  far;  secondly,  the  outflow  of 
private  capital  has  expanded  substantially,  and 
thirdly, it has since November 1968 been neces-
sary to raise interest rates on the money markets 
to an unusually high level. 
The  outlook  for  the  further  trend  of  interna-
tional  trade  and  payments  is  at  the  moment 
particularly  uncertain.  The  key  to  the  trend 
will be the way in which the American economy 
reacts  to  the  anti-inflationary  measures.  The 
extent to which these measures bite will in the 
last  resort  determine  how  severe  American 
money  and  credit  policy  will  in  the  event  be, 
and it will also  influence  the  trend of  interest 
rates on the international capital markets. 
On the trend of world trade, the most probable 
hypothesis is  that imports by  the United States 
will  decline.  This  decline  may  already  be evi-
dent in the second half  of  the year  since  there 
are  various  indications  that the growth of  pro-
duction,  which  at  the  beginning  of  1969  was 
still considerable,  may  flatten  out in the  fairly 
near  future.  Profit  margins  are  shrinking  and 
the investment plans of enterprises, which have 
so  far  been  stepped  up  vigorously  and  whose 
implementation  has  in  the  recent  past  practi-
cally  safeguarded  economic  growth,  are  now 
somewhat  less  substantial;  the  volume  of per-
mits  for  residential  construction  is  contracting, 
and the disposable incomes of households appear 
to be no longer rising as  strongly as  before.  As 
selling  becomes  more  difficult,  there  may  be a 
tendency  to  run  down  stocks,  and  this  might 
entail  a weakening  of  production.  Should this 
happen,  imports  by  the  United  States  would 
suffer  disproportionately. 
1  Between mid-November and mid-June, the interest 
rate  for  three-mc>nth  loans  rose  from  6. 9  ',' ;)  to  a 
peak of 12.5  s~. 
As  Great Britain,  too,  has  reason  to persevere 
with  an  extremely  cautious  import  policy,  the 
result would be a cooling down of world trade, 
with direct or indirect repercussions  that could 
probably  not be offset by  an  expansion  of im-
ports into the Community. 
If the cooling process were to assume consider-
able proportions, this would help to reduce the 
excess  demand  within  the  Community.  The 
Member  States  whose  current  account  shows 
heavy surpluses would have a chance to achieve 
a  more  balanced  pattern  of  payments  with 
abroad.  Those Member States, however, whose 
current account is  in deficit would find it more 
difficult to return to external equilibrium. 
A  slowdown  in  the  expansion  of  world  trade 
will not, incidentally, lead as  a matter of course 
to an easing of the strains at present felt on the 
capital  markets,  especially  the  Eurodollar 
market.  If the upward movement of prices  in 
the United States does not slacken considerably, 
the  monetary  authorities  may  indeed find  that 
they  have  to  continue  their  restrictive  policy 
for  some  time.  The effects  which  this  would 
have on the general business climate both in the 
United  States  and  in  Europe  are  difficult  to 
assess.  It is,  however,  quite reasonable to as-
sume  that a  steady  cooling  down of  economic 
activity  in  the  world,  coupled with the persis-
tence  of  difficult  financing  conditions,  will  in 
the end induce managements in the Community 
to  cut  down  their  investments.  The  current 
situation in the EEC must be  seen  against  the 
background of  these world economic problems. 
2.  Problems facing  the Community 
For  the first  time  in many  years  all  Member 
States of the Community are simultaneously in a 
phase  of  rapid  expansion.  Demand  in  money 
terms is  already or may  soon be-though with 
differences  of  degree-in excess  of  the  supply 
that the individual economies can mobilize.  The 
result  is  that  the  transfer  of  any  supply  still 
available  to  place  it  at  the  disposal  of  those 
member  countries  where  the  strains  are  more 
serious  is  no longer  enough  for  the differences 
developing in the rate of inflation to be reduced, 
and  that  the  exporting  countries  are  exposed 
to a growing pressure of demand from  abroad. 
This enhances the danger of a cumulative infla-
tionary proces>  in the Community. 
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come overheated is, however, not equally strong 
in  all  Member States,  and it must in  any  case 
be  looked  at  against  a  background  of  widely 
varying balance-of-payments situations.  The pre-
cise  steps  that must  be  taken  if  the  margin  of 
excess  demand in the Community is  to be elim-
inated  and  a  better  equilibrium  established  in 
the  price  and  cost  relations  between  Member 
States  and  in  intra-Community  trade  are,  of 
course,  largely  a  function  of  these  differences. 
With a  view  to overcoming  at least  the most 
pressing  difficulties,  Member  States  have  for 
some  time  been  resorting  more  and  more  to 
arrangements  that  constitute  exceptions  to  the 
general rules,  by introducing exchange controls 
(which  involve  the  development  of  parallel 
markets), or by imposing restrictions on capital 
movements,  special taxes  on visible trade, price 
controls,  etc. 
In the circumstances, care must be taken to see 
that the necessary  return to equilibrium in  the 
basic economic aggregates is  brought about in a 
way that makes it possible to rescind  the emer-
gency  arrangements  at  an  early  date,  for  after 
the  degree  of  integration  achieved  previously, 
these  arrangements  are  a  step backward  and  a 
serious obstacle to further progress on the road 
to economic union. 
Ill. The guidelines of short-term eco-
nomic policy in the Community 
1.  Immediate requirements 
The difficult economic problems facing the Com-
munity  internally  and  externally,  the  need  to 
bring national priorities into harmony with the 
general aim  of a return to equilibrium in the ba-
sic  economic aggregates  of the Community, and 
the  growing  economic  interdependence  of  the 
Member  States  urgently  require  the  develop-
ment of a joint strategy and co-ordinated action. 
This does  not mean that the corrections to eco-
nomic trends should be made  against  the  back-
ground of an  adjustment inflation or an  adjust-
ment deflation.  The individual countries should 
instead  seek  to  use  the  right  mix  of  economic 
policy instruments in such a way that the meas-
unes  being taken in the Community at any given 
time are in harmony with each  other, involve a 
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minimum  of  social  costs  for  the  individual 
countries and make it possible to attain the ob-
jectives of Article 104 of the Treaty of Rome. 
In the present  situation,  the Commission  takes  1 
the view that top priority must be given to the 
removal of inflationary tendencies.  It is  espec-
ially insistent on this point because it has  since 
1967  been  consistently  calling  for  an  expan-
sionary  policy,  which  was  warranted  by  the 
economic trend observed in the various member 
countries during the past two years.  Today, the 
Commission must warn against the threat of an 
inflation that would have  serious  economic and 
social  consequences  for  the  Community;  mod-
ernization  of  the economy  and  the adjustment 
of  economic  structures  would  be  impeded,  be-
cause  one  result  of  inflation  would  be  the  re-
tention  of  factors  of  production  in  industries 
with  low  productivity,  or  in  marginal  enter-
prises.  The deterrent effects of the inflationary 
process  on private saving  would upset the bal-
ance of the financing circuit.  In addition, infla- : 
tion  would  once  again  hit the socially  weakest 
1 
groups, as  their income usually adjusts to rising  ' 
prices  only  with  a  considerable  time  lag,  and 
they are the least able to hedge against declines 
in the purchasing power of money. 
The struggle against  inflation is  in addition in-
dispensable if confidence in  a currency is  to be 
maintained;  it therefore  helps  defend currency 
parities, which must remain  stable if  the Com-
mon Market is  to function smoothly. 
Rapid and energetic action is  needed-and per-
haps  now  more  than at any  other time-if the 
Community  is  soon  to  return  to  a  stable  and 
healthy situation, failing  which it would hardly 
be  in a position  to  resist  a possible  setback in 
the  world  economic  trend.  In  view  of  the 
uncertainty  hanging  over  the  international eco-
nomic  trend,  it is  indispensable  that  the Com-
munity  should  restore  equilibrium  in  the  basic 
economic aggregates. 
To  defer  the  necessary  measures  would  only 
aggravate  the  imbalances  that  are  to  be  found 
both at  Community level  and in  the individual 
Member  States.  It  would  mean  jeopardizing 
economic growth and job security in the months 
ahead and call in question the smooth function-
ing of the Common Market and the cohesion of 
the Community. 2.  General  guidelines 
Faster  mobilization  of  economic  resources 
through increased use  of the internal factors  of 
'  production and recourse  to imports is  certainly 
the best way of closing the existing or potential 
gap between supply and demand.  In its Memo-
randum  of  December  1968  the  Commission, 
when dea1i:ng with structural policy,  recommend-
ed that intensive use  should be  made  of these 
methods;  its opinion on this point remains un-
changed.  In particular,  it emphasizes  the need 
to  step  up  the  efforts  for  vocational  training 
and retraining  of  labour  so  that the structural 
unemployment that still persists can be eliminat-
ed  and  the  available  manpower  used  more 
productively.  The policy  of  throwing the mar-
kets  open  and  encouraging  competition,  which 
the Community  pursues  in  the  field  of  foreign 
trade,  is  also  an  important  instrument  in  the 
struggle against inflation.  In addition, the mar-
l kets  with  imperfect  competition  must  be  su-
i pervised  more  closely.  It  also  goes  without 
i saying  that  the  Member  States  must  refrain 
!  from  all measures which might have an  adverse 
effect on  the elasticity of supply,  especially  the 
mobility of the factors of production. 
The pressure of inflation is,  however, so  strong 
and  it  takes  such  a  long  time  for  structural 
measures to lead to an  expansion of production 
that  today  there  is  an  unanswerable  case  for 
strict  discipline  in  connection  with  the  expan-
sion  of  demand.  What  this  requires  is  not  a 
large-scale  action  leading  on  to  a  recession but 
an  effort  to  keep  the  expansion  of  demand  in 
money  terms  within  the limits  that are  set  by 
the growth of overall supply. 
With the changes  that have occurred on the in-
ternational  money  and  capital  markets  since 
1968,  those  responsible  for  credit  policy  have 
little margin for manceuvre.  The higher interest 
rates  introduced because  of rising  rates  on the 
major international markets were in  most cases 
also  intended to  dampen domestic  demand.  In 
the  countries  with heavy  surpluses  on  current 
account,  however,  the raising of domestic inte-
rest rates to bring them into line with the inter-
national rates must not be carried too far, as this 
would  severely  hamper  the  exports  of  capital 
which  are  needed if these countries are  to off-
set  their  surpluses  on  current  account  and  to 
hold  down  the level  of  domestic  liquidity.  In 
such circumstances it would evidently be better 
to switch more to those instruments which have 
a direct effect on bank liquidity and credit.  In 
this  context it should be pointed out that as  a 
rule  the effects  of  money  and credit  policy  on 
actual  demand make  themselves  felt  only  after 
a  certain  time,  particularly  if  transactors  have 
already  adjusted their behaviour to  an  inflatio-
nary rise in prices. 
Even though credit restrictions and higher inte-
rest  rates  must contribute  to  the  desired dam-
pening of economic activity, still greater impor-
tance attaches to budget policy in the efforts to 
regulate  demand.  The  advantage  offered  by 
budget policy is  that the restrictions in the indi-
vidual  member  countries  can  be  more  easily 
mixed  and  therefore  more  closely  co-ordinated 
at  Community  level.  It allows  of  regulatory 
measures  that are  better adapted  to  the causes 
and  the scale  of  the imbalances. 
Generally,  the  impetus  at  present  being  given 
by the budgets must be reduced.  In the coun-
tries  which  have  to  fight  against  exceptionally 
strong  tendencies  towards  imbalance,  strict 
limits  should  be  placed  on the  rise  in public 
spending  and  any  budget  deficit  should  be 
financed from  domestic saving.  Any excess  tax 
receipts should in all countries be used to reduce 
public indebtedness, or even frozen in the Cen-
tral Bank.  If  this  proved  insufficient  to place 
the necessary check on the expansion of demand, 
consideration should be given, depending on the 
tax burden in each country concerned, to  either 
an  increase  in  direct taxation or a  reduction in 
certain  types  of  public  spending,  particularly 
subsidies, and to spreading other types of public 
expenditure over longer periods of time. 
Care  should in addition be taken to avoid con-
centration  of  spending  in  the  areas  and  indus-
tries  hardest  hit  by  the  strains  caused  by  the 
boom.  Some of the relevant decisions  could be 
taken immediately.  In addition, the budgets for 
1970 should provide, if economic developments 
in  the  country  concerned so  require,  not  only 
for a distinct slowdown in the growth of expen-
diture but also  for  measures  in the field of di-
rect taxation, for the possible withdrawal of tax 
incentives  to  investment,  and  for  a  change  in 
certain indirect taxes. 
In the present situation it also  seems  advisable 
to  encourage  certain  forms  of  private  saving, 
particularly saving by employed persons.  Consid-
el1ati.on  should in this  context be given to rais-
117 ing  interest  rates  on  savings  deposits,  which 
allow of adjustment as  interest rates charged to 
borrowers have  risen. 
The policy  required to  restore equilibrium will 
necessarily  involve  temporary  sacrifices.  All 
transactors must, however, become conscious of 
the new requirements of the economic situation 
in the Community and  of the discipline  that is 
needed to protect the currency.  Only if all em-
ployers and employees contribute actively to the 
implementation  of  a  coherent  policy  can  it 
succeed,  only  then  will it be  possible  to  avoid 
more  painful  adjustment  subsequently.  The 
agreement  recently  concluded  in  the  Nether-
lands Economic and Social Council could in this 
respect serve as  a model. 
3.  Guidelines  for  the Member States 
In Franoe,  the necessary return to basic equilib-
rium  calls  for  the  maintenance  of  a  rigorous 
monetary and financial policy.  If applied strict-
ly, the credit policy measures currently in force 
can  be expected gradually to produce results in 
the  second  half  of  this  year.  Any  premature 
relaxation  would  be  detrimental  to  the  attain-
ment of the aims  envisaged.  Care must at the 
same time be taken to see that the way the bud-
get  is  implemented  really  does  not  lead  to  a 
heavier  deficit  than  was  laid  down  in Novem-
ber last  year  when  the  Finance  Act  for  1969 
was  adopted.  Any extra tax receipts  should be 
used  to reduce  the  deficit.  Moderation in  the 
expansion  of incomes  remains  a  basic  require-
ment if the policy of restoring equilibrium and 
defending the currency, pursued after the events 
of May  1968, is  to prove  a success  and if eco-
nomic activity and employment are at the same 
time  to  be  kept  at  as  satisfactory  a  level  as 
possible. 
In the Netherlands, the agreement concluded in 
June in the Economic and Social Council could 
prove  of  great  help  in  the  struggle  against  a 
wage/price  spiral.  In the  final  analysis,  how-
ever,  this  move  will  be  successful  only  if in 
1970  the  authorities  combine  the  already  res-
trictive monetary policy  with rigorous  handling 
of  the  budget,  particularly  in  connection  with 
taxes. 
In Belgium, the effects which the system of tax 
on value added,  to be tintroduced at the begin-
ning of 1970, will have on the price trend will 
be kept within bounds only if this change takes 
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place in a comparatively calm economic climate. 
The budget should  therefore be  handled  along 
particularly  stringent  lines  and  the  restrictive 
bias of credit policy maintained with a view  to 
ensuring that demand does not get out of hand 
1 
at  the end  of  1969 and create a difficult  situa-
tion. 
In the  Grand Duchy  of Luxembourg,  too,  the 
budget needs  to be handled  cautiously.  Closer 
co-ordination between the two sides of industry 
is,  however, indispensable if a price and  wages 
spiral is to be avoided. 
In  Germany,  every  effort  must  be  made  to 
avoid  too  strong  an  expansion  of  demand, 
which would entail an appreciable rise  in prices 
in  the  months  ahead.  At the  same  time,  how-
ever,  care  must  be  taken  to see  that  action  to 
obtain  the  required  reduction  in  the  surpluses 
on current account is not thwarted by an unduly 
strong  dampening  of  domestic  demand.  The 
room  for  manreuvre  open  to  those  responsible 
for  economic  policy  is  therefore  very  narrow. 
1 
Demand  should  in  the  main  be  managed  by 
budgetary  means;  in  particular,  extra  tax  re-
ceipts  should still be frozen  and  the growth of 
public  sector  spending curbed.  For balance-of-
payments  reasons,  on  the  other hand,  the ins-
truments  of  monetary  policy  should  be  used 
with caution only.  Exports of capital should be 
maintained at a high level as  a means  of offset-
ting  the  surplus  on  current  account  and 
sJphoning off domestic liquidity. 
In  Italy,  the  prospective  acceleration  m  the 
growth  of  domestic  demand  warrants  greater 
restraint on the part of the authorities.  In par-
ticular, there appears to be a case for exercising 
caution  in  the  public  finances,  particularly  as 
heavy  additional  burdens have  been  placed  on 
the  budget  since  the  beginning  of  1969.  A 
cautious  line  in  budget  policy  must,  however, 
not  impede  the  maintenance  of  an  economic 
expansion that is compatible with the optimum 
utilization  of resources.  For the  rest,  it seems 
advisable  that  measures  should  be  taken  to 
check  certain  unusual  exports  of  capital,  the 
most  important  being  arrangements  that  could 
make  the  conditions  £or  investment  on  the 
Italian capital  market more  attractive. 
Conclusions 
Summing  up,  the  Commission  notes  that  the 
Community is  at  the  moment caught up in an inflationary process that must be brought rapid-
ly under control. 
Energetic, rapid action must be taken if the im-
'  balances  are  not  to grow even  further  and be-
come  a  permanent  feature;  they  would  then 
entail  a  sharp  rise  in  costs,  and  this  in  turn 
would seriously  damage  the competitiveness of 
several  Member  States.  Such  action  is  all  the 
more  urgent  as  the  Community  must  quickly 
restore equilibrium in its basic aggregates  so  as 
to be in a position to counter the  deflationary 
tendencies  that may  result  from  any  easing  in 
the  world economic  trend. 
It will in any case be necessary to eliminate the 
inflationary  tendencies  if  the  cohesion  of  the 
Community is  to be safeguarded, confidence in 
the stability of the currencies strengthened and 
the stage set for the removal, at the earliest pos-
1  sible  date,  of  the  present  exceptional  arrange-
i  ments,  which  impair  the  Common  Market's 
' ability  to function. 
The policy recommended by the Commission is 
' not aimed  at bringmg about a recession but at 
avoiding it, while there is  still time, by putting 
the Community's  economy  on a  sound footing. 
The  Commission requests  the Council  to agree 
not only to these aims but also  to the means by 
which they are to be achieved, and notably: 
( i)  Systematic mobilization of  the available  re-
sources  so  as  to increase overall supply, mainly 
by means of measures in the field of vocational 
training and retraining of labour; 
( ii) Limitation of the growth of overall demand 
in money terms to correspond with the possibil-
ities  of  expanding  overall  supply;  this  should 
be achieved more through rigorous budget policy 
than  through measures  of  monetary  and credit 
policy,  which  are  already  in  wide use  and for 
which  the  margin  of  manceuvre  has  been nar-
rowed  by  developments  on  the  international 
money  and capital markets; 
(iii) Active participation by both sides of indus-
try in the drawing up and implementation of an 
economic and social policy in the Member States 
that  can  preserve  the  conditions  for  balanced 
economic growth. 
By  making  concerted  efforts  on  these  lines, 
member countries can overcome the current dif-
ficulties  and  ensure  that  the  economic  growth 
they need will not clash with the necessary sta-
bility in the Community. 
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